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Introduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. Although these chapters
study dierent questions and contribute to distinct branches of the literature, they
are related with respect to the research questions and the applied methods. First,
all chapters represent contributions to public economics, reecting my research
interest in a better understanding of the interdependence between the economic
and the political spheres. The rst two chapters concentrate on the subeld of po-
litical economics. They study political competition, i.e., the strategic interaction
of politicians and citizen that represents the basis of all political decision-making
in democratic systems. The incentives created and the results brought about by
the political process determine why, how, and when political decision-makers in-
tervene in the economic sphere. The third chapter contributes to the theory of
optimal income taxation. The analysis thus studies and evaluates the economic
eects of one of the most visible and controversial types of political interventions,
but leaves aside the political decision-making process.
Second, despite many dierences, the results of all chapters are derived us-
ing theoretical models. More precisely, all chapters apply microeconomic theory,
with a particular focus on game theory and information economics. Addition-
ally, the second chapter includes an empirical analysis that allows to confront its
theoretic results with real-world observations.
Chapter 1 The rst chapter of this thesis contributes to the economic theory of
electoral competition. In contrast to most of the previous literature in this eld,
it studies political competition between endogenously formed parties instead of
independent candidates. In the model, party formation allows policy-motivated
citizens to nominate one of their fellow party members as their candidate for a
general election and to share the cost of running in this election. Thus, like-
minded citizens are able to coordinate their political behavior in order to improve
the policy outcome. The chapter investigates the properties of stable parties and
the policy platforms oered by these parties in equilibrium. It focuses on political
1
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equilibria with two active parties, which exist for all levels of membership cost
and electoral uncertainty. The equilibrium platforms of both parties can neither
be fully convergent as in the median voter model (Downs, 1957) nor extremely
polarized as in the citizen candidate model (Besley and Coate, 1997). In the bench-
mark case of full electoral certainty, a unique political equilibrium with positive
platform distance exists. Endogenous party formation thus eliminates a major
weakness of the citizen candidate model, the extreme multiplicity of equilibria.
The model remains tractable, and the qualitative results are shown to be robust
under the assumption of electoral uncertainty, where vote results cannot be per-
fectly predicted.
Chapter 2 The second chapter of the thesis is a slightly modied version of
a joint paper with Andreas Grunewald and Gert Pönitzsch (Grunewald, Hansen,
and Pönitzsch, 2013). It contributes to a growing literature on political selection
and its failure due to informational asymmetries, i.e., on the capability of choosing
qualied political candidates by means of public elections. The chapter investi-
gates whether the quality of political selection can be improved through political
institutions and, specically, through variations in the concentration of political
power. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their abilities and
driven by oce rents as well as welfare considerations. We show that variations
in power concentration involve a trade-o. On the one hand, higher concentra-
tion of power enables the voters’ preferred politician to enforce larger parts of his
agenda. On the other hand, higher power concentration increases electoral stakes
and thereby induces stronger policy distortions. We identify a negative relation
between the optimal level of power concentration and the extent of oce moti-
vation. In particular, full concentration of power is only desirable if politicians
are prevalently welfare-oriented. The results of an empirical analysis are in line
with this prediction.
Chapter 3 The third chapter of this thesis contributes to the theory of optimal
income taxation. The classical result in this literature is that optimal marginal
taxes are strictly positive everywhere below the top, whenever labor supply re-
sponds only at the intensive margin and the social planner holds a utilitarian
desire to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor (Mirrlees, 1971). De-
parting from the classical framework, the third chapter of this thesis studies op-
timal income taxation in a model with labor supply responses at the intensive
and the extensive margin. For this empirically more plausible model, it is shown
that a utilitarian desire for redistribution does not pin down the signs of optimal
marginal taxes and optimal participation taxes. The chapter also provides su-
2
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cient conditions for the optimality of tax schedules with negative marginal taxes
and negative participation taxes for the working poor, complying with the main
features of the US Earned Income Tax Credit. Furthermore, it uncovers a non-
standard tradeo between eciency at the intensive margin and eciency at the
extensive margin, which provides the economic intuition behind the ambiguous
sign of the optimal marginal tax.
3

1
Political Competition with
Endogenous Party Formation and
Citizen Activists
1.1 Introduction
This chapter studies electoral competition between two endogenously formed po-
litical parties. The agents in this model are policy-motivated citizens who are not
only entitled to vote but can also join political parties. Parties serve as twofold
coordination devices. First, the members of each party make monetary contribu-
tions to the parties in order to nance an exogenous (campaign) cost of running
in the general election. Second, they jointly decide about the party’s presidential
candidate in primary elections. Parties can commit to policy platforms by nom-
inating one of their party fellows with appropriate policy preferences as their
presidential candidate. As party membership is costly, the agents will only be-
come active if the induced policy gains resulting from this activity are suciently
large to outweigh the cost of political activity. In this model, party platforms can
be interpreted as local public goods that have to be provided and agreed on by
the party members. Agents make their membership decision on the basis of the
same policy preferences that also govern their voting behavior. There are two
exogenous parameters, the cost of party membership and the degree of electoral
uncertainty.
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Most of the existing literature on political competition studies the policy plat-
forms proposed by a set of independent candidates that do not engage in party
formation. This chapter instead simultaneously investigates the characteristics
and platform choices of stable political parties. In a political equilibrium, no citi-
zen has an incentive to change his party aliation, taking into account the eect
of his deviation on the party platforms. Political equilibria can be characterized
by the tuple of policy platforms oered by the parties and a partition of the set
of agents into the set of independents and the membership sets of both parties.
I concentrate on political equilibria with two active parties, which exist for all
combinations of the exogenous parameters.
The focus of this chapter is on the eect of endogenous party formation on
the equilibrium policy platforms and the implied degree of policy convergence or
polarization, respectively. The main contribution is to show that the equilibrium
distance between party platforms is bounded from below as well as from above.
This in in contrast to the results of the citizen candidate model by Besley and
Coate (1997). Intuitively, parties can only attract citizens that are willing to incur
the membership cost if their platforms are suciently dierent. Thus, there can
never be too much (or even full) policy convergence. On the other hand, political
polarization is limited by the desire to oer competitive platforms and by the
coordination enabled by political parties. If both platformswere too polarized, the
members of each party would prefer to nominate a more moderate presidential
candidate in order to increase the probability of winning the general election.
In this situation, independent citizens with moderate policy preferences would
indeed benet from becoming politically active as the achievable policy gains
would outweigh the membership cost.
The properties of political equilibria depend on the degree of electoral uncer-
tainty and on the membership cost. As the electoral risk increases, the attrac-
tiveness of moderate platforms is weakened, and more extreme platforms can be
supported in equilibrium. Put dierently, if the electoral outcome becomes less
predictable, the upper bound on the platform distance becomes larger while the
lower bound remains unchanged. In the limiting case of full electoral certainty,
both bounds coincide and a unique pair of policy platforms can be oered in equi-
librium. With respect to the second exogenous parameter, both boundaries on the
platform distance increase as the membership cost gets larger. Intuitively, citizens
ask for more dierence in the policy platforms and higher policy gains in order
to be willing to engage politically. Combining these comparative statics, it can be
shown that the classical prediction of full policy convergence to the median voter
is only sustainable for the twofold limiting case of full electoral certainty and zero
costs of political activity.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. After sketching the related literature in sec-
tion 1.2, the model will be presented in section 1.3. In sections 1.4 to 1.6, the game
is analyzed and the main results for a given pair of the exogenous parameters
are derived. In section 1.7, I present comparative statics with respect to member-
ship costs and the degree of electoral uncertainty. For the special case of electoral
certainty, the existence of a unique political equilibrium is derived. Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Related literature
The model builds on the citizen candidate framework introduced by Besley and
Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). In both versions of this model,
the set of candidates is determined endogenously from the set of citizens who
are not only entitled to vote in a democratic election, but can also decide to run
as (individual) candidates, facing an exogenous cost of candidacy. There are no
parties, and citizens cannot coordinate their political behavior. The models do
not deliver a unique theoretical prediction but a multiplicity of political equilibria
with either one or two candidates. Their main insight is that the endogeneity of
the candidate set eliminates the possibility of completely convergent platforms
in two-candidate equilibria. This impossibility result is in sharp contrast to the
classical prediction of the median voter model by Downs (1957) and the proba-
bilistic voting model by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), but is in line with empirical
observations. In both versions of the citizen candidate model, there may however
be equilibria with arbitrarily polarized candidates. In the model by Besley and
Coate (1997), the platform distance in two-candidate equilibria is only bound by
the extremes of the policy space.1
A number of papers extend the basic citizen candidate framework to accom-
modate political parties. For example, Rivière (1999) studies the formation of
parties as cost-sharing devices and provides a game-theoretical explanation for
Duverger’s law, i.e., the prevalence of two-party systems under the plurality rule.
The same result is derived in a dierent environment by Osborne and Tourky
(2008), who analyze the incentives to form parties within a group of legislators
under the assumptions of costly participation and economies of party size. In
contrast, Levy (2004) examines whether the formation of political parties can be
eective in the sense that it enables oering platforms that would not be feasible
1In the version of Osborne and Slivinski (1996), there is large set of equilibria with potentially
large, but limited polarization. In contrast to the analysis in this chapter, however, the upper
bound on the platform distance results from the assumption of sincere instead of strategic
voting and is not related to the candidates’ behavior or coordination.
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without parties. Morelli (2004) studies the implications of alternative electoral
systems for the formation of parties by agents with heterogeneous policy prefer-
ences. Snyder and Ting (2002), as well as Poutvaara and Takalo (2007), show that
parties may serve as brand names or screening devices, which provide superior
information about the candidates’ preferences or quality, respectively.
In contrast to this chapter, these papers do not examine the eects of endoge-
nous formation of political parties on political polarization. Directly related to
this issue, they do not show that party formation alleviates the (often criticized)
indeterminacy of the basic citizen candidate model. Furthermore, these papers
either consider only the case of electoral uncertainty or strongly restrict the type
space. In this chapter, I will instead study the implications of endogenous policy
formation on platform choice in a general setting, allowing for dierent degrees
of electoral uncertainty as well as a continuum of agents without restrictions on
the location of bliss points.2
To my knowledge, only one previous paper investigates the eect of political
parties on platform choice within the citizen candidate framework. Cadigan and
Janeba (2002) study party competition in a US-style presidential election with pri-
mary elections and identify a strong connection between membership structures
and party platforms. Instead of endogenizing membership decisions, however,
they assume exogenous party aliations of the citizens. The drawback of this
model is that any combination of platforms represents a political equilibrium for
some membership structures. As they cannot distinguish between stable and un-
stable membership structures, the model only delivers very limited insights into
the eects of party formation. Furthermore, Cadigan and Janeba (2002) do not
consider the general case of electoral uncertainty.
In addition, there is a small number of papers on the formation of political par-
ties outside the citizen candidate framework. Most closely related, Roemer (2006)
studies the eects of endogenous party formation and campaign contributions by
policy-motivated citizens. Similar to my model, the unique political equilibrium
of Roemer’s model features positive but limited platform distance. However, both
models dier considerably in many aspects. Most importantly, Roemer applies
the cooperative notion of “Kantian equilibrium” in which agents consider joint
(proportional) deviations of all party members at the contribution stage. The im-
plications of this equilibrium concept dier strongly from the non-cooperative
notion of Nash equilibrium that I will apply in my model.3 Furthermore, the plat-
2Dhillon (2004) provides an overview over the existing theoretical models with pre-election as
well as post-election party formation, with a particular focus on papers that extend the citizen
candidate model.
3For example, every citizen is member of one party in the model of Roemer (2006) while there is
a (large) set of independents in any equilibrium of my model.
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forms are chosen through a Nash bargaining process in which the agents’ inu-
ence is proportional to their individual contributions in his model. In my model,
in contrast, there are primary elections wherein each party member has exactly
one vote.
In other papers, citizens only decide whether to support exogenously given po-
litical parties by contributing to their electoral campaigns (Herrera, Levine, and
Martinelli, 2008; Campante, 2011; Ortuño-Ortin and Schultz, 2005). Although
there is no endogenous party formation in these models, citizens have an indi-
rect inuence on policy platforms, which are chosen by the parties, taking into
account the induced contribution behavior. Poutvaara (2003) also models endoge-
nous party formation and predicts a positive but limited platform distance. How-
ever, the results are mainly driven by the assumption that agents make their mem-
bership decisions based on expressive objectives while, in my model, they follow
from strategic membership decision and cooperation between like-minded citi-
zens.4
Finally, this chapter also relates to the literature on probabilistic voting and
electoral uncertainty, beginning with the seminal paper of Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987). Eguia (2007) studies the eect of electoral uncertainty in the citizen can-
didate model. Without party formation, electoral uncertainty has the eect of
increasing the set of political equilibria with two candidates by allowing for asym-
metric equilibria. However, electoral uncertainty per se does not lead to additional
centripetal forces and does not limit political polarization. Both models focus on
the behavior of individual agents and do not examine the eects of party forma-
tion.
1.3 The model
There is a continuum of citizens N of mass one. The policy space X is one-
dimensional and given by the real line (−∞,+∞). The citizens have linear Eu-
clidean preferences and heterogeneous bliss points wi. Thus, if policy x ∈ X is
implemented, citizen i receives a policy payo of
vi(x) = − |x− wi| . (1.1)
4Besides, there exist a few models on endogenous formation of political parties under propor-
tional electoral systems in which the implemented policy is given as a weighted sum of the
party platforms (e.g. Gomberg, Marhuenda, and Ortuño-Ortin 2004; Gerber and Ortuño-Ortin
1998). Due to the incentives given by this electoral system, these models typically predict an
extremely high level of political polarization.
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The distribution of bliss points in the population has full support on R, but is
not known ex ante. The population median m is commonly perceived to be the
realization of a random variable with twice continuously dierentiable cdf Φ and
pdf φ. In particular, I assume that m is perceived as normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation σ.5 As the median voter will be decisive in the
general election, this assumption induces electoral uncertainty.
A general election with plurality (“winner-takes-all”) rule takes place to choose
a president who is entitled to implement policy. There are two parties, the leftist
party L and the rightist party R. The election is party-based in the sense that
only the two parties have the right to nominate presidential candidates who run
against each other in the general election. In order to nominate a candidate, how-
ever, each party is required to pay an exogenous cost C of candidacy, which must
be nanced jointly by the members and supporters of each party. The presiden-
tial candidate of each party is determined in a series of pairwise primary elections
in which all party members are entitled to stand for oce and to vote. Neither
a party nor a candidate is able to make a binding policy commitment prior to
the general election. As will become clear later on, the bliss point of the leftist
(rightist) party’s candidate can consequently be interpreted as policy platform l
(r).
The membership structures of both parties are not given exogenously. Instead,
they follow endogenously from the citizens’ optimizing behavior. Specically, cit-
izens choose their aliation by making contributions αPi ∈ [0,∞) to the parties
P ∈ {L,R}. The utility of citizen i ∈ N is linearly decreasing in his contribu-
tions, and given by
vi(x)− αLi − αRi (1.2)
if policy x is implemented. Agent i becomes a member of party P ∈ {L,R}
if and only if he contributes αPi ≥ c. Thus, c represents the cost of political
activity, which may correspond to monetary costs, but can also be interpreted
as hours worked and eort spent for the electoral campaign and party meetings.
To rule out that only degenerate parties are formed in equilibrium, I assume that
c < C/2 is satised. Each citizen can join one party at most.6 The result of the
5The assumption of a normally distributed population mean is motivated by an extension of
the central limit theorem. This theorem states that, for a sample with a sucient number of
independent and identically distributed random variables, the distribution of the sample mean
approximates a normal distribution. Ma, Genton, and Parzen (2011) discuss the conditions
underwhich the same result applies for the distribution of the samplemedian and other sample
quantiles.
6This assumption simplies the following analysis without aecting the results. It can be shown
that no citizen wants to be a member of both parties in any political equilibrium. Note also
that it is possible to support a party without becoming its member (for αPi < c) or to con-
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party formation game is a partition of the set N into the member sets of each
party (ML,MR) and the set of independents (I) such that N = ML ∪MR ∪ I .7
The political process consists of four stages. At the rst stage, all agents i ∈ N
simultaneously choose their party aliation bymaking contributions to both par-
ties αLi , α
R
i ≥ 0. Party P becomes active and is entitled to nominate a presidential
candidate if and only if
∑
i∈N α
P
i ≥ C . At the second stage, a series of pairwise
primary elections is conducted in each active party to select the presidential can-
didate. In the pairwise elections of each party, only the respective party members
are entitled to vote. In the subsequent general election, the Condorcet winners of
each party’s primaries run as presidential candidates.8
At the third stage, the population median is drawn and the general election be-
tween the nominated presidential candidates takes place. All citizens observe the
identities, i.e., the bliss points, of both presidential candidates and simultaneously
cast their votes. The winner is determined according to the plurality rule and be-
comes president. If there is only one active party and presidential candidate, he
directly enters the presidential oce. At the last stage of the political process, the
elected president implements some policy x ∈ X . The candidates are not able
to make binding policy commitments at earlier stages of the political process. If
there is no active party, a default policy x0 ∈ R is implemented.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 depict the timing of the game and its information structure
graphically. At the rst stage, the citizens simultaneously choose their contribu-
tions (αL, αR), which induce a partition of the agent set N into the membership
sets of both parties ML, MR and the set of independents. Note that gure 1.1
only depicts two possible membership structures for each party (e.g. ML1 , M
L
2 )
in order to illustrate the basic structure, although there is an innite number of
possible membership structures in general. At the rst stage, each agent i ∈ N
must hold beliefs about the resulting membership structures and the platforms
that would arise in case of his membership in any party as well as in case of his
independence. These beliefs determine the expected eect of his political activity
on his individual payo and must be consistent in equilibrium.
At the second stage, the members of each party jointly choose their presidential
candidate and the policy platform, respectively. With respect to the information
structure, I assume that at the time of candidate nomination, themembers of party
P ∈ {L,R} can observe the set of their party fellows (MP ) and their bliss points,
tribute more than the exogenous membership cost. The additional generality of this nancing
structure has no eect on the result of the model.
7As Iwill show in the following sections, themember sets of both parties are nite in any political
equilibrium.
8As shown in the following section, the existence of a Condorcet winner is guaranteed for each
nite membership set.
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Figure 1.1: The party formation subgame
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but not the membership set of the competing party (M−P ). For the members of
party R, all nodes involving membership setMR1 are thus contained in the same
information set I1(R) =
{
(ML,MR) |MR = MR1
}
. Similarly, the members of
party L can neither observe the membership set MR nor the chosen platform
r of the rightist party when they decide about their own platform l. Rather, the
information set I1(L) =
{
(ML,MR) |ML = ML1
}
consists of all nodes involving
the same membership setML1 , but dierent setsM
R and platforms r.
Thus, a specic form of updating takes place at the beginning of the second
stage: Members of the leftist party can perfectly update their previous belief about
the leftist party’s membership structureML, while their beliefs aboutML remain
constant. Consequently, the members of party L must hold a belief about MR
and the nally chosen platform r in each information set (see gure 1). In the
following, I will only consider the belief rˆ about the competing party’s platform r
explicitly, as this is the only payo-relevant variable (in contrast toMR). After the
primary election stage, the nominated candidates and the associated platforms of
both parties become public information, and all citizens update their beliefs rˆ as
well as lˆ. The remaining stages of the game are depicted graphically in gure 1.2
below.
This information structure simplies the analysis while it does not change the
qualitative results of the model. In particular, lower and upper bounds on the
platform distance in political equilibria could also be identied under the alterna-
tive assumption that all agents can observe both member setsML andMR at the
primary election stage.9
9Given this information structure, the analysis of deviations from equilibrium is simplied con-
siderably. If a previously independent agent deviates by joining party L, this will in general
12
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An allocation is given by a tuple of party platforms (r, l) (the presidential can-
didates’ bliss points) and a partition of the population into the sets of party mem-
bers and independents. A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is given by a
strategy prole and a belief system such that, rst, the strategies are sequentially
rational given the belief system and, second, the belief system is derived from the
optimal strategies everywhere on the equilibrium path. Additionally, I assume
that agents do not play weakly dominated strategies at the candidate selection
stage and vote sincerely at the general election stage.10 The goal of this chapter
is to identify the set of equilibrium platform combinations and the correspond-
ing set of stable membership structures. I concentrate on political equilibria in
pure strategies with two active parties.11 In the following, I will solve the model
backwards starting with the policy implementation stage.
Figure 1.2: The general election subgame
m
(l , r) 
xx
0
V
president 
t = 3
t = 4
L R
induce a change of platform l. The members of party R cannot react to this deviation by
changing their platform r, however, since they are not able to observe the deviation. In the
alternative case of fully observable membership sets at the second stage, the same change in
the party aliation of one agent might induce platform changes in both parties. Due to the
nite set of feasible platforms, however, the implied reaction function of the competing party
would in general be discontinuous and depend strongly on the specic composition of MR.
Accounting for these best responses would thus require a large number of case distinctions.
10At the general election stage, the assumption of sincere voting seems innocuous. With any
nite set of voters and only two alternatives, sincere voting would be the weakly dominant
strategy. With a continuum of voters, the notion of weak dominance is not properly dened
since no voter can ever be pivotal. The economic intuition however does not change, leaving
sincere voting as the only reasonable equilibrium behavior.
11In general, there may also exist political equilibria in mixed strategies and equilibria in which
there is only one active party with a suciently moderate platform (see appendix).
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1.4 Policy implementation and general election
The last two stages of the game can be solved straightforwardly. At the last stage,
the elected president decides which policy to implement. Assume agent i with
bliss point wi is the president. Recall that he was unable to commit to any policy
before. He can thus maximize his individual payo vi(x) = − |x− wi| by imple-
menting his bliss point x = wi. This policy choice is anticipated by all agents at
the previous stages. Thus, the nomination of agent i as presidential candidate by
party L implies a (credible) commitment to his individual ideal policy wi. In the
following, I will thus interpret the ideal policies of both presidential candidates
as the parties’ policy platforms l and r.
At the general election stage, all citizens vote for one of the parties or one
of the nominated presidential candidates, respectively. The bliss points of both
candidates are known. For clarity, we denote these bliss points by l and r, as they
represent the platforms oered by both parties L and R. As a convention, the
party with a more leftist platform will be called party L, and its platform will be
denoted by l such that l ≤ r holds.
All citizens vote sincerely in the general election. Thus, citizen i ∈ N votes
for the party whose platform is closer to his own bliss point wi, and the median
voter’s preference prevails. Thus, the leftist party L will win the election if and
only if its platform l is located more closely to the median voter’s bliss point m
(the population median) than platform r, i.e., ifm < l+r2 holds.
Ex ante, however, the agents do not know the exact location of the population
median m ∈ R, but only its probability distribution. Thus, the winning prob-
ability p(l, r) of party L is equal to the value of the distribution function at the
arithmetic mean of both platforms,
p(l, r) = Φ
(
l + r
2σ
)
. (1.3)
Obviously, the winning probability is increasing both in l and r (for l < r). Be-
sides, note that the random distribution ofm induces electoral uncertainty as all
agents assign positivewinning probabilities to both parties for any combination of
l and r ex ante. As I will show in the following section, this electoral uncertainty
implies a smooth trade-o between the subjective desirability and the winning
probabilities of alternative party platforms, which is in line with the economic
intuition and often referred to in political discussions. To simplify notation, we
focus on the case of a standard normal distribution with σ = 1 in the following.12
12In section 1.7, I study the eects of variations in electoral risk, as captured by σ.
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1.5 Candidate selection
At the candidate selection stage, the members of both parties simultaneously
nominate their presidential candidates. As the nomination process in both parties
is completely symmetric, I will only consider intra-party decision making in the
leftist party L. To avoid case distinctions, I impose the simplifying assumption
that each party has an odd number of members.13
At this stage, both member setsML andMR have been determined as the out-
come of the party formation game at the rst stage. By the assumed information
structure, the members of party L can only observe the compositionML of their
own party (see gure 1). For each information set Ik(L), however, they hold a
belief rˆ about the resulting platform of the rightist party.
The presidential candidate is selected by the members of party L in a series of
pairwise elections. This procedure will lead to a clear-cut decision if and only if
one member represents a Condorcet winner, i.e., if a majority of member prefer
one agent i ∈ ML to all other potential candidates. Lemma 1.1 states that a
Condorcet winner exists for any combination of member setML and belief rˆ.
Lemma1.1. LetML be the set of members of partyL,mL the partymedian and rˆ ≥
mL the commonly held belief about party R’s platform. The selected candidate of
party L is given by the member with bliss point l(ML, rˆ) = max
{
mL, lM (rˆ,M
L)
}
,
where lM (rˆ,M
L) ≡ arg max
{wi:i∈ML}
(rˆ − wi)p(wi, rˆ)
First, note that candidate selection serves only as a device to commit to the
preferred platform, as the agents’ utilities do not depend on the identity of the
candidates. Conditional on platform l and belief rˆ, the expected policy payo to
member i of party L is given by
v˜i(l, rˆ) ≡ p(l, rˆ)(− |l − wi|) + [1− p(l, rˆ)] (− |rˆ − wi|)
= p(l, rˆ) {|rˆ − wi| − |l − wi|} − |rˆ − wi| . (1.4)
Each member would like to choose l in order to maximize his individual policy
payo, given the expected platform of the competing party rˆ. For illustration, look
at the preferences of a leftist citizen such that wi < rˆ holds. Obviously, he would
never choose a platform l > rˆ as this would imply an even lower policy payo
than a certain implementation of policy rˆ. Furthermore, no platform to the left
of a member’s bliss point can be individually optimal, since any platform l < wi
leads to a lower winning probability p(l, rˆ) as well as a lower policy payo in case
13For an even number of members, only minor changes occur, while the qualitative results remain
valid.
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of winning (compared to wi). For platforms in the remaining interval [wi, rˆ], the
policy payo function simplies to
v˜i(l, rˆ) = p(l, rˆ)(rˆ − l)− (rˆ − i).
In this interval, the platform preferences involve a trade-o between the prob-
ability of winning p(l, r) and the subjective desirability (l − wi). As platform l
approaches rˆ, member i benets from an increasing winning probability of party
L, but receives a lower payo in case of electoral success. Each member prefers
the platform which induces the largest shift of the expected policy towards his
bliss point. In order to measure this shift, I dene the policy eect function
Γ(l, rˆ) ≡ (rˆ − l)p(l, rˆ) = (rˆ − l)Φ
(
r + l
2
)
. (1.5)
In the appendix, I show that this function is strictly quasi-concave for the case of
a normally distributed population median m. I denote its unique maximizer by
lΓ(rˆ) = arg maxl∈R Γ(l, rˆ). Figure 1.3 depicts the policy eect function graphically.
As the party platformmust equal the bliss point of some partymember j ∈ML,
however, this platform may not be feasible. Taking this restriction into account,
the feasible platform with the highest policy eect is given by lM (rˆ,M
L) =
arg max
{wi: i∈ML}
Γ(l, rˆ). By the quasi-concavity of the policy eect function, the pol-
icy payo of agent i is maximized by the platform lM (rˆ,M
L) if this is more mod-
erate than ωi, and by his own bliss point wi otherwise.
Second, I show in the appendix that the platform preferences satisfy the single-
crossing property (see Lemma 1.3). Thus, voting behavior is monotonic in each
pairwise election. The preferred candidate of the median party member conse-
quently represents a Condorcet winner and is nominated as presidential candi-
date. As explained above, the median member prefers the maximum of his own
bliss point and platform lM (rˆ.
Note that pairwise elections are not the only decision procedure leading to the
nomination of the Condorcet winner as presidential candidate. For example, the
same platforms arise under the formal rule that the median party member is en-
titled to nominate his preferred candidate.14 Furthermore, one could think of a
richer model with US-style primary elections in which all party members are en-
titled to vote and to run as candidates. In such a model, the unchallenged can-
didature of the Condorcet winner identied above would represent a subgame
equilibrium, too.15
14This decision rule is applied in the model of Poutvaara (2003).
15With such a primary election stage, there may be additional equilibria with two winning can-
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Figure 1.3: The policy eect function
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Horizontal axis: Platform l of the leftist party. Vertical axis: Policy eect function Γ(l, r) for
r = 3, σ = 1.
1.6 Political eqilibria
Political equilibria can be characterized by membership structuresML,MR and
the resulting platforms l, r. In the previous section, I identied the presidential
candidates that are nominated by the members of party L in each information
set, i.e., for any combination of member setML and belief rˆ. In a political equi-
librium, the platform beliefs must be consistent. This implies that the equilibrium
platform lmust be the Condorcet winner in setML, given the correct belief rˆ = r
(accordingly for platform r). If membership structures were given exogenously
by some partition (ML,MR), then this condition would already pin down the
unique equilibrium combination of policy platforms.
At the rst stage of the game studied here, however, policy-motivated citizens
choose their party aliation endogenously. In a political equilibrium, member-
ship structures must therefore be stable in the sense that
(I) no member of any party can protably deviate by becoming politically in-
dependent,
(II) no independent citizen can protably deviate by joining any party,
(III) no member of any party can protably deviate by changing his party ali-
ation.
didates between whom the median membermL is indierent.
17
Chapter 1 Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation
Conditions (I) to (III) are necessary and sucient conditions for any political equi-
librium. However, they do not give many insights by themselves, as the eects of
the mentioned deviations depend in a non-trivial way on the complete vector of
contributionsαL, αR and the impliedmembership setsML,MR. In the following,
I will examine the implications of these conditions on the set of policy platforms
that can be supported in equilibrium. After deriving necessary conditions for
political equilibria, I prove equilibrium existence.
Consider some vector of contribution decisions (αL0 , α
R
0 ) and the induced mem-
bership structureML0 ,M
R
0 . Let the resulting policy platforms be given by l0 and
r0. This constellation can only represent an equilibrium if there is no protable
deviation at the party formation stage, i.e., if no agent would benet from chang-
ing his party aliation. Party L is active if and only if the sum of its contri-
butions is larger than the exogenous cost of running:
∑
i∈N
αLi ≥ C . It is e-
cient if
∑
i∈N
αLi ∈ [C,C + c) holds, which implies that there is no wasteful over-
contribution and that the withdrawal of any member would induce the inactivity
of its former party. Conditions (I) and (II) jointly lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 1.2. In any equilibrium with two active parties, both parties are ecient,
i.e.,
∑
i∈N
αPi ∈ [C,C + c) for P ∈ {L,R}.
Lemma 1.2 can be proven by contradiction. In order to do this, assume that there
is a political equilibrium with non-ecient contributions. Let the party platforms
be given by l0 and r0. In equilibrium, the members of both parties hold correct
beliefs rˆ = r0 and lˆ = l0. Now, consider two specic deviations. First, the exit
of the most leftist member j of party L would not induce L’s inactivity but shift
its party median to a more rightist position mL1 > m
L
0 . As party R cannot react
to this deviation and belief rˆ remains unchanged, the withdrawal of agent j will
induce the nomination of a weakly more moderate candidate l1 ≥ l0 by Lemma
1.1. Agent j will prefer to maintain his membership in L if and only if the shift
from l0 to l1 is so large that the reduction in his policy payo outbalances the
saved membership cost.
Next, consider a more rightist, independent agent k with bliss point wk ∈
(l1, r)If he would join party L, this would have the same eects on the party
median and, consequently, on the nominated candidate as the previously consid-
ered exit of the leftist member j. Thus, the policy platform shifts from l0 to l1
once again, inducing an increase of k’s policy payo. Agent k prots from this
deviation if this eect outweighs the cost c of joining party L. In the appendix,
I show that the payo increase to the entrant k is strictly larger than the payo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decrease to j from leaving party L (in absolute values). Thus, whenever agent
j prefers not to become independent, it is protable for k to join party L. Since
either j or k will always have an incentive to change his party aliation, there
cannot be a political equilibrium with inecient parties.
Lemma 1.2 implies the number of party members will be smaller than Cc + 1 in
any political equilibrium. Consequently, the sets of members of both parties will
always be nite, and there will be independent agents in any equilibrium.
Party structures can thus only be stable if the exit of anymember ofL causes the
inactivity of his party and guarantee the implementation of the opposing platform
r. Given this pivotality, agent i prefers to stay a party member if the policy gains
induced by his activity outweigh the cost c of his membership. In equilibrium, this
can only be true for some party members if the policy eect Γ(l, r) of each party
is suciently large. Furthermore, membership structures can only be stable if no
independent agent has an incentive to join one of the parties. By the following
proposition, each party’s platform has to satisfy a set of necessary conditions,
conditional on the platform of the opposing party.
Proposition 1.1. In every political equilibrium in which party R oers platform r,
the leftist platform l satises the following two conditions:
(i) Moderate and extreme boundary: l ∈ [η1(r, c), η2(r, c)], where both thresholds
are given by both roots of function A(l, r, c) = Γ(l, r) − c in l and satisfy
η1(r, c) ≤ lΓ(r) ≤ η2(r, c).
(ii) Extreme boundary: l > λ(r, c), where the threshold λ(r, c) is given by the
unique root of functionB(l, r, c) = Γ(lΓ(r), r)−Γ(l, r)+2p(l, r)(lΓ(r)− l)−c
in l and satises λ(r, c) < lΓ(r).
Proposition 1.1 implies that the leftist party’s platform must be located in some
well-dened interval, which depends on the opposing platform r. Part i is a con-
sequence of the eciency of parties derived in Lemma 1.2 and condition (I) on
party members. No member (including the presidential candidate himself) would
be willing to maintain his political activity if the activity of party Lwould not in-
crease its policy payo suciently strong. For every party member, the induced
policy gain is weakly smaller than the policy eect function Γ(l, r) = (r−l)p(l, r),
which must exceed the membership cost c, thus. The moderate bound η2(r, c) fol-
lows from the necessity to have a suciently large platform dierence (r− l). No
agent would be willing to bear the cost of c if the oered platforms were too sim-
ilar. In particular, the positive costs of political activity eliminate the possibility
of full policy convergence, the classical result due to Downs (1957). Additionally,
there is an extreme boundary η1(r, c) since the members of party L would not
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be willing to support a party with negligible electoral prospects. By the quasi-
concavity of the policy eect function Γ(l, r), both boundaries are well-dened
(see gure 1.3).
The second part of Proposition 1.1 follows from condition (II), according to
which no independent agent must have an incentive to join a party. The extreme
boundary λ(r, c) is derived in two steps. Consider an allocation in which platform
l is located to the left of the maximum eect platform lΓ(r). By Lemma 1.1, this
platform will be chosen if and only if (a) it provides a higher policy eect than
any other available platform and (b) the party median is even more extreme: l =
lM (M
L, r) ≥ mL. It available, the median party member would prefer to oer
the platform with maximum policy eect lΓ(r).
If an independent agent with bliss point wi = lΓ(r) were to join party L, he
would thus become presidential candidate. Thus, an equilibrium with platform l′
only exists if this agent cannot benet from joining party L. On the one hand, he
can clearly achieve a policy gain by joining. On the other hand, he can save the
cost c and free-ride on the provision of party L by other leftist citizens by staying
independent. The net gain from entering party L is given by
B(l, r, c) =v˜i (lΓ(r), r)− c− v˜i(l, r)
= Γ [lΓ(r), r]− p(l, r) [r + l − 2lΓ(r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
policy gain
−c . (1.6)
In any political equilibrium, B(l, r, c)must be negative. Thus, platform l has to
be suciently moderate. For values of l close enough to lΓ(r), the membership
cost dominates the achievable policy gain. If platform l becomes more extreme,
the net gain will however strictly increase for two reasons. First, as the distance
between l and lΓ(r) increases, platform l becomes less attractive to the poten-
tial entrant. Second, the probability of party L’s victory in the general election
becomes smaller. Consequently, there is a unique cut-o value λ(r, c) such that
there is an incentive to deviate whenever l ≤ λ(r, c) holds. Thus, the function
λ(r, c) represents an extreme boundary for platform l, conditional on the platform
of party R.16
As the game is completely symmetric between both political parties, corre-
16Note that l > λ(r, c) is a necessary but not a sucient condition for the stability of party L’s
membership structure. More exactly, one can show that agents with slightly more moderate
bliss point wi > lΓ(r) have an even larger incentive to join party L and still prefer to join
party L in constellations with a slightly more moderate platform l = λ(r, c) + ε. While
the construction of a sucient condition is possible, it does not provide additional economic
insights.
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sponding necessary conditions have to be fullled for the equilibrium platform
of the rightist party R. The following corollary recapitulates the analysis so far
and identies a set of potential political equilibria.
Corollary 1.1. In any political equilibrium, the party platforms l and r satisfy the
following necessary conditions:
1. Platform l of the leftist party L is located in the interval
BL(r, c) = [max {η2(r, c), λ(r, c)} , η1(r, c)]
2. Platform r of the rightist party R is located in the interval
BR(l, c) = [−η1(−l, c),min {η2(−l, c),−λ(−l, c)}]
Note that for any given membership structure, there is a unique reaction func-
tion l(ML, r) with respect to the platform of the competing party R. Since the
party structures are not given exogenously, however, the correspondencesBL(r, c)
andBR(l, c) represent the collection of all reaction functions for the complete set
of stable membership structures. Figure 1.6 depicts these correspondences for
both both parties in a diagram with platform r on the horizontal and platform l
on the vertical axis. The upper and lower bounds for platform l are given by the
solid lines, the bounds for platform r by the dashed lines. Consider an allocation
with any pair of platforms l and r. If the point (r, l) is not located in the area
between both solid lines, platform l cannot be supported in any equilibrium, i.e.,
by any membership structure.
In gure 1.6, region STUV represents the intersection of the correspondences
BL(r, c) and BR(l, c) for the parameter values c = 0.5 and σ = 1. It contains the
set of all tuples (l, r) that satisfy the necessary platform conditions established in
Proposition 1.1. The set of political equilibria is a subset of this intersection, as
the conditions identied in Proposition 1.1 are necessary, but not sucient for
equilibrium. For any combination of platforms outside this interval, in contrast,
there is a protable deviation for at least one agent.
Figure 1.6 graphically shows that the distance between both party platforms is
bounded from above as well as from below for the considered example. Formally,
upper and lower boundaries for the platform distance can be derived from the
conditional boundary functions η2(r, c) and λ(r, c) for all parameter values. In the
minimal distance equilibrium S, both parties oer the most moderate platforms
that can be supported against each other. This implies that the policy eect deliv-
ered by both platforms is exactly sucient to cover the membership cost c. In the
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Figure 1.4: Stable parties and supportable platforms
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Horizontal axis: Rightist party platform r. Vertical axis: Leftist party patform l. Region STUV :
Potential equilibrium platforms for c = 0.5, σ = 1.
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maximum distance equilibrium U , both parties nominate the most extreme presi-
dential candidates for which the necessary conditions in Proposition 1.1 hold. By
the symmetry between both parties, the rightist party’s platforms in both constel-
lations is a xed point of the conditional boundary function: r(c) = −η2(r(c), c)
and r¯(c) = −λ(r¯(c), c).
Proposition 1.2. In every political equilibrium, the platform distance r − l is
(i) weakly larger than 2c > 0, and
(ii) smaller than 2r¯(c), where r¯(c) > c is dened as the unique root of G(r, c) =
λ(r, c) + r in r.
For part (i), note that the function −η2(r, c) is strictly decreasing in r. Thus, it
has at most one xed point. It is easy to show that this xed point is given by the
exogenous membership cost c.17
The proof for part (ii) of Proposition 1.2 is slightly more complicated. First, I
show that the derivative of the maximum eect platform lΓ(r) (the best answer)
with respect to r is always larger than −1. Intuitively, whenever the platform of
party R becomes more extreme, party L would achieve a higher winning proba-
bility ceteris paribus. While the members of party Lmight prefer to change their
platform as well, their best response will never involve a more extreme shift that
would eliminate this advantage. Second, the incentives for the potential entrant
with bliss point lΓ(r) change: his policy payos both in case of joining partyL and
in case of staying independent increase because the rightist platform r becomes
less competitive. Altogether, the derivative of the extreme boundary function
−λ(r, c) in r is smaller than 1 such that there can be at most one xed-point. Ex-
ploiting this xed-point property of r¯, it can nally be shown that the dening
function G(r, c) = λ(r, c) + r has a unique root for any c ≥ 0.
Proposition 1.2 establishes the main result of this chapter and represents a qual-
ication of the insights provided in the basic citizen candidate model (Besley and
Coate, 1997). As in the citizen candidate model, there can only be limited policy
convergence due to the costs of political activity. In contrast, there can only be
limited polarization in my model because of the coordination possibilities pro-
vided by political parties. The following proposition establishes the existence
of equilibria for all parameter constellations, ensuring the relevance of these in-
sights.
17More concretely, it can be shown that either η2(r, c) has a unique xed point in r or that the
associated boundary η1(r, c) has a unique xed point in r. In both cases, the xed point is
given at r = c.
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Proposition 1.3. The set of political equilibria is non-empty for all levels of the
membership cost c ≥ 0.
By this proposition, platform tuples (l, r) and stable membership structures ex-
ist such that the sucient conditions (I)-(III) are satised. To give an intuition
for this result, consider a political constellation where l = mL ∈ [lΓ(r), η2(r, c)]
and party L is ecient according to Lemma 1.2. In this situation, the policy plat-
form l is given by the bliss point of the median party member who prefers this
constellation to any other platform (see Lemma 1.1). Consequently, the oered
platform will not change as long as the party median is constant. Clearly, it is
possible to construct membership structures (with multiple party members that
share the party median’s bliss pointmL) such thatmL does not change due to the
entry of any independent agent. This implies that neither an independent agent
nor a current member of party R has an incentive to join party L. Moreover,
if party L is ecient and the bliss points of all its member are suciently left-
ist, no member of L would benet from becoming independent (as the moderate
boundary condition l < η2(r, c) is satised). If platform r and membership set
MR satisfy equivalent conditions, no agent i ∈ N can protably change his party
aliation. Thus, the existence of a political equilibrium with policy platforms l
and r is guaranteed.
1.7 Comparative statics
In the previous chapters, I have established the existence of political equilibria and
their properties given some xed membership cost c. Moreover, I have focused
on the specic case of the standard normal distribution, σ = 1. This section
investigates the eects of changes with respect to both exogenous parameters,
c and σ. In particular, I am interested in the eects on the boundary functions
r(c, σ), r¯(c, σ) and the implications for equilibrium platform distance.18 First, I
consider variations in the membership cost c, a crucial ingredient of the citizen
candidate framework.
Proposition 1.4. Theminimal distance boundary r(c, σ) and the maximal distance
boundary r¯(c, σ) are strictly increasing in c:
dr(c, σ)
dc
= 1 > 0 ,
dr¯(c, σ)
dc
> 0.
18In the previous chapters, σ was set equal to one in order to simplify notation, and all boundaries
were written as functions of c only. In the following, I will allow for variations in σ. With
some abuse of notation, I redene the boundaries η1, η2, λ, r and r¯ to be the corresponding
functions of c and σ.
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For c approaching zero, the limits of both boundaries are given by
lim
c→0
r(c, σ) =0, and
lim
c→0
r¯(c, σ) =
0.5σ
φ(0)
.
In equilibrium, party members are only willing to maintain their activity if each
party’s activity has a suciently large eect on expected policy, i.e., if the plat-
form distance is large enough. As the cost of political activity becomes larger,
party members demand increasing policy eects and platform distances. Thus,
the minimal distance boundary increases. If, however, the membership cost ap-
proaches zero, the members will be willing to accept increasing convergence. In
the limit, party membership is costless and is even consistent with full policy
convergence.
With respect to the maximal distance boundary, increasing membership costs
tighten the combined coordination and free-riding problem faced by potential
activists. Whenever platform l is located to the left of the maximal eect posi-
tion lΓ(r), all party members unanimously prefer to have a presidential candidate
with bliss point lΓ(r) instead. As long as l does not exceed the extreme bound-
ary, however, agents with this bliss point prefer to free-ride on the current party
members, because the feasible policy gain is outweighed by the membership cost.
With increasing c, an even larger policy gain is required to make political ac-
tivity protable. Thus, more extreme platforms can be supported in equilibrium
and the maximal distance between both parties increases. When the membership
cost converges to zero, on the other hand, this coordination problem vanishes
and an agent with a desirable bliss point wi = lΓ(r) will be willing to join party
L whenever he is sure that he will become presidential candidate, i. e. whenever
the initial platform is more extreme. With c → 0, an independent agent with
bliss point lΓ(r) benets from entering the party whenever this has an eect on
the party’s platform. Thus, the party median members can always recruit their
preferred candidates. Proposition 1.4 gives the mutually best platform choices,
l = −0.5σφ(0) and r = 0.5σφ(0) , that would be chosen by party medians with extreme
policy preferences,mL → −∞ andmR →∞.
Proposition 1.5. The minimal distance boundary r(c, σ) is independent of the de-
gree of electoral uncertainty while the maximal distance boundary r¯(c, σ) is strictly
increasing in σ:
dr(c, σ)
dσ
= 0 ,
dr¯(c, σ)
dσ
> 0.
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In the case of full electoral certainty, both boundaries coincide:
lim
σ→0
r(c, σ) = lim
σ→0
r¯(c, σ) = c.
In gure 1.6, both the minimal and the maximal distance equilibrium involve
symmetric platforms l = −r < 0, and equal winning probabilities for both parties
(independently of σ). In the minimal distance case, the platform distance must
be large enough so that party members do not benet from leaving their party,
and causing its inactivity. Thus, the membership cost c must not outweigh the
policy eect Γ(−r, r, σ) = [r − (−r)]12 = r, which is not aected by increasing
uncertainty in this symmetric constellation. The same policy eect is even given
for σ = 0, the case of a perfectly known population median.19
In contrast, the maximal distance boundary is derived by considering a shift
from an extreme to a more centrist platform, i.e., a deviation from a symmetric
to an asymmetric allocation. This platform shift is protable to the party mem-
bers and the potential entrant if and only if the winning probability increases
suciently. Higher electoral risk however reduces the increase in winning prob-
ability and the incentive for independent agents to join a political party. Overall,
increasing electoral risk diminishes the inherent centripetal forces of platform
choice in endogenous parties, and more polarized platforms can be supported in
equilibrium.
Corollary 1.2. With electoral uncertainty, σ = 0, the platforms of both parties are
given by r = c and l = −c in every two-party equilibrium.
For the case of electoral certainty, all voters know the median voter position
m = 0 ex ante. The uniqueness of party platforms for this case, σ = 0, is directly
implied by the limits of both boundaries in Proposition 1.5. With σ approaching
zero, the lower and upper boundaries r(c, σ), r¯(c, σ) converge and, in the limit,
coincide. The economic intuition for this case is however simple, and can be
provided directly.
If the bliss point of the population median is ex ante known, the political equi-
librium can only involve two active parties if, rst, those oer symmetric plat-
forms l = −r, giving rise to identical winning probabilities. For any other con-
stellation, one party would inevitably loose the general election and have no eect
on the implemented policy. Thus, no agent would be willing to bear the cost of
engaging in this party. Second, there cannot be an equilibrium with r = −l < c,
as the distance between both parties and the implied policy eect would be too
small for any agent to be willing to bear the cost of political activity.
19Note, however, that the moderate boundary η2(r, c, σ) changes for all values r 6= r. Specically,
the moderate boundary function rotates clockwise with increasing σ.
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Finally, platform polarization is limited by the possibility to recruit and nomi-
nate moderate independent citizens. Under electoral certainty, if any entrant with
bliss point wi ∈ (l, 0) were to join party L and to be nominated as presidential
candidate, he would certainly win the general election against platform r = −l.
Since this would induce a shift of the expected policy E(x) = 0 to wi ∈ (l, 0), all
members of party L would strictly prefer his nomination. Thus, an equilibrium
with divergent platforms exists if and only if no independent agent can benet
from this deviation. For the potential entrant, entering party L improves the pol-
icy payo by r. For r > c, joining party Lwould clearly be a protable deviation.
Thus, there is a unique political equilibrium with r = c and l = −c.
Consequently, the eect of endogenous party formation is most obvious in the
case of electoral certainty, which is the case on the basic citizen candidate model
concentrates. The rst two arguments also apply in the model by Besley and
Coate (1997), implying that the platform distance must exceed a lower bound.
Without party formation, however, there is no mechanism limiting policy polar-
ization in equilibrium. Consequently, every symmetric allocation with platform
distance beyond the lower bound represents a political equilibrium.20 The result-
ing multiplicity of equilibria contrasts sharply with the unique determination of
equilibrium platforms derived in Corollary 1.2.21
1.8 Conclusion
Building on the citizen candidate framework, this chapter has investigated po-
litical competition between endogenously formed parties. There seems to be lit-
tle doubt that modeling political competition between parties instead of individ-
ual candidates brings theory closer to real-world politics. The model possesses
a number of compelling properties. The analysis has focused on equilibria with
two active parties, which are shown to exist for all levels of membership costs and
electoral uncertainty. In contrast to the median voter model (Downs, 1957), there
can never be full convergence of party platforms in equilibrium. Thus, the party
20In the model by Besley and Coate (1997), the lower bound on the platform distance depends on
the cost of running in the general election, which has to be paid by a single candidate. Here,
the lower bound instead depends on the cost of party membership. Intuitively, the latter cost
should be considerably smaller.
21Note that, in the Osborne and Slivinski (1996) version of the citizen candidate model, the plat-
form distance is not uniquely determined, but is nevertheless bound from below and from
above. The upper bound follows from the assumption of sincere voting. Intuitively, extreme
polarization is prevented by the assumption that voters are able to coordinate in Osborne and
Slivinski (1996), while it is hindered (more completely) by the coordination of party members
in my model.
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formation model reproduces one of the main results of the basic citizen candidate
model without parties (Besley and Coate, 1997). At the same time, allowing for
party formation alleviates the major drawback of the citizen candidate model, the
extreme multiplicity of equilibria. This becomes most obvious in the benchmark
case of full electoral certainty, i.e., perfect information about the median voter’s
preferences. In this case, innitely many equilibria with two running candidates
exist in the basic citizen candidate model. In contrast, the party formation model
possesses a unique equilibrium with two active parties.
This chapter has concentrated on a particularly simple framework to enhance
the clarity of the arguments. A richer model could allow for, e.g., a larger num-
ber of potential parties, a multi-dimensional policy space, more general rules with
respect to intra-party decision-making, more general policy preferences, or dier-
ent modeling of electoral uncertainty. Further analyses show that the economic
intuition and the main results are robust with respect to all these modications.
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Appendix 1.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1
Lemma 1.1 identies the optimal choice of party platform l in the primary election
of party L, conditional on the membership structureML and belief rˆ. It is proven
through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1.3. Given any platform belief rˆ, the platform preferences of partymembers
over the set of potential platforms fulll the single crossing property.
Proof. The single-crossing property implies that the preferences of agent i with
respect to pairwise comparisons between two alternatives are monotonic in his
bliss point ωi. Consider the case l1 < l2 < rˆ. An agent with bliss point wi prefers
l1 to be the platform of party L instead of l2 if and only if the following condition
holds:
F (l1, l2, rˆ, wi) = v˜i(l1, rˆ)− v˜i(l2, rˆ)
= p(l1, rˆ)(|wi − rˆ| − |wi − l1|)− p(l2, rˆ)(|wi − rˆ| − |wi − l2|)
> 0
First, note that F (l1, l2, rˆ, wi) |wi<l1 = p(l1, rˆ)(rˆ− l1)−p(l2, rˆ)(rˆ− l2) = Γ(l1, rˆ)−
Γ(l2, rˆ) = −F (l1, l2, rˆ, wi) |wi>rˆ. Thus, agents with bliss points at both extremes
of the policy space will always have conicting preferences.
Second, the derivative of function F with repect to wi is given as
dF ( )
dwi
=


0 for wi ≤ l1
−2p(l1, rˆ) < 0 for wi ∈ (l1, l2]
2 [p(l2, rˆ)− p(l1, rˆ)] > 0 for wi ∈ (l2, rˆ]
0 for wi ≥ rˆ
As long as platforms l1 and l2 provide dierent policy eects, there is exactly one
cut-o value ψ(l1, l2, rˆ) such that F (l1, l2, rˆ, ψ( )) = 0 holds.
For Γ(l1, rˆ) > Γ(l2, rˆ), the cut-o is located in the interval (l1, l2). All agents
with bliss points to the left of l1 prefer l1 and we get the following version of the
single-crossing property:
F (l1, l2, rˆ, wi) ≤ 0⇒F (l1, l2, rˆ, wj) < 0 ∀ wj > wi, and
F (l1, l2, rˆ, wi) ≥ 0⇒F (l1, l2, rˆ, wk) > 0 ∀ wk < wi
For Γ(l1, rˆ) > Γ(l2, rˆ), the cut-o is located in the interval (l2, rˆ). This time, all
agents to the left of l1 prefer platform l2 and the preferences exhibit the following
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monotonicity:
F (l1, l2, rˆ, wi) ≤ 0⇒F (l1, l2, rˆ, wj) < 0 ∀ wj < wi, and,
F (l1, l2, rˆ, wi) ≥ 0⇒F (l1, l2, rˆ, wk) > 0 ∀ wk > wi
For the special case of identical policy eects Γ(l1, rˆ) = Γ(l2, rˆ), all agents with
bliss points to the left of l1 as well as to the right of rˆ are indierent between
both platforms while the moderate agents in the interval (l1, rˆ) strictly prefer
the moderate platform l2. Trivially, the preferences satisfy the single-crossing
property in the following sense:
F (l1, l2, rˆ, wi) ≥ 0⇒F (l1, l2, rˆ, wk) ≥ 0 ∀ wk ∈ R
Similar arguments apply for other constellations, e. g. l1 < rˆ < l2.
Lemma 1.4. For any member set ML and platform belief rˆ, there is a Condorcet
winner in the primary election of party L.
Proof. Let the nite set of feasible platforms, i.e., the set of bliss points of party
L’s members, be given by A. Denote by l∗ the platform in A that maximizes the
utility of the median party member with platform wi = m
L:
l∗ = argmax
l∈A
v˜i(l, rˆ) = −p(l, rˆ)
∣∣rˆ −mL∣∣− [1− p(l, rˆ)] ∣∣l −mL∣∣
By the single-crossing property established in Lemma 1.3, platform l∗ is preferred
by a majority of party members (the median member plus either all members
with wj ≤ mL or all members with wj ≥ mL) to any other available platform
l′ ∈ A. Consequently, l∗ wins any pairwise election and represents a Condorcet
winner.
Lemma 1.5. On (−∞, r), the policy eect function Γ(l, r) = p(l, r)(r− l) is strictly
quasi-concave in l and has a unique maximizer lΓ(r).
Proof. For l < r, the policy eect function and its rst and second derivatives
with respect to wi are given as
Γ(l, r) = (r − l)Φ
(
r + l
2
)
,
Γ1(l, r) =
dΓ(l, r)
dl
= −Φ
(
r + l
2
)
+
r − l
2
φ
(
r + l
2
)
, and
Γ11(l, r) =
d2Γ(l, r)
dl2
= −1
2
φ
(
r + l
2
)
− 1
2
φ
(
r + l
2
)
+
r − l
4
φ′
(
r + l
2
)
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= −
(
1 +
r2 − l2
8
)
φ
(
r + l
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
As l approaches −∞ and r, respectively, the rst derivative goes to:
lim
l→−∞
Γ′(l, r) = lim
l→−∞
r − l
2
φ
(
r + l
2
)
= lim
l→−∞
(r − l)/2
1/φ
(
r+l
2
)
= lim
l→−∞
φ
(
r+l
2
)2
φ
(
r+l
2
) = lim
l→−∞
φ
(
r+l
2
)2
−r+l2 φ
(
r+l
2
)
= lim
l→−∞
φ
(
r+l
2
)
−r+l2
= 0, and
lim
l→r
Γ′(l, r) = −Φ
(
2r
2
)
< 0.
The second derivative Γ′′(l, r) is negative if and only if
1 +
r2 − l2
8
> 0
⇒ l ∈ (−
√
r2 + 8,+
√
r2 + 8)
For l < −√r2 + 8, the policy eect function is thus strictly convex. Moreover,
it is strictly increasing in this region, since liml→r Γ1(l, r) = 0. In the interval
(−√r2 + 8, r), the function is strictly concave. Combining these results we know
that Γ(l, r) is strictly quasi-concave on (−∞, r).
As Γ1(l, r) is positive for l < −
√
r2 + 8 and negative for l → r, the policy eect
function must have a unique maximum on l ∈ (−∞, r). This maximum must be
located in the interval (−√r2 + 8; r).
Lemma 1.6. For any membership setML and belief rˆ, the policy payo of the me-
dian party member with bliss point mL < rˆ is maximized by platform l(ML, rˆ) =
max
{
mL, lM (rˆ,M
L)
}
, where lM (rˆ,M
L) = arg max
l∈A
Γ(l, r).
Proof. The party median’s policy payo is given by v˜mL(l, r) = p(l, r)
{∣∣r −mL∣∣
− ∣∣l −mL∣∣} − ∣∣r −mL∣∣. For l ≤ 2mL − rˆ and l ≥ r, the payo is smaller than
in the case of certain implementation of policy r, while it is strictly larger for any
platform in the interval (2mL − rˆ, rˆ). We can thus focus on this interval, where
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the derivative of v˜mL(l, r) with respect to l is given by:
dv˜mL(l, r)
dl
=
{
dp(l,r)
dl (r + l − 2mL) + p(l, r) > 0 for l < mL
Γ1(l, r) for l ∈
(
mL, rˆ
)
Consequently, the median member prefers its own bliss point mL to any more
leftist platform, independently of the implied policy eects. Furthermore, he will
prefer a more moderate platform l′ to his own bliss point if and only if l′ provides
a larger policy eect Γ(l, r). Thus, v˜mL will be maximized by the maximum ofm
L
and the maximum eect platform lM (rˆ,M
L).
Proof of Lemma 1.2
Assume there is a two-party equilibrium with membership structures ML0 , M
R
0 ,
party medians mL0 , m
R
0 and platforms l0 = l(M
L
0 , r0), r0 = r(M
R
0 , l0) such that
partyL is not ecient, i.e.,
∑
i∈N α
L
i ≥ C+c. Then, neither any member j ∈ML0
nor any independent citizen with arbitrary bliss point wk must have an incentive
to deviate. In particular, this must be true for the most extreme member j with
bliss point wj = min
{
wi : i ∈ML
} ≤ mL. Assume he deviates by reducing his
contribution by c, which has two eects. First, the agent saves the membership
cost of c. Second, if this deviation implies he leaves party L, the party median
changes and becomes more moderate mL1 ≥ mL0 . Since the party is not ecient
by assumption, it will still be active in the general election. However, the adopted
platform changes to l1 ≥ l0. The deviation is non-protable for agent j if and only
if the induced policy loss would be larger than the membership cost. Otherwise
he could protably deviate by leaving party L, implying that the initial allocation
cannot represent an equilibrium. Thus, the following condition must hold:
v˜j(l0, r0)− v˜j(l1, r0) = Γ(l0, r0)− Γ(l1, r0) > c (1.7)
Next, consider the incentives for an independent with bliss point wk ∈ (l1, r0)
to join party L. If he would enter party L, this deviation would have exactly the
same eect on the party median as the exit of the extreme member j. Again, we
have the new party medianmL1 ≥ mL0 . Furthermore, the new platform will either
be given by the bliss point of the entrant wk or by the platform adopted after j’s
exit, l1 ≥ l0, once again.
Consider the latter is true, and l1 is the newly adopted platform. The change in
agent k’s policy payo is given by
v˜k(l1, r0)− c−v˜k(l0, r0) = p(l1, r0) [r0 + l1 − 2wk]− p(l0, r0) [r0 + l0 − 2wk]− c
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= Γ(l0, r0)− Γ(l1, r0) + 2(r − wk)[p(l1, r0)− p(l0, r0)]− c
> Γ(l0, r0)− Γ(l1, r0)− c.
The last expression is positive whenever condition (1.7) above holds. If the new
platform is instead given by the bliss point of the entrantwk, the induced increase
of the policy payo to k will be even larger.
Thus, if the extreme member j cannot deviate protably by leaving party L,
joining the party will be a protable deviation for agent k. In other words, if
party L is not ecient, there is always a protable deviation for at least one of
these two agents, which is a contradiction to the equilibrium assumption.
Proof of Proposition 1.1
Part (i) For the rst part of Proposition 1.1, assume the policy eect associated
with platform l does not exceed the membership cost: Γ(l, r) < c. By Lemma
1.2, parties are ecient in every political equilibrium. Whenever one member of
L deviates by choosing αLi = 0 and leaving party L, the sum of contributions to
party L falls below the amount required cost of running C . Thus, there will no
presidential candidate nominated by L in the general election, and the rightist
candidate wins certainly. For the presidential candidate or any more extreme
member with ωi < l, this deviation induces a utility change of
vi(r)− (v˜i(l, r)− αLi ) ≥ vi(r)− v˜i(l, r) + c = −Γ(l, r) + c > 0
Thus, leaving party Lwould be protable to agent i and, in equilibrium, platform
l must fulll the condition Γ(l, r) ≥ c.
By Lemma 1.5 in the appendix, the policy eect function is strictly quasi-con-
cave and approaches 0 for l → −∞ and l → r. If Γ (lΓ(r), r) < c, function A has
no root. If Γ (lΓ(r), r) = c, the maximum eect platform lΓ(r) = η1(r, c), η2(r, c)
represents the unique root; the only equilibrium with platform r also involves
lΓ(r). If nally Γ (lΓ(r), r) > c, function A(x, r, c) has two roots in x, denoted
by η1(r, c) < lΓ(r) and η2(r, c) > lΓ(r). Then, A(x, r, c) ≥ 0 holds if and only
if x ∈ [η1(r, c), η2(r, c)]. Consequently, the condition stated in the rst part of
Lemma 1.3 is only fullled for platforms l in this interval.
Part (ii) For the second part of Proposition 1.1, consider an allocation with plat-
forms r and l < lΓ(r). This position l can represent the outcome of a primary sub-
game equilibrium if and only if it provides higher policy eect than the bliss point
of any other member in party L and if the party median is even more extreme:
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mL(ML) ≤ l. The allocation can only represent an equilibrium, if an indepen-
dent agent with bliss point wi = lΓ(r) cannot protably deviate by joining party
L. Given this deviation, agent i would certainly win the primary of party L and
run as its presidential candidate in the general election since his bliss point is pre-
ferred to any other available platform by the party median. On the one hand, this
change in L’s platform increases the policy payo to the entrant i. On the other
hand, he has to pay the membership cost c. Overall, the induced change of utility
for agent i is given by
B(l, r, c) = v˜i (lΓ(r), r)− c− v˜i(l, r) = Γ (lΓ(r), r)− p(l, r) [r + l − 2lΓ(r)]− c
Agent i benets from joining party L if and only if B(l, r, c) > 0 holds. The
function has a unique root in l which is located in the interval [2lΓ(r)− r, lΓ(r)].
First, the deviation is protable for any l < 2lΓ(r)− r since
B(l, r, c) =Γ(lΓ(r), r)− p(l, r) [r + l − 2lΓ(r)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−c
>Γ(lΓ(r), r)− c > Γ(l, r)− c ≥ 0
The second inequality holds by the denition of lΓ(r), the last one must hold
in any potential equilibrium by part (i). Next, joining party L is obviously not
protable for i if l approaches lΓ(r): liml→lΓ(r)B(l, r, c) = −c < 0. Finally, the
incentive for political activity is strictly decreasing in l in this interval:
dB(l, r, c)
dl
= −dp(l, r)
dl
(r + l − 2lΓ(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−p(l, r) < 0
Thus, function B(l, r, c) has a unique root in l in (−∞, lΓ(r)), which we dene as
the extreme boundary function λ(r, c). For all platforms l < λ(r, c), joining party
L and becoming its presidential candidate at the cost of c is a protable deviation
for agent i. Consequently, there cannot be an equilibrium with platforms r and
l < λ(r, c).
By the symmetry of both parties, the platform of party R must satisfy r ≤
−λ(−l, c) in every political equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proposition 1.2 builds on the following lemma with respect to derivative of func-
tion lΓ(r).
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Lemma 1.7. The derivative of the maximum eect platform lΓ(r) with respect to
platform r is given by dlΓ(r)dr > −1.
Proof. The maximum policy eect platform lΓ(r) is implicitly (and uniquely) de-
ned by the equation
dΓ(lΓ(r), r)
dl
=
r − lΓ(r)
2
φ
(
r + lΓ(r)
2
)
− Φ
(
r + lΓ(r)
2
)
= 0
Substituting in x = r+lΓ(r)2 , we can the following dependence:
lΓ(r) = f (x) =x− Φ(x)
φ(x)
, and
r = g(x) =x +
Φ(x)
φ(x)
.
Making use of these function, we can rewrite the function lΓ(r) = f (x(r) =
f (g−1(r)).
For being able to use the inverse function g−1, function g must be monotonic
in x. For the standard normal distribution, φ(x)φ(x) = −x holds, so that the derivative
of g equals g′(x) = 2 + xΦ(x)φ(x) . We show that x
Φ(x)
φ(x) > −1, which is a sucient
condition for g′(x) > 0 everywhere onR. We do this by considering the auxiliary
function a(x) = xΦ(x) + φ(x), and proving that this function is positive for all
x ∈ R. We can derive the limit of a(x) for x→ −∞ by making use of l’Hopital’s
rule several times:
lim
x→−∞
a(x) = lim [xΦ(x) + φ(x)] = lim
x
1/Φ(x)
+ 0
= lim
1
−φ(x)/ [Φ(x)]2 = lim−
Φ(x)2
φ(x)
= lim−2Φ(x)φ(x)
φ(x)
= lim−2Φ(x)φ(x)−xφ(x) = limb→−∞
2Φ(x)
x
= 0
Moreover, a(x) is strictly increasing in x, since a′(x) = Φ(x) + xφ(x) + φ(x) =
Φ(x) > 0 for any x ∈ (−∞,+∞). Thus, we have shown that a(x) > 0 for every
x ∈ (−∞,+∞), which is equivalent to
xΦ(x) >− φ(x)
⇔ xΦ(x)
φ(x)
>− 1
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Consequently, g′(x) = 2 + xΦ(x)φ(x) > 0 holds for all x, and the inverse function
x(r) = g−1(r) is well-dened. Its derivative is given by x′(r) = [g′(g−1(r))]−1 > 0.
Second, consider the maximum eect platform function lΓ(r) = f (g
−1(r)). Its
derivative is given by
dlΓ(r)
dr
=f ′(x)x′(r) =
[
−xΦ(x)
φ(x)
]
x′(r)
=− xΦ(x)/φ(x)
2 + xΦ(x)/φ(x)
As shown above, the denominator of this fraction is strictly positive. The sign
of the numerator, and thus the complete expression, equals the sign of x. For all
x < 0, it follows that dlΓ(r)dr > 0 (note that x < 0 results for r <
0.5
φ(0) ). For x > 0,
the numerator is positive, but strictly smaller than the denominator, implying that
dlΓ(r)
dr ∈ (−1, 0) holds. Thus, the derivative of lΓ(r) is larger than −1 on its whole
domain.
Making use of Lemma 1.7, Proposition 1.2 can be proven in the following.
Part (i): Lower bound By Lemma 1.3, the moderate platform boundary is de-
ned as the larger root of A(l, r, c) = Γ(l, r) − c. Making use of this implicit
denition, the derivative of η2(r, c) with respect to r is given by
dη2(r, c)
dr
= − ∂A/∂r
∂A/∂η2
= − Φ(
η2+r
2 ) +
r−η2
2 φ(
η2+r
2 )
−Φ(η2+r2 ) + r−η22 φ(η2+r2 )
The numerator of this expression is positive. As η2 is the larger root of A(l, r, c),
the denominator is negative by the strict quasi-concavity of the policy eect func-
tion. Thus, dη2(r,c)dr > 0 holds for all r ∈ R. Thus, the equation r = −η2(r, c)
has at most one solution in r. Denote this solution by r(c). In this intersection,
both platform are equal to their conditional minimal boundaries: l = η2(r, c) and
r = −η2(−l, c). The intersection exists if and only if η2(r, c) < −r holds for some
r ∈ R.
On the other hand, the extreme boundary value η1(r, c) (also dened in Lemma
1.7) is strictly decreasing in r, and its derivative is given by dη1(r,c)dr < −1. Thus, the
equation r = −η1(r, c) has at most one solution, too. However, this solution exists
if and only if η1(r, c) > −r for some r ∈ R which is equivalent to η2(r, c) > −r
for all r ∈ R. Thus, the 45◦ line has either a unique intersection with the function
η2(r, c) or a unique intersection with the function η1(r, c).
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Finally, plugging in r = r, l = −r gives
A(−r, r, c) = Γ(−r, r)− c = r − c
Obviously, this function has value zero if and only if r = c. Thus, the minimal
distance boundary r exists. By the values of the derivatives, the constellation
l = −r, r = r in fact constitutes the equilibrium with smallest platform distance
r − l.
Part (ii): Upper bound The extreme boundary λ(r, c) is dened as the unique
root of the function B(l, r, c) = Γ(lΓ(r), r) − p(l, r) [r + l − 2lΓ(r)] − c in l. The
partial derivatives of B(λ, r, c) with respect to λ and r are given by
∂B(λ, r, c)
∂λ
=− 1
2
φ
(
λ + r
2
)
(r + λ− 2lΓ(r))− Φ
(
λ + r
2
)
, and
∂B(λ, r, c)
∂r
=2Φ
(
lΓ(r) + r
2
)
+ 2Φ
(
λ + r
2
)
dlΓ(r)
dr
− 1
2
φ
(
λ + r
2
)
(r + λ− 2lΓ(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−Φ
(
λ + r
2
)
< 0
Thus, the derivative of λ(r, c) with respect to r follows as
dλ
dr
=− ∂B(λ, r, c)/∂r
∂B(λ, r, c)/∂λ
=
2Φ
(
lΓ(r)+r
2
)
+ 2Φ
(
λ+r
2
) dlΓ(r)
dr − 12φ
(
λ+r
2
)
(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
r + λ− 2lΓ(r))
>0
−Φ (λ+r2 )
1
2φ
(
λ+r
2
)
(r + λ− 2lΓ(r)) + Φ
(
λ+r
2
)
This derivative is larger than −1 if
Φ
(
lΓ(r) + r
2
)
+ Φ
(
λ + r
2
)
dlΓ(r)
dr
> 0.
Every term in this expression except dlΓ(r)dr is strictly positive. For r ≤ 0.5φ(0) , the
condition above holds because dlΓ(r)dr ≥ 0, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1.7.
For r > 0.5φ(0) , we have
dlΓ(r)
dr > −1. Making use of the fact that λ(r, c) < lΓ(r), we
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then get
Φ
(
lΓ(r) + r
2
)
+ Φ
(
λ + r
2
)
dlΓ(r)
dr
> Φ
(
λ + r
2
)(
1 +
dlΓ(r)
dr
)
> 0
Thus, dλ(r,c)dr > −1 holds for all r ∈ R.
Consequently, there can be at most one intersection between the boundary
function λ(r, c) and the 45◦ line (l = −r). Looking at the dening function of
r¯(c), this statement is equivalent to the existence of a unique root in the function
B˜(r, c) = B(−r, r, c). This function can be expressed as
B˜(r, c) =Γ(lΓ(r), r)− p(−r, r)(r + (−r)− 2lΓ(r))− c
=Γ(lΓ(r), r) + lΓ(r)− c
For r = 0.5φ(0) , we have lΓ(r) = − 0.5φ(0) and B˜(r, c) = −c < 0. Moreover, B˜(r, c) is
strictly increasing in r:
dB˜(r, c)
dr
=
dΓ(lΓ(r), r)
dl
dlΓ(r)
dr
+
dΓ(lΓ(r), r)
r
+
dlΓ(r)
dr
=2Φ
(
lΓ(r) + r
2
)
+
dlΓ(r)
dr
> 0
Once again, this statement holds for all r ∈ R. Furthermore, it can be shown that
there are δ > 0, ε ∈ (0, 1) such that dB˜(r,c)dr > ε > 0 holds for all r > 0.5φ(0) + δ.
Thus, it is guaranteed that limr→∞ B˜(r, c) > 0. We can conclude that there exists
a unique threshold r¯(c) > 0.5φ(0) such that B˜(r¯, c) = 0 and B˜(r, c) > 0 if and only
if r > r¯. In the maximum distance equilibrium, the party platforms are given by
(l, r) = (−r¯, r¯).
Finally, the threshold r¯ strictly exceeds c, the rightist party’s platform in the
minimum distance equilibrium. At r = c, we have
B˜(c, c) = Γ(lΓ(c), c) + lΓ(c)− c = [p (lΓ(c), c)− 1] (c− lΓ(c)) .
For all σ > 0, we have p (lΓ(c), c) < 1. Moreover, lΓ(c) < c holds generally. Thus,
B˜(c, c) < 0, which implies that r¯ > c by the arguments above.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
We prove the existence of symmetric equilibria with l = −d and r = d, where
d ∈ [c, c + ε] for some ε > 0. Consider an allocation in which both parties are
38
1.A Proofs
ecient, party medians are given by mL = −d, mR = d, and all party members
are weakly more extreme, i.e., ωi ≤ −d for all i ∈ML and ωj ≥ d for all j ∈MR.
Let all members contribute only the membership fee c to their party, so that each
party consists of exactlyC/c+1 ≥ 3members. Thus, the entry of amoremoderate
agent would not cause a shift in the party medians.
Recall that the platform bounds specied in Proposition 1.1 are only necessary,
but not sucient conditions. The allocation represents an equilibrium if and only
if conditions (I), (II) and (III) are satised. Conditions (I) and (III) are satised for
all d ≥ c, because leaving his party would induce a policy loss of d to each party
member, but only save the cost of activity c.
Condition (II) ensures that no independent agent can protably join one of the
parties. First, consider the case c < 0.5φ(0) . For all d ≤ 0.5φ(0) , we have lΓ(d) ≤
−d. Thus, the party medians prefer there own bliss point to any more moderate
platform. If c < 0.5φ(0) , the allocation characterized above represents an equilibrium
for all d ∈
[
c, 0.5φ(0)
]
, consequently. Now, consider case c ≥ 0.5φ(0) > 0, and let d ≥ c.
Then, some independent agents with ωi ∈ (−d, d) could indeed enter party L and
be nominated as presidential candidate. Taking into account the membership cost
c, their utility would however change by
Γ (ωi, r)− Γ (−d, d) + 2p (−d, d) (ωi − l)− c = Γ (ωi, r) + ωi − c
= [p (ωi, d)− 1] (d− ωi) + d− c < d− c.
Because p (ωi, d) < 1, the rst term in the last line is strictly negative. Thus,
there is a ε > 0 such that the utility change of the joining agent is negative for all
d ∈ [c, c + ε]. If the symmetric allocation satises this condition, it consequently
represents an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
The minimal distance boundary is given by r(c) = c, which directly gives the
derivative provided in Proposition 1.3.
Themaximal distance boundary r¯(c) is dened implicitly as the root of function
B˜(r, c) = Γ(lΓ(r), r) + lΓ(r)− c in r. Thus, its derivative is given as
dr¯(c)
dc
= −∂B˜(r¯, c)/∂c
∂B˜(r¯, c)/∂r
=
1
2Φ
(
lΓ(r)+r
2
)
+
dlΓ(r)
dr
> 0
Note that the positive sign of the denominator has already been proven for Propo-
sition 1.2.
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For the limit, r¯(0) is given by the root of Γ(lΓ(r), r) + lΓ(r). This equation is
satised for 0.5φ(0) . As there is at most one root as shown above, this must be the
limit r¯(0).
Proof of Proposition 1.5
First, note that r(c, σ) = c for all σ ≥ 0. Next, look at the derivative of r¯(c, σ)
with respect to σ. The maximum distance boundary is dened by r¯(c, σ) = r ∈
R : f (r, σ) = Γ(lΓ(r, σ), r, σ) + lΓ(r, σ) − c = 0. By Proposition 1.2, function f
has a unique root in r. The derivative follows as dr¯(c,σ)dσ = −∂f(r¯,σ)/∂σ∂f(r¯,σ)/∂r .
The partial derivative of f in r is given by:
∂f
∂r
=Γ1(lΓ(r, σ), r, σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dlΓ(r¯, σ)
dr¯
+ Γ2(lΓ(r, σ), r, σ) +
dlΓ(r, σ)
dr
=2 Φ
(
r + lΓ(r, σ)
2σ
)
+
dlΓ(r, σ)
dr
As r¯ + lΓ(r¯, σ) > 0 holds in general, the induced winning probability of party L
is strictly larger than one half. Thus, the partial derivative in r¯ is strictly positive.
∂f
∂r¯
> 1 +
dlΓ(r¯, σ)
dr︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1
> 0
With respect to the partial derivative of f in σ, we get the following expression
where I omit the arguments of lΓ(r, σ) in order to simplify notation.
∂f
∂σ
=
∂Γ(lΓ, r, σ)
∂lΓ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dlΓ
dσ
+
∂Γ(lΓ, r, σ)
∂σ
+
dlΓ
dσ
=− r
2 − l2Γ
2σ2
φ
(
r + lΓ
2σ
)
+
1
σ
8σ2lΓ + (r − lΓ)(r + lΓ)2
8σ2 + r2 − l2Γ
It can be shown that this expression is negative if and only if the following con-
dition holds:[
1− Φ
(
r + lΓ
2σ
)]
(r − lΓ)(r + lΓ)2 < 8σ2(r + lΓ)Φ
(
r + lΓ
2σ
)
− 8σ2lΓ
Making use of the fact that p(lΓ(r, c, σ), r, σ) >
1
2 once again, the following su-
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cient condition for ∂f∂σ < 0 can be derived:[
1− Φ
(
r + lΓ
2σ
)]
(r − lΓ)(r + lΓ)2 <4σ2(r − lΓ)
⇔
[
1− Φ
(
r + lΓ
2σ
)](
r + lΓ
2σ
)2
<1
Substituting b = r¯+lΓ2σ > 0, this condition is given as
fˆ (b) = b2 [1− Φ(b)] < 0
It can be shown that this condition holds on the relevant interval (for all b > 0).
Thus, we have established ∂f∂σ < 0.
Consequently, the maximum distance boundary r¯(c, σ) is strictly increasing in
σ:
dr¯(c, σ)
dσ
= −
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂f (r¯, σ)/∂σ
∂f (r¯, σ)/∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0
Finally, consider the limit of r¯(c, σ) for σ converging to zero. Look at platform
l˜ = −r+ ε with arbitrarily small ε > 0. The policy eect of this platform is given
by
Γ(l˜, r, σ) = (r − l˜)Φ
(
r + l˜
2σ
)
= (2r − ε)Φ
( ε
2σ
)
For σ → 0, this policy eect converges to limσ→0 Γ(l˜, r, σ) = 2r − ε. Thus,
l˜ = lΓ(r, 0) holds for ε → 0. Then, looking at the dening function of r¯(c, σ)
for general r, we get:
lim
σ→0
f (r, σ) = Γ(l˜, r, σ) + l˜ − c = 2r − ε− r + ε− c
Since r¯(c, σ) is dened to be the root of function f (r, σ) in r, we obviously have
the limiting result: lim
σ→0
r¯(r, σ) = c.
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Political Selection and the
Concentration of Political Power
2.1 Introduction
In representative democracies, political power is exercised by elected politicians.
The role of institutions is to enforce the voters’ interests within the political pro-
cess. From the founding of modern democracies in the 18th century to recent
constitutional drafts in Egypt and Lybia, political thinkers have been engaged in
nding the best institutions. A central question in the debate has been whether
political power should be concentrated on one group of political agents, typically
the party winning the general election, or dispersed between dierent groups.
Strikingly, there are pronounced cross-country dierences along this dimension,
with classical extreme cases being the United Kingdom (concentrated power), and
Switzerland (dispersed power).1
The Federalist Papers highlight two channels through which constitutions af-
fect social welfare: the selection of competent politicians into oce and the dis-
ciplining of politicians in oce.2 The economic literature on the second chan-
1For a discussion of this crucial issue and its relation to various specic institutions, see Lijphart
(2012), Lijphart (1999), and Tsebelis (2002).
2“The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought to be, rst to obtain for rulers men who
possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society; and
in the next place, to take the most eectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they
continue to hold their public trust” (Madison, 1788b).
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nel consistently nds that power-dispersing institutions increase welfare as they
help to discipline egoistic incumbents. In contrast, economists have little to say
about the rst channel, political selection (see Besley 2005). It cannot be taken
for granted that voters are able to identify and empower the most competent
politicians. Since voters base their ballot on their perceptions of candidates’ com-
petencies (Stokes, Campbell, and Miller, 1958; King, 2002; Pancer, Brown, and
Barr, 1999), politicians exert considerable eort to appear competent and virtu-
ous during electoral campaigns. This impedes the voters’ capacity to empower
able candidates. A comprehensive appraisal of political institutions thus has to
account for whether or not institutions enforce the selection of competent candi-
dates for oce.
The aim of this chapter is to study the eects of power-concentrating institu-
tions on the politicians’ campaign behavior and on political selection. We consider
a pre-election setup inwhich candidates are privately informed about their quality
and partly motivated by oce rents. Voters infer candidates’ qualities from their
policy proposals. We identify a trade-o that arises for changes in the level of
power concentration. On the one hand, higher concentration of power implies a
better allocation of power to competent candidates. We refer to this positive eect
on welfare as the empowerment eect of power concentration. On the other hand,
more concentration of power increases the desire of oce-motivated candidates
to win the election. Mimicking of competent candidates becomes more protable,
resulting in increasingly distorted policy choice. Thus, campaigns convey less in-
formation about the candidates’ competence, and the voters’ capacity to select
high-ability politicians is reduced. We label this negative eect on welfare the
behavioral eect of power concentration.
We formalize our argument by a simplemodel inwhich two candidates compete
in a public election by making binding policy proposals. In particular, they can
either commit to risky reforms or to the (riskless) status quo. Candidates dier
in their abilities, which are unobservable to the electorate. Only highly able can-
didates can increase expected welfare by implementing a reform, while less able
candidates should stick to the status quo. Voters observe policy proposals, draw
inferences about the candidates’ abilities, and vote accordingly. In equilibrium,
a reform proposal is associated with high ability, and reforming candidates win
the election more often than those proposing the status quo. Politicians do not
only care about welfare, but are also oce-motivated. This creates incentives for
low-ability candidates to mimic the policy choice of their more able counterparts
at the cost of adopting inecient policies.
Variations in the level of power concentration induce the empowerment eect
and the counteracting behavioral eect. The relative sizes of these eects depend
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on the importance of oce motivation in politicians’ preferences. The optimal in-
stitution balances both eects. We nd that the optimal level of power dispersion
is higher, the more politicians are driven by oce rents. If and only if politicians
care predominantly about implementing ecient policies, it is optimal to concen-
trate power completely in the hands of the election winner. Conversely, if oce
rents are a strong component of the candidates’ motivation, some dispersion of
political power enhances voter welfare.
The basic intuition behind this result is the following. Candidates’ oce mo-
tivation induces mimicking and distorts policy choices. Higher concentration of
power strengthens the electoral incentives and, consequently, aggravates these
distortions. For suciently high levels of oce motivation, it is optimal to reduce
the resulting ineciencies by decreasing the concentration of power, even though
this involves the delegation of some power to low-ability candidates. Hence, wel-
fare can be enhanced through power-dispersing institutions.
To provide an economic intuition, we rst analyze a simple model which ab-
stracts from many important aspects of the political process. The qualitative re-
sults are however robust to a number of extensions and modications. In section
2.8, we discuss two modications of the theoretical model. First, we allow for het-
erogeneous policy preferences in the electorate. In this setting, we additionally
show that power-dispersing institutions help to reduce inequality in the society,
giving rise to a second rationale for power dispersion. In other words, if the social
objective involves inequality aversion and a desire for balancing the interests of
dierent groups in the society, less power should be concentrated in the hands
of the election winner. Second, we relax the assumption of binding policy com-
mitments. The qualitative results derived for the main model continue to hold if
candidates are able to sometimes withdraw a proposed reform after the election,
as long as policy proposals are not pure cheap talk.
Data from international surveys like the International Social Survey Panel indi-
cate considerable dierences across countries in how voters assess the motives of
their politicians. Assuming that these dierences mirror actual heterogeneity in
politicians’ motivation, our theoretical analysis gives rise to a testable hypothesis:
Countries with strongly policy-motivated politicians benet from power concen-
tration. In contrast, countries with predominantly oce-motivated politicians
suer from reduced welfare if they concentrate political power.
In a cross-country design, we investigate whether the welfare eect of power
concentration indeed depends on politicians’ motivation. For this purpose, we
combine data on the perceived motivation of politicians with measures of polit-
ical institutions.3 As a measure for the performance of the political system, we
3We use Lijphart’s index of the executive-parties dimension, which orders political systems ac-
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use growth in real GDP per capita. Due to data availability restrictions, our anal-
ysis is restricted to eighteen established democracies, which rules out a rigorous
statistical test. Nevertheless, the data for this limited set of countries are in line
with our hypothesis.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the related literature.
Section 2.3 presents the model. Section 2.4 delivers the benchmark of perfect in-
formation. Thereafter, we analyze the equilibrium behavior of privately informed
politicians in Section 2.5. We proceed by examining the eects of institutions in
Section 2.6. In Section 2.7, we present design and results of the empirical analysis.
Section 2.8 provides two modications of the theoretical model, and Section 2.9
concludes. All formal proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2.2 Related literature
In this chapter, we identify the economic eects of power-dispersing institutions,
which limit the oce-holders discretion. Many economists have addressed this
question for a homogeneous set of politicians, thereby abstracting from polit-
ical selection. With homogenous politicians, power-dispersing institutions in-
crease voter welfare. For example, Lizzeri and Persico (2001) demonstrate in a
pre-election setting that oce-motivated politicians provide more of an ecient
public good and less pork barrel under proportional representation than under
plurality voting. In a post-election setting, Persson and Tabellini (2003) show
that voters are more able to discipline an incumbent if power is separated be-
tween multiple political agents.
These papers abstract from any heterogeneity in candidate quality and thus
from the role of political selection.4 The importance of incorporating selection
into the analysis of political institutions is demonstrated by Besley (2005). Se-
lecting competent politicians has two aspects. First, to choose among competing
candidates the one who holds most promise to design and implement ecient
policies. This aspect is based on the candidates’ campaign behavior. Second, to
keep in oce only politicians who perform adequately during the term. In other
words, politicians are screened both before and after an election.
The role of institutions for political selection has so far only been studied in
post-election settings. A rst model addressing this question is Maskin and Ti-
cording to the implied dispersion or concentration of power, considering ve categories of
political institutions (Lijphart, 1999).
4The assumption that candidates dier in a quality dimension, sometimes referred to as “valence
issue”, is applied in a large number of papers, including Adams (1999), Ansolabehere and Sny-
der (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Messner and Polborn (2004), Sahuguet and Persico
(2006), and Krasa and Polborn (2011).
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role (2004). It investigates conditions under which the voter prefers political deci-
sions to be taken by accountable “politicians” instead of non-accountable “judges”.
Maskin and Tirole (2004) argue that holding public ocials accountable in reelec-
tions provides incentives to pander to public opinion and is thus not optimal for
some kinds of political decisions. While they do not compare alternative demo-
cratic institutions, this approach is taken by Smart and Sturm (2013). They study
variations in the level of accountability through the introduction of term limits.
Depending on the share of public-spirited politicians, a limit of two terms as ap-
plied in many modern democracies is shown to be optimal.
Closest to this chapter is the analysis by Besley and Smart (2007), who study the
eects of several scal restraints on political selection in a post-election setting.
Similar to Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Smart and Sturm (2013), they identify
a trade-o between disciplining incumbents and improving political selection.
Whenever an institution allows the disciplining of bad incumbents, i.e., makes
them adopt welfare-enhancing policies, this prevents eective political selection
because voters are unable to distinguish a disciplined but bad politician from a
good one. Our pre-election model produces a dierent trade-o. If voters have
to infer the ability of candidates from their campaigns, dispersing power leads
to both better policy choice and better selection, but comes at the cost of giving
some political power to low-ability candidates. Besley and Smart (2007) consider
four scal restraints that limit the oce-holders’ discretion, including limits on
government size and transparency. Our focus, in contrast, is on power-dispersing
institutions, such as proportional representation, federalism, or public referenda.
Interestingly, Besley and Smart (2007) nd that three of the four restraints only
increase voter welfare if there are suciently many benevolent politicians. This
contrasts our result according to which power dispersion is optimal if and only if
the candidates are strongly driven by egoistic motives.
In this chapter as in the models discussed so far, the pool of political candi-
dates is taken to be exogenous. In general, however, political institutions could
also aect the quality of political selection by changing the set of agents that
decide to enter politics. This aspect has been studied by another branch of the
literature (Iaryczower and Mattozzi, 2008; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008; Caselli and
Morelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004). Closest to our analysis is the paper
by Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2008) who investigate the eects with alternative
voting systems on the quality of political candidates. They nd that neither the
majoritarian electoral system nor proportional representation clearly brings forth
a higher-quality pool of candidates. Other papers study whether the quality of the
candidate pool can be improved by nancial incentives, i.e., changing the levels of
wages paid to elected ocials (Mattozzi andMerlo, 2008; Caselli andMorelli, 2004;
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Messner and Polborn, 2004). In contrast, our model analyzes a broader range of
political institutions and their eect on the competence in government, but takes
the pool of candidates as given.
Finally, we relate to a growing empirical literature on democratic systems and
their eects on scal policy. The analyses often focus on specic political insti-
tutions (see, e.g., Feld and Voigt, 2003; Persson and Tabellini, 2004; Enikolopov
and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Blume et al., 2009; Voigt, 2011). In contrast, we apply
a classication of political systems based on the implied dispersion of political
power, thus encompassing a broad range of institutions. Using the same classi-
cation, Lijphart (1999; 2012) as well as Armingeon (2002) examine the inuence
of power dispersion on various political and economic outcomes. While Lijphart
(1999) nds no eect of power dispersion on measures of economic performance,
Armingeon (2002) nds a negative eect of power dispersion on unemployment
and ination. Complementing these ndings, we show that the eect of power
dispersion on growth in real GDP per capita positively depends on the strength
of politicians’ oce motivation.
2.3 The model
Our model studies the eects of institutions on candidates’ campaigns and polit-
ical selection. Candidates dier in quality, more precisely in the ability to imple-
ment welfare-enhancing policies. They are privately informed about their abil-
ities and commit to a policy prior to the election. The policy space is given by
the unit interval, where the end points correspond to the status quo and a large-
scale reform. Voters observe candidates’ campaigns and vote based on the welfare
they expect each candidate to provide. We depict political institutions in reduced
form, by means of how much political power is concentrated in the political sys-
tem. With higher concentration of power, the candidate receiving a majority of
votes is more capable to enforce his agenda.
The game consists of three stages. At the rst stage, nature independently
draws both candidates’ abilities a1 and a2, which are privately revealed to the
candidates. At the second stage, both candidates simultaneously make binding
policy proposals, x1 and x2. At the third stage, the voters observe the proposals,
update their beliefs about the candidates’ abilities and cast their votes. Based on
the election result, the set of political institutions determines how political power
is divided between both candidates. In general, the election winner as well as the
loser win have some inuence on policy choice.
While the basic model serves to clarify the main arguments, we allow for het-
erogeneity in the voters’ policy preferences and for a form of limited commitment
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in Section 2.8. While providing some additional insights, these modications do
not alter the main results derived in the following.
2.3.1 Voters
There is a continuum of fully rational and risk-neutral voters of mass one who
have preferences both over policy and candidates. In the considered policy eld,
an amount x ∈ [0, 1] of a risky reform can be implemented, where x = 0 and
x = 1 represent the status quo and a complete reform, respectively. If a reform is
successful, all voters receive a return of x, while a failed reform yields a return of
zero. Whenever policy x is adopted, all voters bear a cost of cx. Maintaining the
status quo is thus costless and yields a certain payo of zero.
Voters are not exclusively interested in their expected payo in the considered
policy eld. Instead, they also care about other policy elds and about the can-
didates’ ideologies or personal characteristics other than ability. We account for
these preferences by assuming that voters have heterogeneous candidate pref-
erences, following the probabilistic voting approach (see Lindbeck and Weibull
1987). If policy is set by candidate 1, voter k receives an additional utility of µk,
while we normalize the additional utility if candidate 2 determines policy to zero.
Let µk be distributed according to some continuous pdf that is symmetric around
zero and has full support on the interval [−1, 1]. This guarantees heterogeneity
in the resulting voting preferences.5
If candidate i implements policy xi, voter k receives a utility of
Vk(xi, i) =


1i=1 µk + xi (1− c)
1i=1 µk − c
1i=1 µk
if
reform succeeds
reform fails
status quo is maintained,
(2.1)
where 1i=1 denotes the indicator function which is one if i = 1 and zero other-
wise. Voter k prefers candidate 1 if and only if he expects Vk(x1, 1) to be larger
than Vk(x2, 2). We assume sincere voting, i.e., each voter casts his vote for his
preferred candidate. Hence, candidate i’s vote share depends positively on the
voters’ belief about the payo he provides, and negatively on the belief about the
payo provided by his opponent.
5Note that our results are independent of whether these candidate preferences are subject to an
additional aggregate shock as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
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2.3.2 Candidates
Two candidates run for oce. Each candidate i can commit to a policy xi ∈ [0, 1].
More able candidates design better reforms, i.e., reforms that are more likely to
succeed. We measure candidate i’s ability by the implied probability of a success-
ful reform, ai ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, policy xi set by candidate i provides an expected
payo of xi(ai − c) to each voter. Since candidate preferences are symmetrically
distributed around zero, this is candidate i’s expected welfare contribution.
Both agents’ abilities are realizations of two independent random variables with
identical cumulative distribution Φ. Let the corresponding density function φ
have full support on [0, 1] and be continuously dierentiable. Tomake the problem
interesting, we assume that the expected ability
∫ 1
0 aφ(a)da is below c. Thus, the
voters benet from a reform in expectation if and only if it is designed by a high-
ability candidate. After observing his ability, each candidate i commits to policy
xi ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the strategy Xi of politician i is a mapping from abilities to
policy proposals.
Each candidate cares about his amount of political power (oce motivation) as
well as about his expected welfare contribution (policy motivation). The utility
function of politician i is given by
Ui(ai, xi) = f (vi, ρ) [θ + xi(ai − c)] , (2.2)
where θ > 0 denotes the relative weight of oce motivation. Put dierently, θ
describes the increase in the candidates’ oce utility due to a marginal increase
in his amount of power.6 The term f (vi, ρ) ∈ (0, 1) captures candidate i’s political
power, which we dene as his inuence on policy implementation after the elec-
tion. As explained in more detail below, the implemented policy is in general a
compromise between both candidates’ proposals. More precisely, we assume that
the implemented policy is a linear combination of the proposals with weights be-
ing equal to the power of the candidates. Each candidate’s power depends on his
vote share vi and the parameter of power concentration ρ, representing the set of
political institutions. To simplify notation, this utility function is formulated at
an ex interim stage, i.e., taking the expected payo after the election but before
the reform outcome has been realized. For readability, we have also omitted the
dependence of vi on both candidates’ strategies and actions.
Note that candidate i only cares about how expected welfare is aected by his
policy choice, not about voter welfare in general. This way to formulate policy
6We assume that θ mirrors the candidates’ intrinsic utility of power exertion and can thus not
be manipulated by institutions. If the preference parameter θ could instead be decreased
by changing political institutions or the politicians’ wages, this would obviously be welfare-
enhancing.
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preferences of politicians has been introduced by Maskin and Tirole (2004), who
label it legacy motive. It captures the politicians’ desire to leave a positive legacy
to the public.7
2.3.3 Political institutions
We model political institutions by a power allocation function f that translates
election results into an allocation of political power, i.e., each politician’s prob-
ability to implement his policy proposal. Formally, candidate i’s power f (vi, ρ)
depends on his vote share vi and on the level of power concentration ρ implied
by the set of political institutions.
Denition 2.1. The continuously dierentiable function f : [0, 1]× R+ → [0, 1]
is a power allocation function if it satises
(i) symmetry in vi: f (vi, ρ) = 1− f (1− vi, ρ),
(ii) monotonicity in vi:
∂f(vi,ρ)
∂vi
≥ 0 ∀ ρ,
(iii) piece-wise monotonicity in ρ: ∂fi(vi,ρ)∂ρ > 0 ∀ vi ∈ (1/2, 1), and
(iv) limρ→∞ f (vi, ρ) is a step function with a discontinuity at vi =
1
2 .
Property (i) establishes anonymity, i.e., the constitution does not treat candi-
dates dierently. Property (ii) rules out that candidates receive a larger amount
of political power if they gain less votes in the election. By property (iii), the pa-
rameter ρ can be interpreted as a measure of power concentration. The higher ρ,
the larger is the amount of power assigned to the election winner, i.e., the candi-
date who gains more than half of the votes. Finally, (iv) implies that in the case of
full power concentration, the electoral margin does not matter. In other words,
the election winner receives all power that is allocated through the corresponding
election.
This modeling approach allows to study a large variety of institutional dier-
ences. Figure 2.3.3 illustrates how political institutions can be represented by
power allocation functions. Each panel depicts two examples. Throughout, the
solid line represents institutions that concentrate power more strongly than those
corresponding to the dashed line.
Panel I depicts two stylized allocation rules frequently used to compare elec-
toral systems in the theoretical literature (see, e.g., Lizzeri and Persico 2005). The
7Alternatively, we could assume that candidates directly care for welfare. While complicating
the analysis, this assumption would not change the qualitative results.
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Figure 2.1: Political institutions and corresponding power allocation functions.
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solid line represents institutions that fully concentrate power in the hands of the
election winner. In political economy, this step function is the standard way to
model plurality voting. The dashed line represents proportional representation,
which implies a lower concentration of political power and is often modeled by
the identity function f (vi, ρ) = vi.
A less simplistic representation of these two systems is shown in Panel II. Here,
the winner’s amount of power depends on his margin of victory, e.g., because
delegates might vote against the party lines. Plurality voting tends to generate
clear-cut majorities, as the winning party typically receives a share of parliamen-
tary seats beyond its vote share. In contrast, the allocation of seats corresponds
closely to vote shares under proportional representation. Thus, the dashed curve
for the proportional system is atter than the one for plurality voting.
In Panel III, the dashed line represents a political system with a supermajor-
ity requirement for certain policy decisions (as employed in Germany and the
US). This requirement generates additional steps in the power allocation function,
since some policies can only be enforced after a landslide victory. In contrast, the
solid line corresponds to a system as applied in the UK, where any decision can
be taken by a simple majority.
Finally, the dashed line in Panel IV depicts the use of direct democratic insti-
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tutions as employed for example in Switzerland. Even after a landslide victory in
the election, the winning party cannot always implement its agenda. The opposi-
tion party can block policies via a referendum or even enforce its own proposals.
Thus, only a limited part of political power is at stake in the parliamentary elec-
tion (similar arguments can be made with respect to federalism, bicameralism or
a constitutional court).
2.3.4 Eqilibrium concept and normative criterion
To solve the game, we apply the notion of Perfect Bayesian equilibria and the D1
renement proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987). A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of the game dened above consists of a strategy prole (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) and a belief
system σ∗ such that (1) both candidates play mutually best responses when an-
nouncing their policy proposals, anticipating the winning probabilities for each
vector (x1, x2) that are implied by the voters’ beliefs σ
∗, and (2) the voters’ belief
system σ∗ is derived from the candidates’ strategies X∗1 , X
∗
2 according to Bayes’
rule everywhere on the equilibrium path. A D1 equilibrium is a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium that is robust to the D1 criterion, which restricts the set of beliefs o
the equilibrium path. Intuitively, the D1 criterion rules out “unreasonable” be-
lief systems by requiring that each deviation from equilibrium actions must be
attributed to types that prot from it under the most general conditions.8
We investigate the eects of changes in power concentration, i.e., in the pa-
rameter ρ. As normative criterion, we use a utilitarian welfare function in ex ante
perspective, i.e., expected welfare before candidates’ abilities are drawn:
W (ρ, θ) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
φ(a1)φ(a2)
2∑
i=1
f (vi, ρ)Xi(ai)(ai − c) da2da1. (2.3)
Welfare is hence given by the weighted sum of the politicians’ welfare contri-
butions, integrated over all possible combinations of the candidates’ ability. The
weights correspond to the candidates’ power, f (vi, ρ). Note that welfare is calcu-
lated using equilibrium strategies, which are functions of the parameters ρ (power
concentration) and θ (candidates’ oce motivation).
8More precisely, D1 species the beliefs associated to each o-equilibrium action x as follows:
First, identify for each type a the set of beliefs Σ(a, x) for which the action would be prof-
itable. Second, type a belongs to set Ad(x) if there is some other type a
′ such that Σ(a, x) is
a strict subset of Σ(a′, x). D1 requires that action x must not be associated to any type in the
dominated set Ad.
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2.4 Benchmark case: perfect information
If individual abilities are observable to the electorate, voters condition their ballot
on candidates’ abilities and reform proposals. In particular, the fraction of citizens
voting for a candidate is increasing in his welfare contribution.
With perfect information, the agents’ oce and policymotives are fully aligned:
Each candidate maximizes his power by proposing the policy with the highest
welfare contribution. Hence, a complete reform (xi = 1) is proposed by high-
ability candidates with ai ≥ c. In contrast, a candidate with ability ai < c gains
more power by proposing the status quo instead of a reform with a negative wel-
fare contribution. Thus, equilibrium policy choices are undistorted: A politician
proposes to implement a complete reform if and only if the reform enhances wel-
fare. As a consequence, candidates with higher ability, i.e., those who propose to
reform, receive higher vote shares in the election.
This result has a direct welfare implication. While variations in power concen-
tration ρ do not distort candidates’ behavior, a higher concentration of power
allocates more power to candidates with higher welfare contribution. Hence,
welfare strictly increases with the level of power concentration. The following
Proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2.1. Under perfect information, candidates propose a complete reform
if and only if ai ≥ c. Welfare is maximized if political power is completely concen-
trated.
2.5 Imperfect information
For the remainder of this chapter, we assume that both candidates are privately
informed about their abilities. Voters observe the policy proposals x1, x2 and form
beliefs about the candidates’ abilities a1, a2, on which they base their voting deci-
sions. As a consequence, the vote shares of both candidates depend on the belief
system σ. More concretely, the belief system determines the expected welfare
contributions pˆii(xi) = xi [aˆi(xi)− c] for i ∈ {1, 2}, where aˆi(xi) denotes the ex-
pected ability of candidate i proposing policy xi implied by belief σ. In a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, these beliefs are consistent with the candidates’ strategies
everywhere on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 2.2. In every Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the strategy of candidate
i ∈ {1, 2} can be characterized by a cuto αi ∈ (0, c) and a reform magnitude
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bi ∈ [0, 1] such that
X∗i (ai) =
{
0 for ai < αi,
bi for ai ≥ αi.
(2.4)
By Proposition 2.2, both agents play simple cut-o strategies that involve at
most two actions. In the appendix, we rst show that the policy preferences of
candidate i satisfy a single-crossing property, given any belief system σ and strat-
egy X−i played by the opponent. Second, we nd that candidate i will propose
the same policy X∗i (ai) = x whenever his ability ai is above the reform cost c.
Consequently, any other equilibrium proposal x′ can only be proposed for some
ability below c. As the voters anticipate this, any proposal x′ 6= x will be associ-
ated with an expected ability aˆi (x
′) below c, and a negative welfare contribution
pˆii(x
′). But this implies that, for all agents with ability below c, proposing any pol-
icy x′ > 0 gives a lower welfare contribution as well as a lower vote share than
the status quo proposal xi = 0. Thus, candidate iwill never play any other action
than the status quo and a unique reform announcement bi > 0 in equilibrium.
The concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not pin down the exact level
of the reformmagnitude bi, however. For all parameter values, there exists in con-
trast a large set of equilibria with diering levels of b1 and b2. For some combina-
tions of the parameters ρ and θ, there even exist equilibria with bi = 0, in which
candidate i plays a pooling strategy, proposing the status quo independently of
his ability level. These equilibria are however supported by very pessimistic out-
of-equilibrium beliefs, associating a very negative ability to candidate iwhenever
he proposes some other policy.
Because the incentive to deviate by proposing a reform is strictly increasing in
the ability of candidate i, such pessimistic beliefs seem “unreasonable” though.
Indeed, the D1 criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987) rules out these beliefs
and consequently eliminates all equilibria with pooling strategies. More gener-
ally, we nd that only a small subset of the Pareto ecient equilibria are robust
to the D1 criterion.
Proposition 2.3. For all combinations of θ and ρ, the set of D1 equilibria is non-
empty. In every political D1 equilibrium, both candidates play identical strategies
X∗i (ai) =
{
0 for ai < α,
1 for ai ≥ α,
(2.5)
with a symmetric cutoα ∈ (a, c), where a > 0 is implicitly dened by ∫ 1a adΦ(a) =
0.
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The D1 criterion restricts the beliefs for o-equilibrium actions. Intuitively, it
requires that the voters must associate the deviation to any o-equilibrium action
x′ to the types that benet from this deviation under the largest set of beliefs
(Cho and Kreps, 1987). In this model, this equilibrium renement eliminates all
equilibria with bi 6= 1 for one of the candidates. If bi would in contrast dier from
unity, the D1 criterionwould require that the voters must associate an expectation
of aˆi(1) = 1 to the o-equilibrium action xi = 1. Given this belief, the deviation
would however be protable for high-ability agents. Thus, only Perfect Bayesian
equilibria with full reforms by both candidates are robust to the D1 criterion.9
By Proposition 2.3, the equilibrium behavior of both candidates is completely
characterized by the symmetric cuto α ∈ (a, c). If candidate i has an ability
above the cuto α, he can achieve a higher payo by proposing a full reform
xi = 1 than by proposing the status quo. Formally, the utility dierence
Ea−i [Ui(ai, 1)|X∗−i (a−i) , σ]− Ea−i [Ui(ai, 0)|X∗−i (a−i) , σ] (2.6)
is positive if ai > α, and negative if ai < α. At the cuto level ai = α, candidate
i is indierent between both actions. For any level of rho, α is implicitly dened
by the equation
R(α, ρ) =Ea−i [Ui(α, 1)|X∗−i (a−i) , σ]− Ea−i [Ui(α, 0)|X∗−i (a−i) , σ]
= θ
(
f (vr(α), ρ)− 1
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in oce utility
+
[
1
2
+ Φ(α)
(
f (vr(α), ρ)− 1
2
)]
(α− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in welfare contribution
= 0 .
(2.7)
Here, vr(α) denotes the vote share of a reforming candidate when facing an op-
ponent who proposes the status quo, given that the voters’ beliefs are consistent
with the equilibrium cuto α. In the following, we refer to function R(α, ρ) as
the reform incentive function.
Equation (2.7) distinguishes between both aspects of the politicians’ prefer-
ences. By proposing a reform instead of the status quo, a candidate can gain more
political power, but will also provide a dierent welfare to the voters. For the cut-
o type, both eects exactly outweigh each other. As a consequence, the cuto α
satises two conditions in every equilibrium. First, the reform proposal must be
associated with a positive welfare contribution, i.e., aˆi(1) =
∫ 1
α adΦ(a) > c. This
9In contrast, equilibria with b1 = b2 = 1 are robust to the D1 criterion. The formal arguments
are provided in more detail in the appendix.
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requires α to exceed the lower bound a > 0, as the average ability is assumed to
be below c. In equilibrium, policy proposals thus provide at least some informa-
tion to the voters. Assume in contrast a negative welfare contribution, aˆi(1) < c.
Then, reforming candidates would achieve a lower vote share than those propos-
ing the status quo. Thus, no type with ability below c would prefer proposing a
reform, which is inconsistent with the assumption aˆi(1) < c.
Thus, a reform proposal is always associated with a positive contribution, and
leads to a higher vote share than the status quo. It follows that candidates with
ability above c always choose to reform. They gain not only from their positive
welfare contribution, but also from an increase in expected oce rewards. Thus,
the equilibrium cutos must be strictly below c. For all abilities below c, in con-
trast, a reform proposals leads to two counteracting eects in oce utility and
his welfare contribution. In particular, each candidate is willing to commit to an
inecient reform for all abilities in the interval [α, c) in order to achieve a higher
vote share.
In general, the number of D1 equilibria depends on the properties of the ability
distribution Φ. The following regularity condition ensures equilibrium unique-
ness.
Assumption 2.1. The pdf of the ability distribution φ(a) is bounded from above
with φ(a) < 1+Φ(a)c−a for all a < c.
Proposition 2.4. Under Assumption 2.1, there is a unique D1 equilibrium.
As argued above, any root of the reform incentive function R(α, ρ) in its rst
argument represents a D1 equilibrium. Assumption 2.1 ensures that R is mono-
tonically increasing in its rst argument for all levels of ρ and θ. This directly
rules out the possibility of multiple equilibria. Assumption 2.1 is fullled, e.g., for
the uniform distribution. For the remainder of the chapter, we take it as given
and derive the eects of variations in the institutional setting in the unique D1
equilibrium.10
2.6 Effects of power-concentrating institutions
Empirically, democratic countries dier strongly in their political institutions and
the implied power concentration. As we have argued in Subsection 2.3.3, our
10If Assumption 2.1 is not satised, multiple equilibria may arise. The following analysis of the
eects of power concentration is still valid if we restrict our attention to the equilibrium with
the highest cuto level, which also involves the highest level of welfare.
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framework allows to represent these dierences by an appropriate power alloca-
tion function f (vi, ρ). In this section, we study the eects of variations in power
concentration ρ.
2.6.1 Effects on candidates’ behavior
The power allocation function f determines the electoral incentives of political
candidates. Under perfect information, variations in power concentration leave
the behavior of candidates unaected and policy choice is ecient (see Proposi-
tion 2.1).
With asymmetric information and oce-motivated candidates, in contrast, pol-
icy choice is distorted as some low-ability candidates propose welfare-reducing
reforms. Political institutions aect the magnitude of these policy distortions.
Proposition 2.5. Increasing power concentration ρ leads to the proposal of strictly
more inecient reforms: dαdρ < 0.
Consider some level of power concentration ρ0. The cuto type with ability
ai = α0 < c is dened by the condition (2.7), i.e., is indierent between a reform
proposal and the status quo. We nd that after an increase in power concentra-
tion, the cuto type strictly prefers to propose a reform. In particular, his utility
of proposing the status quo decreases while his utility of proposing a reform in-
creases.
If the cuto type proposes the status quo, his welfare contribution is equal to
zero. Thus, he only draws utility from oce rents, which are in expectation pos-
itive in any equilibrium. With increasing power concentration, these oce rents
are reduced because he receives less power when running against a reforming
opponent.
If the cuto type proposes a reform, he again receives oce rents, but also in-
curs a utility loss due to his negative welfare contribution. His overall utility is
given by the sum of these two components, which is positive because it must be
equal to the utility from a status quo proposal. With increasing power concen-
tration, both the oce rents and the negative welfare contribution increase by
the same factor. Hence, his utility from a reform proposal also increases by this
factor.
Consequently, with higher levels of power concentration, status quo proposals
yield lower utility while reform proposals become more attractive. The equilib-
rium cuto thus decreases with the level of power concentration.
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2.6.2 Effects on welfare
In the following, we study the eects of power-concentrating institutions on ex
ante welfare. With privately informed candidates, the relation between power
concentration and welfare is not as clear-cut as under perfect information.
On the one hand, there is still a positive empowerment eect of power concen-
tration. Whenever both policies are proposed, the majority of votes goes to the
reforming candidate, who provides higher expected welfare than the candidate
proposing the status quo (see Section 2.5). Consequently, any increase in power
concentration ρ assigns more power to the appropriate candidate.
On the other hand, the previous section demonstrated a negative behavioral
eect of power concentration. By reinforcing the electoral stakes, stronger con-
centration of power induces the proposal ofmore inecient reforms. This reduces
the information revealed during the campaigns and limits the voters’ capacity to
allocate power to high-ability candidates.
We impose the following regularity condition on the ability distribution.
Assumption 2.2. The ability distribution is log-concave, i.e., Φ(a)/φ(a) is non-
decreasing in a.
Assumption 2.2 is satised for many common distributions, including the nor-
mal, the uniform and the exponential distributions.
Lemma 2.1. The welfare functionW is strictly quasi-concave in ρ.
Lemma 2.1 implies that the welfare function has a unique maximum in ρ. Its
proof involves analyzing how power concentration inuences the empowerment
eect and the behavioral eect.
First, consider the positive empowerment eect. With increasing ρ, a reform-
ing candidate receives more power if he runs against an opponent proposing the
status quo. Welfare is increased by this reallocation of power because reforms are
associatedwith a positive expectedwelfare contribution as argued above. The size
of the empowerment eect is determined by the average reform payo. At higher
levels of ρ, more inecient reforms are proposed, so that the average reform pay-
o is diminished. Consequently, the empowerment eect is strictly decreasing in
ρ, as illustrated by the solid line in Figure 2.6.2.
Second, consider the negative behavioral eect. It results because increasing
power concentration leads to a reduction in the cuto α. The size of this eect
depends on, rst, the marginal welfare loss from a decline in α, and second, the
sensitivity of α with respect to changes in power concentration. Both factors are
aected dierently by increasing power allocation.
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Figure 2.2: Empowerment eect and behavioral eect
¶W
¶Α
¶Α
¶ Ρ
¶W
¶ Ρ
2 4 6 8
Ρ
Welfare Effect
The welfare eects of a change in ρ for a logistic power allocation function with mean µ = 0.5 and
scale parameter β = 1/ρ, µk distributed according to N (0, 0.5), a uniform ability distribution,
θ = 1, and c = 0.6. The solid line represents the (positive) empowerment eect, the dashed line
represents the (negative) behavioral eect. The optimal level of ρ is attained at the intersection of
both lines.
Regarding the rst factor, higher power concentration induces the cuto to de-
part further from its ecient level c. As increasingly inecient reforms are pro-
posed, the marginal welfare loss from reductions in α increases with ρ. Regarding
the second factor, the sensitivity of α depends on the additional vote share a can-
didate gains by proposing a reform, which is directly related to the average reform
payo. For higher levels of power concentration, the average reform payo be-
comes smaller and so does the additional vote share. Thus, higher levels of ρ come
along with a reduced sensitivity of α, which attenuates the behavioral eect. As
a consequence, the behavioral eect is non-monotonic in ρ (see the dashed line
in Figure 2.6.2).
The sign of the overall eect of power concentration on welfare depends on the
relative sizes of both eects. With a log-concave ability distribution, the ratio of
empowerment eect and behavioral eect is strictly decreasing in ρ at every local
extremum, as we show in Appendix A. Thus, the welfare function cannot have an
interior minimum and at most one interior maximum in ρ, which corresponds to
the denition of quasi-concavity.
Proposition 2.6. If and only if oce motivation is below some threshold level θ¯,
welfare is maximized by full concentration of power. If instead θ > θ¯, it is optimal
to disperse power, ρ∗(θ) ∈ (0,∞), and the optimal concentration of power is strictly
decreasing in the candidates’ oce motivation, dρ
∗
dθ < 0.
Proposition 2.6 establishes a relation between parameter θ, capturing the can-
60
2.7 Empirical analysis
didates’ motivation, and the optimal level of power concentration. Intuitively,
higher oce motivation makes mimicking more attractive and induces more in-
ecient reforms. Allocating power to reforming candidates is consequently less
benecial, so that the positive empowerment eect decreases in θ. Furthermore,
higher oce motivation reinforces the negative behavioral eect, since candi-
dates respond more strongly to the electoral incentives.
Regarding the optimal constitution, we have to distinguish two cases. First,
consider the case of mainly policy-oriented candidates, θ < θ¯, in which mim-
icking is not prevalent and the average reform payo is large. In this case, the
negative behavioral eect is suciently small to be dominated by the positive
empowerment eect for all levels of ρ. Consequently, welfare is maximized by
full concentration of power. Second, consider the case of mainly oce-motivated
candidates, θ > θ¯, in whichmimicking is widespread. Hence, the behavioral eect
is reinforced relative to the empowerment eect. It is then optimal to attenuate
electoral incentives by decreasing power concentration. Both eects outbalance
each other at some interior level ρ∗ ∈ (0,∞) that represents the optimal institu-
tion. By the same logic, the optimal level of power concentration is reduced with
any further increase in the level of oce motivation.
So far, this section has studied the optimal institutional setup, given that polit-
ical power is delegated through democratic elections. However, our model also
allows to investigate whether the democratic selection of political leaders is de-
sirable at all. A similar question has been addressed by Maskin and Tirole, 2004,
who compare decision-making by accountable “politicians” and non-accountable
“judges”. A non-democratic regime allocates all political power to a randomly
chosen dictator. While such a regime obviously rules out selection, it also elimi-
nates incentives for inecient policy choice. In our model, this non-democratic
system yields the same welfare as the limiting case of a democratic system with
fully dispersed power. Consequently, Proposition 2.6 implies that democratic sys-
tems with appropriately chosen power concentration always dominate the non-
democratic alternative. In contrast, Maskin and Tirole (2004) nd that, under
certain circumstances, political decisions should rather be delegated to “judges”
than to “politicians”.
2.7 Empirical analysis
In this section, we analyze whether data for established democracies support our
model predictions. Proposition 2.6 states that power concentration is conductive
to the implementation of ecient policies if politicians exhibit low levels of oce
motivation, θ < θ¯. At higher levels of oce motivation, in contrast, it is optimal
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to disperse power. Moreover, the optimal degree of power concentration declines
for further increases in oce motivation. The implications of our model can be
summarized in the following Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2.1. The eect of power concentration onwelfare depends on the level of
politicians’ oce motivation. If politicians are mainly policy-motivated, power con-
centration has signicantly positive eects on welfare. If politicians are in contrast
mainly oce-motivated, the welfare eect of power concentration is signicantly
smaller or even negative.
While this theoretical prediction can in principle be confronted with empiri-
cal data, several restrictions to data availability make a rigorous stochastical test
infeasible. In particular, objective measures for the politicians’ oce motivation
or the ability of empowered politicians do not exist for obvious reasons. We are
however able to resort to some indirect measures that exist for a (only) limited
set of established democratic countries. In the following, we suggest an empirical
strategy based on a cross-country analysis that illustrates the consistency of our
model predictions with the data.
2.7.1 Operationalization
The empirical analysis requires three basic measures. As the dependent variable,
we need a measure of ecient policies. Key independent variables are the degree
of power concentration within the political system and the extent of politicians’
oce motivation.
As a measure for ecient policies, we use growth in real GDP per capita (World
Bank). It provides a concise and objective measure of developments that bear the
potential of welfare improvements for the general public. Growth has been used
as outcome variable by a number of other empirical studies on political institu-
tions as Feld and Voigt (2003) and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007). Other
frequently used outcome measures relate to scal policy (see Voigt, 2011), which
is not addressed in our model.
Several measures of democratic institutions have been discussed in the litera-
ture. Lijphart’s index of the executive-parties dimension captures the concentra-
tion of power that is implied by the set of political institutions (Lijphart, 1999).
This well-established measure quanties how easily a single party can take com-
plete control of the government. We revert the original index, so that high values
of our explanatory variable correspond to high concentration of power within
the political system. Index values are provided for 36 economically developed
countries with a long democratic tradition. The measure is based on the period
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1945-1996. New Zealand underwent major constitutional changes after 1996 and
is thus excluded from the analysis. Its inclusion, however, does not change the
qualitative results.
While oce motivation cannot be measured objectively, indication for it may
come from voter surveys. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in-
cludes questions on voters’ opinions about politicians.11 The item relevant to our
studywas included in its 2004 survey (ISSP Research Group, 2012), whichwas per-
formed in most democratic states: “Most politicians are in politics only for what
they can get out of it personally." Agreement with this statement is coded on a
ve point scale. We use the mean points of all survey participants in a country as
our measure for the importance of oce motivation. That means we assume that
dierences in this item reect dierences in politicians’ motives.12
For an easy interpretation of regression results, we normalize the indices for
both oce motivation and power concentration to range between zero and one.
High values indicate pronounced oce motivation of political leaders or a strong
concentration of political power, respectively.
2.7.2 Design
Our analysis focuses on countries with a similar degree of democratization. We
require that all countries be established democracies as identied by the 2002
Polity IV Constitutional Democracy index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). All coun-
tries have to feature an index of 95 or higher, which excludes Venezuela from the
sample. The remaining 18 countries in the sample are similar with respect to their
economic characteristics. In particular, all countries are economically highly de-
veloped, as classied by the World Bank. They furthermore feature a Human
Development Index (HDI) of at least 0.9 in 2004, which places them in the top
quintile of all countries.13
The time-invariant regressors require a cross-country analysis. All explanatory
variables correspond to 2004 or earlier years. As dependent variable, we use aver-
age economic growth per year after 2004. By this choice of the time horizon, we
11Other surveys such as theWorld Values Survey, the Global Barometer Survey, the Eurobarome-
ter, or the European Value Survey query trust or condence in institutions, such as the political
parties and the national parliament. Such questions only indirectly relate to politicians’ moti-
vation.
12Alternatively, one could use measures that are based on experts’ assessments like the Cor-
ruption Perception Index from Transparency International and the Worldwide Governance
Indicators from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009). However, these indices focus on rent
extraction and not on private motivations of politicians in general.
13The similarity in socioeconomic development was formulated as a major prerequisite for cross-
country analyses in Armingeon (2002).
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limit address potential problems of reverse causality as the explanatory variables
cannot be aected by our explained variable.14
To test for an interaction eect between our main explanatory variables, power
concentration and oce motivation, we include the product of both variables in
the regression.15 We control for variables that may be correlated with both our
explanatory variables and our explained variable. Most notably, past economic
performance aects growth (see, e.g., Barro, 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1994) and may
also alter voters’ perception of politicians. We hence control for GDP per capita in
2004. Besides, the empirical growth literature has identied other variables that
robustly aect growth, such as capital accumulation, school enrollment rates, life
expectancy, or openness of the economy (see, e.g., Sala-i-Martin, 1997). Given
the size of our country sample, it is however impossible to control for all these
variables in one regression. To capture these inuences and to keep the number
of explanatory variables low, we add past growth in real GDP per capita (from
1991 to 2004) to the regression.16
2.7.3 Results
For a rst description of the data, we split the country set at the median value
of politicians’ oce motivation. Figure 2.3 plots growth against concentration of
power separately for the two sets of countries. The left panel depicts the rela-
tionship for countries in which politicians’ oce motivation is below its median
value. For this group of countries, the gure does not reveal a clear pattern. The
right panel depicts the relationship for countries in which politicians’ oce mo-
tivation is above its median value. For this set, countries with more concentrated
power seem to experience less economic growth. For both groups of countries,
the bivariate correlations between power concentration and growth support this
observation.17
14It is instead possible that our explained variables are aected by past growth prior to 2004. If
growth before and after 2004 were correlated, this might lead to a spurious correlation be-
tween our explanatory and explained variables. We eliminate this possibility by controlling
for growth before 2004 explicitly in our regression model.
15The analysis of an interaction eect can be problematic if the interacting variables are highly
correlated. However, we nd no signicant correlation between power dispersion and oce
motivation (Pearson’s correlation coecient ρ = −0.199, p = 0.427). This also suggests that
historically developed political institutions within a country do not exhibit the optimal level
of power concentration.
16Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Appendix C.
17For countries with high levels of politicians’ oce motivation, there is a negative and weakly
signicant relationship between growth and power concentration (Pearson’s correlation co-
ecient, ρ = −0.618, p = 0.076), while there is no signicant relationship between the two
variables for countries with low levels of politicians’ oce motivation (Pearson’s correlation
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Figure 2.3: Power concentration, oce motivation and growth: Empirical patterns
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For a statistical test of the eects of power concentration on economic growth,
we conduct an regression analysis that also controls for relevant covariates. For
this analysis, we use oce motivation as a continuous explanatory variable in-
stead of the binary measure used above. Table 2.1 presents the regression results.
Test statistics are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Column (a) displays the results of a regression model without interaction term.
In this regression, the coecient of power concentration estimates the eect on
economic growth under the assumption that this eect does not depend on the
level of oce motivation. We nd that this coecient is insignicant.
This picture changes if the interplay between power concentration and politi-
cians’ motivation is taken into account. Column (b) reports the corresponding re-
gression results. Most importantly, the coecient of the interaction term between
power concentration and oce motivation is negative and signicant. Thus,
power concentration is more negatively related to growth, the more oce-moti-
vated politicians are. The inclusion of the interaction term in the regression also
strongly increases the explanatory power of the econometric model. The adjusted
R2 increases from 0.19 to 0.49, even though no additional information is used.
As it turns out, power concentration comes along with either increased or de-
creased growth prospects depending on the level of politicians’ oce motivation.
The conditional eect of power concentration at the lowest and the highest level
of oce motivation in our country set are reported in Table 2.2. At the lowest
level of oce motivation, power concentration is positively related to growth. In
contrast, this relationship is negative at the highest level of oce motivation. Our
coecient, ρ = −0.291, p = 0.447).
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Table 2.1: Power concentration and growth: OLS regression results
Growth in real GDP per capita (2004-2011)
(a) (b)
Power concentration −0.852 3.565*
(0.490) (1.637)
Oce motivation −0.125 2.566*
(1.090) (1.182)
Power concentration -8.948**
· oce motivation (3.520)
Real GDP per capita −0.025 −0.0436*
in 2004 (in $ 1000) (0.025) (0.021)
Growth in GDP per capita −0.267*** −0.352***
(1991-2004) (0.079) (0.059)
Constant 2.382** 1.845**
(1.090) (0.806)
adjusted R2 0.19 0.49
F 4.38 14.17
N 18 18
Standard errors are provided in brackets. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, re-
spectively.
analysis thus leads to the following result.
Result 2.1. The higher is ocemotivation, the more negative is the relation between
power concentration and growth. Furthermore, power concentration is negatively
related to growth if politicians’ oce motivation is high. If politicians are mainly
policy-motivated, power concentration comes along with increased growth.
We conclude that the data is in line with the model presented in this chap-
ter. We do not only observe a negative and signicant interaction eect, but also
that the eect of power concentration changes its sign as suggested by the theory.
Moreover, taking this interaction eect into account increases explanatory power
considerably. In the analysis of political institutions, neglecting the interplay be-
tween power concentration and politicians’ ocemotivation thus conceals actual
patterns and yields misleading conclusions.
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Table 2.2: Conditional eects of power concentration
lowest oce motivation highest oce motivation
Coecient 3.565* −5.382**
Standard error 1.637 1.955
The table depicts the coecient of power concentration for the lowest level of oce motivation (θ = 0)
and for the highest level of high oce motivation (θ = 1). ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1-, 5-, and
10-percent level, respectively.
2.7.4 Discussion of empirical results
We conduct several robustness checks for our empirical analysis. In the following,
we discuss the use of dierent indicators for our main variables, a possible impact
of the nancial crisis on our results, and an alternative explanation for our result.
First, we check whether the negative and signicant interaction term between
power concentration and politicians’ oce motivation is robust to the use of dif-
ferent measures for our key variables. Instead of politicians’ motivation from the
ISSP, we also use condence in political parties as contained in the third wave
of the World Values Survey (WVS) concluded in 1998 (WVS, 2009). Using this
measure and adjusting the GDP and growth variables to the survey date, the in-
teraction eect remains negative and signicant (p=0.009, F=1141.31, N=10). Un-
fortunately, the set of countries covered both by the third wave of the WVS as
well as by Lijphart is even smaller than for our preferred model. Other surveys
on politicians’ oce motivation have been conducted only very recently and are
thus not applicable within our research design.
The measure for power concentration by Lijphart (1999) is available in a more
current version from Armingeon et al. (2011). The use of this indicator yields
a highly signicant interaction term (p=0.009, F=9.95, N=17). Armingeon et al.
(2011) also provide a modied index that focuses on institutional factors only. It is
based on the variables "electoral disproportionality" and "number of parties" and is
invariant to behavioral factors such as "absence ofminimalwinning coalitions" in-
cluded in the original index. Using this measure instead, the results remain signif-
icant (p=0.061, F=15.99, N=17). We also use three dierent measures that capture
important aspects of power concentration and nd similar patterns. For the index
for checks and balances (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003) and a plurality electoral sys-
tem dummy (Beck et al., 2001), the interaction eect is signicant and shows the
expected sign (p = 0.046, F = 17.26, N = 18 and p = 0.087, F = 8.91, N = 18,
respectively). For the nine-categorial type of electoral system (IDEA, 2004), how-
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ever, the coecient is insignicant (p = 0.159, F = 8.53, N = 18).
Second, one might fear that our result is inuenced by the nancial crisis which
aected output beginning in 2008. To ensure that the nancial crisis does not
drive patterns in the data, we may restrict explained GDP growth to the years
2004-2007. For this shorter period, the interaction term between power concen-
tration and oce motivation remains weakly signicant (p=0.092, F=4.20, N=18).
Using the World Values Survey for our measure of politicians’ oce motivation
we can expand explained GDP growth to the years 1998-2007. These data provide
a similar picture (p=0.062, F=127.54, N=10). An alternative approach to deal with
the nancial crisis is to exclude countries that were particularly aected. The re-
sult is robust to the one-by-one exclusion of each country in our sample from the
analysis (all p-values below 0.068, F above 4.82) as well as to the exclusion of any
subset of the countries Ireland, Spain, and Portugal (all p-values below 0.031, F
above 4.82), which were hit most severely by the nancial crisis.
Finally, the empirical result could be explained by a dierent channel. In partic-
ular, it could be argued that the main role of political institutions is to discipline
rent-seeking politicians. In particular, power-dispersing institutions may restrict
rent extraction in oce, which would be more important the more politicians
value rents. However, the altered behavior of politicians would also aect the
possibility to screen politicians in oce and to reelect only good ones. Empiri-
cally, we cannot distinguish between our explanation and this alternative, since
measures for politicians’ oce motivation may capture not only preferences for
power per se, but also for rent extraction. Besley and Smart (2007) however study
this alternative channel in a post-election model, investigating the eects of four
scal restraints that limit the oce holders’ discretion. According to their the-
oretical results, three of these constraints enhance welfare only if the share of
benevolent politicians is suciently large. This suggests that power dispersion
enhances welfare only if oce motivation is low, which is in contrast to our the-
oretical results and the empirical ndings.
2.8 Extensions
In the following section, we discuss two modications of the theoretical model
studied above. First, we allow for heterogeneous policy preferences of voters in
the sense that reforms may benet a majority of voters, but harm some minority
in the society. We show that all result derived above continue to hold. With
heterogeneous policy preferences, however, the question arises whether political
institutions can help to secure the rights of the minority. Second, we show that
limited commitment, i.e., the possibility to withdraw a proposal after the election
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with a certain probability, does not change the results. For both extensions, we
slightly simplify the model by abandoning the assumption of a continuous policy
space. Instead, we assume that candidates can only choose between two policy
proposals, the status quo and the full reform.18
2.8.1 Heterogeneous preferences
In political philosophy as well as public debate, a major virtue of power dispersion
is seen in the political representation ofminorities and the prevention of a tyranny
of the majority. For example, James Madison argues in the Federalist #51 that
"the rights of the minority will be insecure" without proper checks and balances
(Madison, 1788a). So far, our analysis has abstracted from this aspect of political
institutions in order to emphasize eects of power dispersion that are independent
of minority rights.
To incorporate heterogeneity in voters’ policy preferences into our model, we
may assume that voters dier in their benet from a reform rather than in their
candidate preferences. In particular, voter k receives a payo of µk if a reform
is successfully implemented. Let the preference parameter µk be symmetrically
distributed according to the pdf ξ(µ) and the cdf Ξ(µ) with full support on some
interval
[
µ, µ¯
]
. We assume that the mean preference is larger than the reform
cost c, while µ ∈ (0, c). This implies that a majority of voters is in favor of the
reform, as long as it is adopted by a suciently able candidate, while a minority
unambiguously prefers the status quo.
Proposition 2.7. If the voters have heterogeneous policy preferences according to
distribution Ξ(µ), Propositions 2.1 and 2.3 to 2.6 continue to hold.
Essentially, the proofs for all previous results hold whenever the expected vote
share of a reforming candidate i is increasing in the average ability of candidates
that propose a reform, i.e., in the equilibrium cuto αi. The basic model can be
seen as the special case with a degenerate distribution function with µk = 1 for
all voters.19
18Recall that, for themainmodel, these are the only proposals that are made along the equilibrium
path in any D1 equilibrium.
19Our model also allows for additional (ideological) heterogeneity with respect to the candidates.
Let the reforms advocated by both candidates be targeted towards dierent groups of voters
and let µki denote the payo to voter k from a successful reform by candidate i. If both
parameters share the unconditional distributionΞ(µ) dened above, Proposition 2.7 continues
to hold for any correlation between µk1 and µk2. With negative correlation, the candidates’
reform proposals dier strongly or are even diametrically opposed (as in a stylized left-right
policy space).
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Given these heterogeneous policy preferences, our model allows to reconsider
Madison’s conjecture. Increasing power dispersion leads to higher amounts of
power for candidates proposing the status quo, which is the minority’s preferred
option. As a consequence, the status quo is proposed more often yielding an
additional increase in the minority’s welfare.
Lemma 2.2. In any informative equilibrium, the utility of each minority voter k
with µk ≤ c is strictly decreasing in the concentration of political power.
The quote above suggests that the Founding Fathers of the United States were
interested in the protection of minority rights per se. Formally, this objective
can be captured by introducing inequality aversion into the welfare function, us-
ing a strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously dierentiable
weighting function w:
WIA =
∫ µ¯
µ
w(V (µk, ρ))ξ(µk)dµk.
In this function, V (µk, ρ) represents the expected utility of a voter with preference
µk. Following Atkinson (1973) and Hellwig (2005), the relative curvature of w can
be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion. Compared to the inequality-
neutral welfare function, WIA puts higher weights on voters with low expected
utility.
Proposition 2.8. Any welfare functionWIA with inequality aversion is maximized
at a lower level of power concentration than the inequality-neutral functionW .
Intuitively, power-dispersing institutions reduce the discretion of the election
winner, who is chosen by the majority. The expected utility of the majority of
voters is hence reduced while the minority is better o. The utility of the minority
is valued strongly by an inequality averse constitutional designer. Thus, he will
choose to disperse power more strongly than if he were inequality-neutral.20
2.8.2 Limited commitment
The assumption of full commitment is widely used to ensure tractability of models
(see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2003). However, it may seem too restrictive that
politicians can never change or adapt their agenda. In our setting, candidates
20Note that WIA is maximized at a strictly lower level than W for any θ > θ¯. For the opposite
case, even constitutional designers with small degrees of inequality aversion will prefer to
concentrate power completely.
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with ability lower than c have an incentive to withdraw a reform proposal when
they gain power. A straightforward way to introduce limited commitment into
the model is to assume that, with probability λ > 0, the environment changes
after the election and politicians may deviate from their proposal. For example,
this could be due to an unexpected shock in the policy eld or a major event in
another policy eld. With probability 1 − λ, on the contrary, they have to carry
out their proposal.
Proposition 2.9. Suppose policy proposals are binding with probability λ. Then
Propositions 2.1 and 2.3 to 2.6 continue to hold.
This form of limited commitment increases incentives to propose a reform for
low ability candidates, since they may be able to withdraw their proposal after
the election. However, this only aects the level of equilibrium cutos and not
the qualitative results.
Note that the welfare eect of reduced commitment is ambiguous. On the one
hand, all candidates with ability ai < cwithdraw their reforms with probability λ,
thereby increasing welfare. On the other hand, as limited commitment diminishes
the negative welfare contribution of a reform proposal for low ability candidates,
more inecient reforms are proposed. Thus, reform proposals become less infor-
mative to the voters, and high-ability candidates receive less political power. The
worse selection of politicians as well as the more inecient reform proposals per
se represent negative eects on welfare.
2.9 Conclusion
We have investigated how the level of power concentration aects campaign be-
havior of politicians and social welfare if candidates are oce-motivated and pri-
vately informed about their ability. Increasing the concentration of power has
two eects. On the one hand, it has a positive empowerment eect because more
power is given to electionwinners, who provide higherwelfare in expectation. On
the other hand, it also has a negative behavioral eect. Stronger concentration of
political power reinforces the incentive for low-ability candidates to mimic more
able ones. This limits the voters’ capacity to identify and empower high-ability
politicians.
The optimal institutional design balances both eects. We have shown that
the optimal level of power concentration is negatively related to the extent of
oce motivation. If politicians care mainly about welfare, power concentration
yields strictly positive eects. In politicians are mainly oce-motivated, on the
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contrary, welfare is maximized by institutions that divide power between elec-
tion winner and loser. Intuitively, the concentration of power induces distortions
in policy choice of oce-motivated candidates. The more oce-motivated the
candidates are, the more benecial it is to reduce these distortions by means of
power-dispersing political institutions.
In the empirical part, we have confronted these predictions with data for eigh-
teen established democracies. Our ndings are in line with the theoretically de-
rived hypothesis. In a regression with economic growth as dependent variable,
we nd a negative and signicant interaction eect between oce motivation
and power concentration. For the highest levels of oce motivation, power-
concentrating institutions come along with signicantly lower economic growth,
while we nd a positive correlation for countries with the lowest levels of oce
motivation.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs for main model
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Ecient policy choice
Since voters can directly observe candidates’ abilities as well as their policies, they
are able to anticipate their expected policy payos, xi (ai − c) for i ∈ {1, 2}. The
vote share of candidate 1 is consequently given by
v1(x1, x2, σ) = 1− Ω(x2(a2 − c)− x1(a1 − c)),
which is strictly increasing in his welfare contribution x1 (a1 − c).
Candidate 1 chooses x1, taking into account his opponent’s strategy X
∗
2 , to
maximize
Ea2 [U1(x1, a1)] =
∫ 1
0
φ(a2)f (v1(x1, X
∗
2 (a2), σ) , ρ)da2︸ ︷︷ ︸
fFI(x1)
(θ + x1(a1 − c)) .
ByDenition 2.1, f is monotonically increasing in v1. As long as f
FI(x1) > 0, this
implies that candidate 1 is only interested in maximizing his welfare contribution.
Moreover, candidate i can always achieve fFI(x1) > 0 by proposing the status
quo policy, x1 = 0.
Thus, the dominant strategy is given by
XFI1 (a1) =
{
xi = 0
xi = 1
for
ai < c
ai > c.
By symmetry, the same reasoning applies for candidate 2.
Positive welfare eect of increasing power concentration
Under full information, welfare is given by
WFI(ρ) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
φ(a1)φ(a2)
[
f (v1, ρ)X
FI
1 (a1) + (1− f (v1, ρ))XFI2 (a2)
]
da2da1
As argued above, equilibrium behavior is independent of ρ. The derivative of the
welfare function with respect to power concentration is thus given by
∂WFI(ρ)
∂ρ
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
φ(a1)φ(a2)
∂f (v1, ρ)
∂ρ
[
XFI1 (a1)−XFI2 (a2)
]
da2da1 > 0
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If X∗1 > X
∗
2 , we have v1 >
1
2 , and
∂f
∂ρ is positive by Denition 2.1. If instead
X∗1 < X
∗
2 , v1 <
1
2 implies that
∂f
∂ρ is negative. Thus, all terms below the integral
with X∗1 6= X∗2 are strictly positive, while all others are zero, ensuring a strictly
positive derivative.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
The following notation is used in the proofs below. We denote by aˆi(x) ≡ E [ai ∈
[0, 1] : X∗i (ai) = x] the expected ability that voters associate to candidate i if he
proposes policy x. The vote share of candidate 1 results as v1(x1, x2, σ
∗) = 1−
Ω [x2 (aˆ2(x2)− c)− x1 (aˆ1(x1)− c)]. By fˆ (x) = Ea−i
[
f
[
vi
(
x,X∗−i(a−i)
)
, ρ
]]
,
we denote the expected power share that agent i can gain by proposing x, given
his opponent’s equilibrium strategy X∗−i. The proof involves three steps.
First, X∗i (ai) = 0 is true for some ai ∈ [0, 1] in each equilibrium. Assume oth-
erwise thatX∗i (ai) > 0 for all ability levels. Because the expected ability is below
c, there must be some equilibrium action x′ such that aˆi(x
′) < c. Because this
implies a negative expected payo x′ (aˆ(x′)− c), proposing x′ leads to a smaller
vote share for candidate i than the status quo proposal xi = 0, given any action
x−i by the opponent. By the denition 2.1, we also have fˆ (0) ≥ fˆ (x′). Moreover,
fˆ (0) > 0 is true because, by the same arguments, there must be some equilibrium
action x′′ such that aˆ−i < c. Whenever ai ≤ c, candidate i is strictly better o
with the status quo proposal than with x′:
fˆ (0)θ > fˆ (x′)
[
θ + x′ (ai − c)
]
Thus, x′ can at most be proposed by some agent with ability ai ≥ c, which contra-
dicts aˆi(x
′) < c. More generally, this implies that candidate i with ai < c strictly
prefers the status quo proposal to any action x > 0 associated with aˆi(x) < c.
Second, each candidate i can propose at most one positive reform proposal x >
0. Assume that the strategy of candidate i involvestwo dierent actionsX∗i (a
′) =
x′ and X∗i (a
′′) = x′′ for two ability levels a′′ > a′. By the optimality of X∗i for
each ability level, this requires that[
fˆ (x′′)x′′ − fˆ (x′)x′
] (
a′′ − c) ≥ [fˆ (x′)− fˆ (x′′)] θ
≥
[
fˆ (x′′)x′′ − fˆ (x′)x′
] (
a′ − c)
Both conditions can only be satised if fˆ (x′′)x′′ ≥ fˆ (x′)x′. If the latter inequality
were satised with equality, we would have fˆ (x′′) 6= fˆ (x′). In this case, candidate
i would either strictly prefer x′ to x′′ for all ability levels, or vice versa. This
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contradicts the initial assumption that x′ and x′′ are both played in equilibrium.
If instead fˆ (x′′)x′′ > fˆ (x′)x′, which is only possible with x′′ > 0, there is a
unique cuto α′ such that candidate i prefers x′′ to x′ if and only if ai > α
′. This
implies that aˆi(x
′′) > aˆi(x
′). As x′′ can only be an equilibrium action if aˆi(x
′′) ≥ c
as argued above, this implies fˆ (x′′) ≥ fˆ (x′). Consequently, the cuto α′ is below
c, so that candidate i strictly prefers x′′ to x′ for all abilities ai > c. But then, x
′
can at most be the optimal action for some ability levels below c, implying aˆi < c.
Whenever x′ > 0, however, candidate i strictly prefers the status quo proposal to
x′ whenever ai ≤ c as argued above. Thus, X∗i (ai) = x′ can only be satised for
some ai ∈ [0, 1] if x′ = 0.
Third, assume that X∗i (a) = 0 and X
∗
i (a
′) = b > 0 for some abilities a′ 6= a.
The second condition can only be satised if fˆ (b) > 0. Then, candidate i prefers
b to 0 if and only if
ai ≥ fˆ (0)− fˆ (b)
fˆ (b)
θ + c = αi.
Thus, each candidate plays a cuto strategy as claimed in Lemma 2.2.
For fˆ (0) ≥ fˆ (b), we would have αi > c and aˆi(b) > c. But this implies that
fˆ (b) > fˆ (0), a contradiction. For fˆ (0) < fˆ (b), the cuto is instead below c
(see Lemma 2.2). To be consistent with fˆ (0) < fˆ (b), αi must however satisfy∫ 1
αi
aφ(a)da > 0, which is equivalent with α > a.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Non-robustness of (0, b) equilibria with b < 1
The D1 criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987) renes the equilibrium con-
cept by restricting o-equilibrium beliefs. Intuitively, it requires that each devia-
tion from equilibrium strategies must be associated to the set of types that would
benet from this deviation for the largest set of beliefs. Put dierently, a deviation
to some action cannot be associated to a type t if there is some other type t′ such
that the deviation would be protable for an agent with type t′, rst, for all beliefs
such that the deviation would be protable to type t, and second, for some beliefs
such that the deviation would not be protable to type t.
Generally, the set of D1 equilibria is a subset of the set of Perfect Bayesian
equilibria. In our model, this criterion eliminates all equilibria in which X∗i (1) is
unequal to 1. Consider some equilibrium with b < 1. For an agent with ai < αi,
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a deviation to x = 1 would be protable for any belief such that
fˆ (1) > fˆ (0)
θ
θ + ai − c ≥ fˆ (b)
θ + b(ai − c)
θ + ai − c .
For an agent with ai > αi, instead, a deviation to x = 1 would be protable for
any belief such that
fˆ (1) > fˆ (b)
θ + b(ai − c)
θ + ai − c .
The right-hand side is below fˆ (b) for all ai > αi, and strictly decreasing in ai.
Thus, the set of beliefs giving rise to a protable deviation to x = 1 is strictly
larger for ai = 1 than for all ai < 1. The D1 criterion thus stipulates aˆi(1) = 1,
implying 1 (aˆi(1)− c) > b (aˆi(b)− c) > 0 and fˆ (1) > fˆ (b). Given this belief, the
deviation from b to 1 is however protable for candidate iwhenever ai ≥ c. Thus,
no equilibrium with b ∈ (0, 1) is robust to the D1 criterion. By similar arguments,
equilibria with pooling by one candidate are not robust with respect to D1.
Robustness of (0, 1) equilibria
Second, the equilibria identied in Lemma 2.3 satisfy D1. Consider a deviation to
any b′ ∈ (0, 1). For agents below αi, this deviation is protable if and only if
fˆ (b′) > fˆ (0)
θ
θ + b′(ai − c) > fˆ (0).
For agents above αi, the deviation is protable if
fˆ (b′) > fˆ (1)
θ + ai − c
θ + b′(ai − c) .
As the right-hand side is strictly increasing in ai, the deviation must be attributed
to type αi < c according to D1. Given this belief, we have fˆ (b
′) < fˆ (0), so that
the deviation is not protable to candidate i for any ai ∈ [0, 1].
Symmetry of cutos
By the arguments above, candidate i proposes xi = 1 if and only if his ability is
above αi ∈ (0, c), and the status quo policy otherwise. The vote share of candi-
date 1 depends positively on the dierence x1 [aˆ1(x1)− c] − x2 [aˆ2(x2)− c] and
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parameter ρ. Let g be the expected power share above one half, dened by
g(x1 [aˆ1(x1)− c]− x2 [aˆ2(x2)− c] , ρ) ≡ f (v1(x1, x2, σ), ρ)− 1
2
.
Denote by pii ≡ aˆi(1)− c the expected welfare contribution that the voters expect
from candidate i given proposal xi = 1. Using these functions, the cut-o abilities
α1 and α2 are implicitly dened as follows.
For candidate 1, proposing the status quo gives an expected utility of{
Φ (α2)
1
2
+ [1− Φ (α2)]
[
1
2
− g (pi2, ρ)
]}
θ,
while the reform proposal x1 = 1 gives an expected utility of{
Φ (α2)
[
1
2
+ g (pi1, ρ)
]
+ [1− Φ (α2)]
[
1
2
+ g (pi1 − pi2, ρ)
]}
[θ + a1 − c] .
The reform incentive function R1 measures the utility gain of candidate 1 from
proposing a reform instead of the status quo, depending on a1, and the cutos α1
and α2:
R(a1, α1, α2) =(1− Φ(α2))
[(
g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + 1
2
)
(θ + a1 − c)
]
+ Φ(α2)
[(
g(pi1, ρ) +
1
2
)
(θ + a1 − c)
]
− (1− Φ(α2))
(
1
2
− g(pi2, ρ)
)
θ − Φ(α2)θ1
2
.
For the cuto ability α1, the reform incentive is zero in equilibrium.
R1(α1, α1, α2) = 0
⇔ θ [Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2)) [g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi2, ρ)]]
c− α1 =
1
2
+ Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2))g(pi1 − pi2).
Subtracting the corresponding equation for R2, we get
θ [Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2)) [g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi2, ρ)]]
c− α1
− θ [Φ(α1)g(pi2, ρ) + (1− Φ(α1)) [−g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi1, ρ)]]
c− α2 =
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Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2))g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)− Φ(α1)g(pi2, ρ)
+ (1− Φ(α1))g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)
⇔
[
θΦ(α2)
c− α1 −
θ(1− Φ(α1))
c− α2 − Φ(α2)
]
g(pi1, ρ)
−
[
θΦ(α1)
c− α2 −
θ(1− Φ(α2))
c− α1 − Φ(α1)
]
g(pi2, ρ)
+
[
(1− Φ(α2))
(
θ
c− α1 − 1
)
+ (1− Φ(α1))
(
θ
c− α2 − 1
)]
g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0.
If α1 = α2, this condition is trivially fullled. Assuming wlog α1 > α2, the
equality above can only be satised if[
θΦ(α2)
c− α1 −
θ(1− Φ(α1))
c− α2 − Φ(α2)
]
g(pi1, ρ) <[
θΦ(α1)
c− α2 −
θ(1− Φ(α2))
c− α1 − Φ(α1)
]
g(pi2, ρ).
However, we have pi1 > pi2 by assumption, which implies g(pi1, ρ) > g(pi2, ρ).
Furthermore, we can show that the factor before g(pi1, ρ) is larger than the one
before g(pi2, ρ):
θ
c− α1Φ(α2)−
θ
c− α2 (1− Φ(α1))− Φ(α2) >
θ
c− α2Φ(α1)−
θ
c− α1 (1− Φ(α2))− Φ(α1)
⇔ θ
c− α1 + Φ(α1) >
θ
c− α2 + Φ(α2).
The last inequality is clearly fullled, generating a contradiction. Thus, the reform
incentive functions R1 and R2 cannot simultaneously attain zero for dierent
cutos, and there are only symmetric equilibria.
Existence
Let pi denote the dierence in welfare contributions between a reform and a sta-
tus quo proposal. Making use of the symmetric cutos, the incentive function
simplies to
R(α, ρ) =
[
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
]
(α− c) + θg(pi, ρ) = 0.
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Note that R(1, ρ) is always positive. If R(0, ρ) < 0, the reform incentive is equal
to zero at least once due to continuity, and there exists an interior equilibrium. If
R(0, ρ) ≥ 0, it is an equilibrium that candidates of all abilities choose to reform.
Hence, there is at least one equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Next, we establish uniqueness. The derivative of the incentive function with re-
spect to α is
∂R
∂α
= (θ + (α− c)Φ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)∂pi
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
(
1
2
+ (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
The reform incentive function yields that A is always larger than zero in equilib-
rium for the cuto type. B is also larger than zero, due to Assumption 2.1. The
reform incentive is thus throughout increasing in the cuto. Consequently, the
reform incentive attains zero for at most one cuto value.
We use implicit dierentiation to prove that there is a unique θ˜(ρ) such that
the unique equilibrium is informative if and only if θ < θ˜(ρ). If θ = θ˜(ρ) < ∞,
the reform incentive is exactly zero for α = 0. In an informative equilibrium, the
derivative of the cuto in θ is given by
dα
dθ
= − g(pi, ρ)
(θ + (α− c)Φ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)∂pi∂α +
(
1
2 + (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
) < 0.
The denominator is positive (see above), as is the numerator. Thus, this derivative
is strictly negative in any informative equilibrium, and α > 0 for any θ < θ˜(ρ).
Moreover, the reform incentive function implies that α → c if θ → 0. By conti-
nuity, there is a unique θ˜(ρ) > 0 such that the unique equilibrium is informative
if θ < θ˜(ρ).
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Again, we use implicit dierentiation to evaluate the derivative.
dα
dρ
= − (θ + (α− c)Φ(α))gρ(pi, ρ)
(θ + (α− c)Φ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)∂pi∂α +
(
1
2 + (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
)
< 0.
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While the numerator is unambiguously positive, the positive sign of the denom-
inator follows from Assumption 2.2. Hence, the overall eect is negative.
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Using the symmetry in equilibrium, welfare can be simplied considerably.
W (ρ)
2
=
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(a− c)da︸ ︷︷ ︸
z(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
.
Note that there is a direct eect on welfare, since the function g(pi, ρ) depends on
ρ, and an indirect eect, since ρ changes the strategies of the politicians. Hence,
we evaluate the total derivative ofW (ρ):
dW
dρ
=
∂W
∂ρ
+
∂W
∂α
dα
dρ
.
In the following, we denote byD > 0 the denominator of the derivative of αwith
respect to ρ.
dW
dρ
=Φ(α)z(α)gρ(π, ρ)+
+
{
(c− α)φ(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(π, ρ)
)
+ z(α)
(
φ(α)g(π, ρ) + Φ(α)gpi(π, ρ)
∂π
∂α
)}
dα
dρ
=
{
Φ(α)z(α) [θ + (α− c)Φ(α)] gpi dπ
dα
+Φ(α)z(α)
[
1
2
+ (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(π, ρ)
]
−
[
(c− α)φ(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(π, ρ)
)
+ z(α)
(
φ(α)g(π, ρ) + Φ(α)gpi(π, ρ)
∂π
∂α
)]
[θ +Φ(α)(α− c)]} gρ(π, ρ)
D
=
gρ(π, ρ)
D
{
Φ(α)z(α)
[
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(π, ρ) + (α− c)φ(α)g(π, ρ)
]
− [φ(α)θg(π, ρ) + z(α)φ(α)g(π, ρ)] c− α
2g(π, ρ)
}
=
gρ(π, ρ)
D
{
Φ(α)z(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(π, ρ)
)
− φ(α)(c− α)
[
θ
2
+ z(α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)
)]}
=
gρ(π, ρ)
D
{
Φ(α)
W (ρ)
2
− φ(α)(c− α)
[
θ
2
+
W (ρ)
2
]}
=
gρ(π, ρ)
2D
{Φ(α)W (ρ)− φ(α)(c− α) (θ +W (ρ))}
In any interior (ρ <∞) extreme value of the welfare function, the term in brack-
ets has to equal zero, since its factor is positive. Rearranging, we get the following
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necessary and sucient condition for interior extreme values of the welfare func-
tion:
h(ρ) ≡ Φ(α)
φ(α)(c− α) −
(
1 +
θ
W (ρ)
)
= 0.
Next, we prove that function h has at most one root in ρ, i.e., the welfare func-
tion attains at most one maximum. Assumption 2.2 is a sucient condition for
the rst term to be decreasing in ρ and, thus, increasing in α. In any interior
extreme value of the welfare function, the second term is constant in ρ. Thus, h
is decreasing in ρ at each interior root and so is the term in brackets. As h(ρ) is
continuous in ρ, this implies that the welfare function has at most one interior
maximum and no interior minimum, i.e., it is strictly quasi-concave.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
In the next step, we show how the optimal level of ρ shifts with changes in θ. The
optimal level of ρ is interior whenever limρ→∞ h(ρ) < 0, since limρ→0 h(ρ) > 0
for all θ. For θ → 0, we get α = c from the equilibrium condition. The limit of
h(ρ) at θ = 0 is given by limρ→∞ Φ(c)W (ρ). This is strictly positive for all ρ <∞.
Hence, the optimal institution embodies full concentration of power for θ → 0.
Due to continuity, this is also true for an interval around 0. In contrast, for large θ,
α is close to zero if power concentration is high and limρ→∞ h(ρ) < 0. Hence, the
optimal level of power concentration is interior. Finally, we show that the optimal
ρ decreases monotonically in θ at any interior maximum. Implicit dierentiation
gives
dρ∗
dθ
= −
dh(ρ)
dθ
dh(ρ)
dρ
∣∣∣
ρ=ρ∗
.
As argued before, the term in the denominator is negative. With respect to the
numerator, note that the equilibrium cuto α is decreasing in θ, dαdθ = −g(pi,ρ)D <
0. Consequently, the same is true for welfare, dWdθ =
∂W
∂α
dα
dθ < 0. Hence, h is
monotonically decreasing in θ. In total, we conclude that dρ
∗
dθ < 0. Overall, this
implies that there is a cuto θ¯ such that if and only if θ > θ¯, the optimal level of
ρ is smaller than innity and strictly falling in θ.
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Appendix 2.B Proofs for extensions
Proof of Proposition 2.7
The proofs in Appendix A only use one important feature of the vote share func-
tion vi(x1, x2, σ). Namely, we use that the vote share of candidate i is weakly
increasing in his expected ability given a reform proposal, and thus in the dif-
ference in welfare contributions between a reform and a status quo proposal. In
the following, we show that this still holds for the case of heterogeneous policy
preferences. All other proofs do not change. In the new setting, voter k votes for
candidate 1 if
x1(µkaˆ1(x1)− c) ≥ x2(µkaˆ2(x2)− c),
where aˆj(xj) denotes the expected ability of candidate j ∈ {1, 2}.
If both candidates propose a reform, candidate 1 receives all votes if aˆ1(1) >
aˆ2(1), and zero if the opposite is true. Thus, the vote share is monotonically in-
creasing in aˆ1(1).
If candidate 1 faces a status quo proposing opponent, his expected vote share is
v1(x1 = 1, x2 = 0, σ) =
∫ l
c
aˆ1(1)
ξ(µk)dµk.
The derivative with respect to aˆ1 is strictly positive.
If candidate 1 instead proposes the status quo, he provides a certain payo of
zero to all voters, independent of his ability. Thus, the vote share does not depend
on the expected ability aˆi(0). Hence, the expected overall vote share of candidate
i is weakly increasing in his expected competence and, thus, his welfare contri-
bution.
Proof of Lemma 2.2
In an informative equilibrium, the expected utility of voter k with reform prefer-
ence µk is given by
V (µk, ρ) = 2
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
.
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It is strictly increasing in µk, and negative for any µk ≤ c. Its derivative with
respect to power concentration follows as
dV (µk, ρ)
dρ
= 2Φ(α)
dg
dρ
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
+ 2
[(
φ(α)g + Φ(α)
dg
dρ
)∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
−φ(α)(c− µα)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)]
dα
dρ
= 2
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
(Φ(α) + φ(α− c)) dg
dρ
∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
+ 2
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
φ(α)(c− µα)dα
dρ
=
gρ
D
{
[Φ(α)− φ(α)(c− α)]
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)∫ 1
α
φ(a)(µka− c)da
−φ(α)(c− µα)θ
2
}
.
For any ρ ≤ ρ∗(θ), the term Φ(α) − φ(c − α) is positive by Proposition 2.6 and
Assumption 2.2. Thus, the expected utility of every voter with µk < c is strictly
decreasing in ρ on this interval. By a similar argument as used in Lemma 2.1, it
can be shown that V (µk, ρ) has at most one minimizer. For the limit case ρ→∞,
however, we nd that dVdρ ≤ 0. In this limit, we have g(pi, ρ) = 1, which implies
θ ≥ [1 + Φ(α)] (c − α) and a negative sign of the bracket in the last line above.
Thus, V (µk, ρ) is monotonically decreasing in ρ.
Proof of Proposition 2.8
The proof consists of two steps. First, we show that there exists at least one max-
imum for some ρ < ρ∗. Second, we ensure that there can never be a maximum
for any ρ ≥ ρ∗. Note that the expected utility V (µk, ρ) is increasing in the re-
form preference µk. Due to the strict concavity of w, this directly implies that
w′(V (µk, ρ)) > w
′(V (µ′k, ρ)) for any µk < µ
′
k. Moreover, the cross derivative of
expected utility with respect to ρ and µk is
d2V (µk, ρ)
dρ dµk
=
2gρ(pi, ρ)
D
[(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
(Φ(α) + φ(α)(α− c))
∫ 1
α
aφ(a)da
+
θ
2
αφ(α)
]
.
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Since this term does not depend on µk, the marginal eect of ρ on expected utility
is monotonic in µk. Take any welfare function of an inequality averse society:
WIA(ρ) =
∫ µ¯
µ
w(V (µk, ρ))ξ(µk)dµk.
Its derivative with respect to ρ is
dWIA(ρ)
dρ
=
∫ µ¯
µ
w′(V (µk, ρ))
dV (µk, ρ)
dρ
ξ(µk)dµk.
For the case of ρ′ < ρ∗, the cross derivative d
2V (µk,ρ)
dρ dµk
is larger than zero. All
terms of it are always positive except for (Φ(α) + φ(α− c)). This, however, is
positive for all ρ′ ≤ ρ∗ (see Proposition 2.6 and Assumption 2.2). The positive
cross derivative yields
dWIA(ρ)
dρ
=
∫ µ¯
µ
w′(V (µk, ρ))
dV (µk, ρ)
dρ
ξ(µk)dµk <
dW (ρ)
dρ
=
∫ µ¯
µ
dV (µk, ρ)
dρ
ξ(µk)dµk.
The derivatives of the expected utility are smaller for voters with smaller µk. Ex-
actly these utilities are weighted more strongly in the case of inequality aversion,
since w′(V (µk, ρ)) > w
′(V (µ′k, ρ)). Hence, the derivative of the welfare func-
tion at ρ∗ is negative, and there exists at least one local maximum for some level
ρ′ < ρ∗.
Now consider the case of ρ′ > ρ∗, where dWdρ < 0. From above, we know
that the cross derivative is throughout either positive or negative. Suppose the
cross derivative is positive. Then, we have that dWIAdρ
∣∣∣
ρ′
< dWdρ
∣∣∣
ρ′
< 0, and there
cannot be a maximum at ρ′. Suppose that the cross derivative is negative at ρ′.
From Lemma 2.2, we know that the marginal eect of ρ is throughout negative
for voters with µ < c. As a consequence of the negative cross derivative, the
marginal eect is negative for all agents. Thus, the derivative ofWIA is certainly
negative. Overall, there cannot be any maximum in the range [ρ∗,∞).
Proof of Proposition 2.9
For the case of limited commitment, the proofs of Propositions 2.1 and 2.3 to 2.6
need to be considered one by one. We shorten the proof whenever it is analogous
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or very similar to the case with full commitment. The proof of Proposition 2.1
does not rely on full commitment and thus carries over to the new setting.
Proof of Proposition 2.3 with limited commitment
We just need to prove symmetry of cutos. The proof with regard to the classi-
cation of equilibria is identical to the case with full commitment. In equilibrium,
the reform incentive with limited commitment simplies to
R1(α1, α1, α2) =
θ [Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ2) [g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi2, ρ)]] +
λ(α1 − c)
[
1
2
+ Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2))g(pi1 − pi2)
]
= 0
⇔ θ [Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2)) [g(pi1 − pi2, ρ) + g(pi2, ρ)]]
λ(c− α1) =
1
2
+ Φ(α2)g(pi1, ρ) + (1− Φ(α2))g(pi1 − pi2).
Subtracting the corresponding equation for the second player and proceeding as
in the proof with full commitment, we obtain[
θΦ(α1)
λ(c− α2) −
θ(1− Φ(α2))
λ(c− α1) − Φ(α1)
]
g(pi2, ρ) =[
θΦ(α2)
λ(c− α1) −
θ(1− Φ(α1))
λ(c− α2) − Φ(α2)
]
g(pi1, ρ)+[
(1− Φ(α2))
(
θ
λ(c− α1) − 1
)
+ (1− Φ(α1))
(
θ
λ(c− α2) − 1
)]
g(pi1 − pi2, ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
If α1 = α2, this condition is trivially fullled. Assuming wlog α1 > α2, the
equality above implies that[
θΦ(α2)
λ(c− α1) −
θ(1− Φ(α1))
λ(c− α2) − Φ(α2)
]
g(pi1, ρ) <[
θΦ(α1)
λ(c− α2) −
θ(1− Φ(α2))
λ(c− α1) − Φ(α1)
]
g(pi2, ρ).
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However, we have pi1 > pi2. Moreover, we can show that
θ
λ(c− α1)Φ(α2)−
θ
λ(c− α2)(1− Φ(α1))− Φ(α2) >
θ
λ(c− α2)Φ(α1)−
θ
λ(c− α1)(1− Φ(α2))− Φ(α1)
⇔ θ
λ(c− α1) + Φ(α1) >
θ
λ(c− α2) + Φ(α2).
Thus, the reform incentive functions R1 and R2 can never simultaneously attain
zero for α1 > α2. Thus, there can only be symmetric equilibria.
With respect to equilibrium existence, the reform incentive function simplies
to
R(α, ρ) =
[
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
]
λ(α− c) + θg(pi, ρ) = 0.
Note that it is always positive ifα = 1. IfR(0, ρ) < 0, the reform incentive is equal
to zero at least once, due to the continuity and there exists an interior equilibrium.
If R(0, ρ) ≥ 0, it is an equilibrium that all candidates choose to reform. Hence,
there is at least one equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.4 with limited commitment
Next, we establish uniqueness. The derivative with respect to α is
∂R
∂α
= (θ + (α− c)λΦ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)∂pi
∂α︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+λ
(
1
2
+ (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
The remainder of the proof is analogous to the case with perfect commitment.
Proof of Proposition 2.5 with limited commitment
We use implicit dierentiation to prove the proposition:
dα
dρ
= − (θ + λ(α− c)Φ(α))gρ(pi, ρ)
(θ + (α− c)λΦ(α))gpi(pi, ρ)∂pi∂α + λ
(
1
2 + (Φ(α) + (α− c)φ(α))g(pi, ρ)
)
< 0.
While the numerator is unambiguously positive, the positive sign of the denom-
inator follows from Assumption 2.1.
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Proof of Proposition 2.6 with limited commitment
Inserting equilibrium strategies, the welfare function can be simplied to
W (ρ)
2
=
(
λ
∫ 1
α
r(a)da + (1− λ)
∫ 1
c
r(a)da
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
z(λ,α)
(
1
2
+ Φ(α)g(pi, ρ)
)
,
where r(a) = φ(a)(a − c). The total derivative of the welfare function can be
simplied along the same lines as with full commitment and yields the same nec-
essary and sucient condition for extreme values:
h(ρ) =
Φ(α)
φ(α)(c− α) −
(
1 +
θ
W (ρ)
)
= 0.
Thus, the rest of the proof is equivalent.
For the second step, we have to show how the unique maximum changes with
θ. For θ → 0, we get from the reform incentive α = c and
dW (ρ)
dρ
∣∣∣
θ=0
=
gρ(pi, ρ)
D
Φ(α)λW (ρ).
This is positive. For θ → 0, the optimal institution hence fully concentrates power.
Due to continuity, we get that this is also true for an interval around 0. Since
h(ρ, α) does not changewith limited commitment, we again refer the reader to the
proofs for full commitment to see that the optimal ρ is monotonically decreasing
in θ.
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Appendix 2.C Data
Description and sources of variables
Main variables
Growth in real GDP per capita Average growth rate. Computed based on
per capita GDP in constant 2000US$. World
Bank (2012).
GDP per capita Denominated in constant 2000 TUS$.
World Bank (2012).
Oce motivation International Social Survey Programme
2004: Citizenship I. ISSP Research Group
(2012).
Power concentration Lijphart’s index for executive-parties di-
mension, reverted. Lijphart (1999).
Variables for robustness checks
Trust in political parties World Values Survey, third wave. WVS
(2009).
Power dispersion Time-variant proxy for Lijphart’s
executive-parties dimension, year 2004.
Armingeon et al. (2011).
Power dispersion, institutional Time-variant proxy for Lijphart’s
executive-parties dimension, institu-
tional factors, year 2004. Armingeon et al.
(2011).
Checks and balances Number of veto players. Keefer and Stasav-
age (2003).
Plurality electoral system Dummy variable. Beck et al. (2001).
Electoral system Type of electoral system, 9 minor cate-
gories. IDEA (2004).
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Country list
Australia Austria Canada Denmark
Finland France Germany Ireland
Israel Japan Netherlands Norway
Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland
United Kingdom United States
Summary of variables
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Poss. values
Power concentration −0.31 0.98 −1.77 1.21 [-2,2]
Oce motivation 3.37 0.37 2.61 4.20 [1,5]
GDP p.c. 26.98 7.69 11.55 39.83
GDP p.c. growth
(2004-2011)
0.68 0.74 −0.61 2.40
GDP p.c. growth
(1991-2004)
2.08 1.07 0.56 5.59
For the regression analysis, the variables power concentration and oce motivation are
rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
89
Chapter 2 Political Selection and the Concentration of Political Power
Correlation table
Power Oce GDP p.c. growth
concentration motivation GDP p.c. (2004-2011)
Oce 0.20 1
motivation (0.43)
GDP p.c. −0.20 −0.58 1
(0.43) (0.01)
GDP p.c. −0.44 0.072 −0.15 1
growth (0.07) (0.78) (0.56)
(2004-2011)
GDP p.c. 0.27 −0.10 −0.021 −0.48
growth (0.28) (0.69) (0.93) (0.05)
(1991-2004)
Pearson’s correlation coecient, p-values in parentheses.
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On the Ambiguous Sign of the
Optimal Utilitarian Marginal
Income Tax
3.1 Introduction
In the last decade, the seminal paper by Saez (2002) has initiated a growing liter-
ature that aims at rationalizing the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the largest
tax/transfer program transferring resources towards the poor in the United States.
For low-income workers, the EITC species a negative marginal income tax and
a negative participation tax, i.e., a higher transfer than the one paid to the unem-
ployed. Strikingly, both properties are at odds with the central result of optimal
taxation theory due to Mirrlees (1971), according to which the optimal marginal
income tax is strictly positive everywhere below the very top. Subsequent studies
have shown the robustness of this result for all models in which, rst, agents ad-
just their labor supply only at the intensive margin, i.e., choose how many hours
or how hard to work, and second, the tax designer has a utilitarian desire for
redistribution from rich (high-skill) to poor (low-skill) agents.1
Most prominently, two approaches have been brought forward to rationalize
the EITC, each abandoning one of these basic assumption and explaining one
1Amongst others, see Seade (1977), Seade (1982), Diamond (1998), and Hellwig (2007). Note that,
under certain assumptions, the optimal marginal tax is also zero at the very bottom.
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property of the EITC. First, Saez (2002) shows that negative participation taxes
might be optimal if agents adjust their labor supply only at the extensive mar-
gin, i.e., only take the binary decision whether or not to enter the labor market
(see also Diamond 1980 and Choné and Laroque 2011). The basic intuition be-
hind this result is that redistributing resources from the rich towards the working
poor is less costly in eciency terms than redistributing resources towards the
unemployed. In particular, a negative participation tax for low-skill workers in-
duces inecient labor supply responses in this skill group only, while a rising
unemployment benet gives rise to labor supply distortions in all skill groups.
Second, Choné and Laroque (2010) show that negative marginal taxes can be
rationalized in an intensive-margin model if the social planner prefers to redis-
tribute resources from agents earning low incomes on the labor market to high-
income earners. In this case, the social planner’s anti-utilitarian desire to redis-
tribute resources to high-skill agents is restricted by binding upward incentive
compatibility constraints, which can only be relaxed through negative marginal
taxes.2
These studies give rise to the questions whether an EITC-style tax scheme with
negative marginal taxes and participation taxes can be optimal if, rst, the social
planner has a standard utilitarian desire for redistribution from high-skill to low-
skill workers and, second, agents adjust their labor supply at the intensive and
the extensive margin, which is arguably the most appropriate assumption from an
empirical perspective.
In this case, marginal income taxes induce labor supply distortions at the in-
tensive margin, which cannot occur in extensive-margin models by construction
(Saez, 2002; Choné and Laroque, 2011). Relatedly, the social planner is restricted
by incentive compatibility constraints as in the classical Mirrlees (1971) frame-
work. As a consequence, it is unclear whether the simple intuition from the ex-
tensive models is still valid. If downward incentive compatibility constraints are
binding in the optimal allocation, negative participation taxes for the working
poor are associated with higher eciency costs. Additional transfers to low-skill
workers must then be accompanied either by stronger downward distortions at
the intensive margin, or by similar transfers to workers of all higher skill types,
which is at odds with the utilitarian objective. Moreover, negative marginal taxes
can only be benecial if upward incentive compatibility constraints are binding
in the optimal allocation, i.e., if more resources are transferred to some group of
workers than to a slightly less productive group of workers. The literature has not
2In the model by Choné and Laroque (2010), agents are heterogeneous with respect to skill and,
additionally, some other cost-related parameter. The authors show that an anti-utilitarian
desire to redistribute from low-income to high-income workers can arise if these two type
parameters exhibit a suciently strong correlation.
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yet provided an explanation for why this might be in the interest of a utilitarian
planner.
To some extent, this skepticism is conrmed by Jacquet, Lehmann, and Linden
(2013) in a recent paper on optimal income taxation with labor supply responses
at both margins. In particular, the authors show that optimal marginal taxes are
positive everywhere below the very top whenever some sucient condition is
met. However, this sucient condition is expressed in terms of endogenous vari-
ables, i.e., endogenous social weights and properties of the optimal allocation it-
self. Moreover, the relation between this condition and common assumptions on
the economic primitives and the social planner’s objective function remains un-
clear.
Contributions The rst contribution of this chapter is to show that the sign of
the optimal marginal income tax is in general ambiguous even if the social planner
holds a utilitarian desire for redistribution. For some utilitarian welfare functions,
the optimal marginal tax is positive everywhere below the very top. But for other
utilitarian welfare functions, the optimal marginal tax is zero throughout, or even
negative at some low income levels. Complimenting these general insights, the
analysis in this chapter is the rst to provide sucient conditions on the primi-
tives such that an EITC-style tax scheme is indeed optimal, giving rise to upward
distortions at both margins for some skill groups.
The second contribution of this chapter is to explain why negative marginal
taxes can be optimal in the model with labor supply responses at both margins.
In contrast to the Mirrlees (1971) model, the sign of the optimal tax rate is not
pinned down by a standard tradeo between equity and eciency. Instead, an
additional tradeo between intensive eciency and extensive eciency aspects
arises, which has not been discussed in the literature so far. In section 3.6, I show
that both aspects of eciency can be disentangled using an inverse elasticity rule.
As will become clear below, this tradeo between intensive eciency and exten-
sive eciency drives the ambiguity of the optimal marginal tax: inducing upward
distortions at the intensive margin through negative marginal taxes can be opti-
mal if and only if this helps to reduce labor supply distortions at the extensive
margin.
The nal contribution of this chapter is to show that the potential optimality of
the EITC depends crucially on the assumed information structure. Following the
related literature, I study a model in which agents are heterogeneous with respect
to two type dimensions, skills and xed costs of working. I show that an EITC-
style tax scheme can be optimal in this framework if and only if agents possess
private information about both type dimensions. In contrast, optimal utilitarian
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marginal taxes and participation taxes are always non-negative if the planner is
able to observe either skills or xed costs of working directly. Put dierently, the
optimal directions of labor supply distortions at both margins are ambiguous in
multi-dimensional screening problems, while they are pinned down uniquely in
problems of one-dimensional screening.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I introduce the basic model in section 3.2 and
impose a set of regularity conditions in section 3.3. Section 3.4 introduces the
problem of optimal income taxation and some relevant terminology. In section
3.5, I rst derive the main results on the ambiguous sign of the optimal marginal
taxes and participation taxes. Then, I provide sucient conditions for the opti-
mality of specic non-standard tax schedules, including an EITC-style tax scheme
that induces upward distortions at both margins for some skill groups. Section 3.6
studies an auxiliary problem that helps to develop an economic intuition for this
ambiguity and work out the tradeo between intensive eciency and extensive
eciency. Section 3.7 studies optimal utilitarian taxation under the alternative
assumptions that either skills or xed costs are publicly observable. Section 3.8
discusses the relevance of the imposed assumptions. Section 3.9 reviews the re-
lated literature, and section 3.10 concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to the
mathematical appendix.
3.2 Model
I study optimal Utilitarian income taxation in an economy with labor and one
homogeneous good. There is a continuum of agents of mass one, each of whom is
identied with a two-dimensional type (ω, δ). For reasons that will become clear
below, I refer to ω ∈ Ω as the skill type, and to δ ∈ ∆ as the xed cost type. The
skill type space Ω and the cost space ∆ are compact sets, with x and x¯ denoting
the smallest and largest value of x ∈ {ω, δ}. Each agent’s skill type ω and cost
type δ are the realizations of two random variables ω˜ and δ˜ with joint probability
distribution Ψ. The distribution Ψ is identical for all agents, and has full support
on the type space Ω × ∆ ∈ R+ × R. Imposing a law of large numbers, I assume
that Ψ also represents the cross-section distribution of types in the continuum of
agents.3
The agents supply labor and consume the homogeneous good. If an agent with
type (ω, δ) consumes c units and supplies labor to produce y units of this good, he
receives a utility of V (c, y, ω, δ). An allocation is given by two functions c(ω, δ) ≥
0 and y(ω, δ) ≥ 0 that specify the consumption level and output level for each type
3For conditions justifying this approach, see Sun (2006).
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in Ω×∆. It is feasible if and only if overall consumption does not exceed overall
output, i.e., ∫
Ω×∆
c(ω, δ)dΨ(ω, δ) ≤
∫
Ω×∆
y(ω, δ)dΨ(ω, δ) (3.1)
Each agent is privately informed about his skill ω and xed cost δ. Thus, an
allocation can only be implemented if it is incentive-compatible, i.e., if
V (c(ω, δ), y(ω, δ), ω, δ) ≥ V (c(ω′, δ′), y(ω′, δ′), ω, δ) (3.2)
for all types (ω, δ) and (ω′, δ′) in Ω × ∆. Normative comparisons of allocations
are enabled by the welfare function∫
Ω×∆
U [V (c(ω, δ), y(ω, δ), ω, δ)] dΨ(ω, δ) (3.3)
The welfare function integrates over all agents’ utilities, subject to some positive-
monotone transformation U . Its properties capture the planner’s objective with
respect to redistributive taxation, beyond the properties of the utility function V .
Thus, the desirability of redistribution depends on both V and U . To guarantee
existence of a solution, let limz→∞ U
′(z) ≤ 1.
3.3 Assumptions
Throughout the chapter, I will impose the following assumptions.
Regularity Conditions (RC): The utility function V : R4 7→ R is twice con-
tinuously dierentiable in c, ω, δ and, for y > 0, in y. It is strictly concave and
increasing in c. For y > 0, it is strictly concave and decreasing in y, increasing in ω
and decreasing in δ.
Strict Single-Crossing (SSC): For all (c, y, ω) ∈ R3+++, the utility function sat-
ises
∂
∂ω
[
Vc(c, y, ω, δ)
Vy(c, y, ω, δ)
]
< 0 (3.4)
Assumptions RC and SSC are standard in the literature, and will not be dis-
cussed further.
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Additive Fixed Costs (AFC): The utility function consists of a gross utility com-
ponent V˜ and an additively separable xed cost component δ:
V (c, y, ω, δ) = V˜ (c, y, ω)− 1y>0δ (3.5)
Function U is twice continuously dierentiable and strictly increasing in its argu-
ment, while V˜ inherits the properties of V with respect to c, y, and ω.
Assumption AFC is made for tractability, allowing to study the optimal tax
problem with the random participation approach due to Rochet and Stole (2002).
It has also been made in related papers on optimal taxation with labor supply re-
sponses at the extensive margin (Jacquet, Lehmann, and Linden, 2013; Choné and
Laroque, 2011).
Quasi-Linearity in Consumption (QLC): The gross utility component V˜ is
quasi-linear in consumption:
V˜ (c, y, ω) = c− h(y, ω) (3.6)
For (y, ω) ∈ R2++, the eort cost function is strictly increasing and convex in y,
strictly decreasing in ω and has a strictly negative cross derivative hyω(y, ω). For
any ω ∈ Ω, the eort cost function satises h(0, ω) = 0 and the Inada conditions
limy→0 hy(y, ω) = 0 and limy→∞ hy(y, ω) =∞.
Assumption QLC rules out income eects in labor supply, which considerably
simplies the analysis. For this reason, it has also been imposed in a number of
related papers, including Diamond (1998). Moreover, it implies that the desirabil-
ity of redistribution depends only on the properties of transformation U in the
planner’s objective function. For example, if transformation U were given by the
identity function, welfare could not be increased through redistributive taxation.
Relevance of Extensive Margin (REM): For any type (ω, δ), let
yLF = argmax
y
V (y, y, ω, δ) (3.7)
be the output level that an agent of type (ω, δ) would choose under laissez-faire.
Heterogeneity in xed costs is large enough to ensure that yLF (ω, δ) > 0, and
yLF
(
ω¯, δ¯
)
= 0 hold.
By Assumption REM , every skill group would involve active workers and un-
employed agents without redistributive income taxation. This guarantees that
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changes in the tax schedule will induce labor supply responses at the extensive
margin by agents of all skill groups in some neighborhood of the laissez-faire al-
location. The assumption is imposed to work out very clearly the dierences to
the standard Mirrleesian framework, where agents adjust their labor supply at
the intensive margin only.
Discrete Skill Space (DSS): The skill space Ω is given by the nite set {ω1, ω2,
. . . , ωn} with ωj+1 > ωj for all natural numbers below n. The cost space ∆ is given
by some interval
[
δ, δ¯
]
on the real line.
By assumption DSS, the skill space is discrete, while the cost space is contin-
uous. While this type space corresponds to the model studied by Saez (2002), it
diers from Choné and Laroque (2011) and Jacquet, Lehmann, and Linden (2013)
who consider models in which Ω and ∆ are both given by an interval.
The next two assumptions restrict the joint type distribution Ψ, rewritten as
(F,G1, . . . , Gn). F denotes the cumulative distribution function of skills, with
fj > 0 representing the probability that an agent has skill type ωj ∈ Ω. Gj
denotes the cdf of xed costs in the group of agents with skill type ωj , and has a
corresponding pdf gj that is strictly positive if and only if δ ∈ ∆.
Log-Concave Fixed Cost Distributions (LC): In all skill groups ωj ∈ Ω, the
distribution of xed costsGj is strictly log-concave, i.e., the inverse hazard rate
Gj(δ)
gj(δ)
is strictly increasing on the cost space ∆.
This regularity assumption is satised for most commonly used distributions,
including the uniform, normal, log-normal, exponential and Pareto distributions.
Ordered Fixed Cost Distributions (OFCD): For each pair of skill levels ωj and
ωj+1 in Ω, the skill-dependent xed cost distributions satisfy
(i) Gj+1(δ) ≥ Gj(δ) for all δ ∈ ∆, and
(ii)
Gj+1(δ)
gj+1(δ)
≥ Gj(δ)gj(δ) for all δ ∈ ∆.
By the rst part of Assumption OFCD, Gj weakly dominates Gj+1 in the sense
of rst-order stochastic dominance. By the second part, the inverse hazard rate at
any cost level δ is larger for high-skill groups than for low-skill groups. In general,
both properties are closely related but not identical (for the uniform distribution,
the second property is implied by rst-order stochastic dominance). Note that
OFCD covers the benchmark case of independence, in which Gj(δ) = G(δ) for
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all δ ∈ ∆ and all ωj ∈ Ω. As will become clear below, the results of this chapter
depend crucially on this assumption.4
The nal assumption restricts the social objective as captured by the positive-
monotone transformation U . To simplify notation, dene the endogenous social
weight αj of workers of skill levels ωj in allocation (c, y) by
αUj (c, y) ≡
1
α¯(c, y)
Eδ
[
U ′
(
V
(
c(ωj, δ), y(ωj, δ), ωj, δ
)) |δ ∈ ∆ : y(ωj, δ) > 0]
(3.8)
and the endogenous social weight αU0 (c, y) of unemployed agents by
αU0 (c, y) ≡
1
α¯(c, y)
E(ω,δ)
[
U ′ (V (c(ω, δ), 0, ω, δ)) |ω ∈ Ω, δ ∈ ∆ : y(ω, δ) = 0] ,
(3.9)
where α¯(c, y) = E(ω,δ) [U
′ (V (c(ω, δ), y(ω, δ), ω, δ))].
Economically, the social weight αj measures the average welfare increase in-
duced by a lump-sum transfer of a marginal unit to all workers with skill type
ωj , relative to the average welfare eect of a marginal lump-sum transfer to all
agents in the economy, α¯U (c, y). Thus, the sequence of social weights measures
the social planner’s redistributive concerns.5
Desirability of Utilitarian Redistribution (DUR): For every ωj ∈ Ω, the fol-
lowing is true in every implementable allocation (c, y)
0 < αUj+1(c, y) < α
U
j (c, y) < α
U
0 (c, y) (3.10)
Condition DUR provides the rationale for optimal redistributive taxation. It
implies that, if incentive considerations could be ignored, the social plannerwould
unambiguously prefer redistributing resources from the workers within each skill
group to each group of workers with lower skill type and to unemployed agents. It
captures the same idea as conditionDesirability of Redistribution in Hellwig (2007),
which guarantees the optimality of positive marginal taxes in a model with labor
supply responses at the intensive margin only.6
4In section 3.8, I discuss the eects of Assumption OFCD and the robustness of the results in
more detail.
5By construction, the average social weight over all subgroups in the population equals unity.
6Note, however, that DUR is slightly stronger as it is assumed to hold for all implementable
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In the following, I distinguish between the economy E and the social objective
U as two separate parts of the optimal tax problem. I refer to the economy E
as the collection of the type space Ω × ∆, the type distribution Ψ and the utility
function V .
Denition 3.1. Economy E is regular if and only if it satises assumptions RC,
SSC, AFC, QLC, REM , DSS, LC and OFCD.
For any regular economy, the set of feasible and incentive-compatible alloca-
tions is uniquely pinned down. In contrast, the normative ranking of the alloca-
tions in this set is enabled by the planner’s objective, in particular by transforma-
tion U .
Denition 3.2. For any regular economy E, the set of utilitarian allocations
U(E) is given by all allocations that maximize some welfare function satisfying
DUR over the set of feasible and incentive-compatible allocations.
These denitions allow to rephrase the research question of this chapter. In
the following, I derive the properties of the income tax schedules that allow to
decentralize utilitarian allocations. In particular, I shall show that some utilitarian
allocations cannot be decentralized with positive marginal taxes.
3.4 The optimal taxation problem
The optimal taxation problem is given by the problem of maximizing social wel-
fare by designing an income tax schedule T that maps gross income levels into
tax payments, and letting each agent choose labor supply to solve the problem of
household utility maximization:
Household Problem. Given individual type (ω, δ), maximize over y ≥ 0 individual
utility
y − T (y)− h(y, ω)− 1y>0δ (3.11)
Denote by yT (ω, δ) the gross income solving this problem for an agent with
type (ω, δ), and by YT the set of all income levels solving this problem for some
type in Ω×∆. I shall be interested in two key properties of the optimal utilitarian
tax schedule for all income levels y ∈ YT . The eects of the tax schedule on
individual labor supply decision depend on two characteristics.
allocations, while Hellwig (2007) assumes Desirability of Redistribution only for a subset of
implementable allocations.
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If the tax function T is continuously dierentiable, the marginal tax T ′(y) is
given by the derivative of T with respect to y. Under the imposed assumptions,
every implementable allocation can indeed be decentralized through a continu-
ously dierentiable tax schedule.7 As common in models with nite skill spaces,
the set of implemented income levels YT in the optimal allocation will be nite.
As a result, the optimal tax schedule might be increasing (or decreasing) over YT ,
even if the marginal tax is not positive (or negative) at any level y in YT .
8
The participation tax TP (y) = T (y) − T (0) measures the increase in tax lia-
bilities that an unemployed agent experiences if he enters the labor market and
earns a gross income of y.9 Depending on the sign of TP (y), the governmental
budget constraint is constrained or relaxed if a positive mass of agents enter the
labor market and earn gross income y.
Under the imposed assumptions, the taxation principle by Hammond (1979)
and Guesnerie (1995) applies. Thus, the optimal tax problem is equivalent to the
problem of maximizing the welfare function (3.3) subject to feasibility (3.1) and
incentive compatibility (3.2). By standard arguments, the solution to this prob-
lem must be Pareto-ecient within the set of implementable, i.e., feasible and
incentive-compatible, allocations.
Lemma 3.1. Every implementable and Pareto-ecient allocation (c, y) : Ω×∆→
R
2 can be characterized by two vectors
(
yj
)n
j=1
,
(
cj
)n
j=1
and a scalar b ≥ 0 such
that
• within each skill group ωj ∈ Ω, there is a threshold cost type δˆj ∈ ∆ such that
all
• all agents with types (ωj, δ) such that δ > δˆj = cj−h(yj, ωj)− b provide zero
output and enjoy the same consumption level b,
7In the following, we thus assume that T is indeed continuously dierentiable. For non-
dierentiable tax schedules, the implicit marginal tax T ′i (y) can be dened for any consump-
tion bundle (y − T (y), y) with y ∈ YT . If this bundle is allocated to agents with skill type
ωj , the implicit marginal tax is given by one minus the marginal rate of substitution between
output and consumption for this skill type, i.e., T ′i (y) = 1− h1(y, ωj).
8Related to this issue, the marginal income tax is sometimes dened dierently for models with
discrete skill spaces. In particular, the marginal tax between two adjacent skill levels ya and
yb > ya in YT can alternatively be dened as T
′ (ya, yb) =
[yb−T (yb)]−[ya−T (ya)]
yb−ya
(see, e.g.,
Saez 2002). Dened this way, the marginal income tax does not convey information about the
eciency properties of implemented allocations. In contrast, the denition used here implies
that the marginal tax is positive (negative) if and only if labor supply is upward distorted at
the intensive margin.
9The term participation tax was rst introduced by Choné and Laroque (2011). Referring to the
same concept, Beaudry, Blackorby, and Szalay (2009) use the term employment tax/subsidy.
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• all agents with skill type ωj and cost type δ ≤ δˆj provide the same output yj
and enjoy the same consumption level cj .
By Lemma 3.1, every implementable allocation involves pooling of all unem-
ployed agents and of all workers of the same skill group. The social planner’s
problem is thus reduced to choosing a universal unemployment benet b and a
consumption-output bundle for each skill type ωj ∈ Ω. This simplication di-
rectly results from the additive separability of the xed cost δ, imposed by as-
sumption AFC. In the appendix, I demonstrate that the existence of a universal
unemployment benet b and identical gross utilities c − h (y, ωj) in each skill
group follow directly from implementability. In a second step, the Pareto crite-
rion implies that all workers of the same skill group enjoy the same consumption
level cj and provide the same output level yj .
Another implication of assumption AFC is that the value of employment is
monotonically decreasing in δ within each skill group ωj , while the outside op-
tion of unemployment has the same value for all types. Thus, there is at most one
threshold cost type δˆj ∈
[
0, δ¯
]
for each skill group such that an agent with type(
ωj, δ
)
weakly prefers labor market participation if and only if with δ ≤ δˆj .
Consequently, the social planner’s problem can be formally dened much sim-
pler.
Lemma 3.2. The social planner’s problem is equivalent to maximizing the utilitar-
ian welfare function
n∑
j=1
fj
{∫ δˆj
δ
gj(δ)U
[
cj − h
(
yj, ωj
)− δ] dδ + [1−Gj (δˆj)]U [b]
}
(3.12)
over y =
(
yj
)n
j=1
, c =
(
cj
)n
j=1
, subject to the constraints
b =
n∑
j=1
fjGj
(
δˆj
) [
yj − cj + b
]
, (3.13)
δˆj =max
{
δ,min
{
cj − h
(
yj, ωj
)− b, δ¯}} ∀ ωj ∈ Ω, (3.14)
cj+1 − cj ≥h
(
yj+1, ωj+1
)− h (yj, ωj+1) ∀ ωj ∈ Ω, (3.15)
cj+1 − cj ≤h
(
yj+1, ωj
)− h (yj, ωj) ∀ ωj ∈ Ω (3.16)
Constraint (3.13) represents the feasibility constraint. The incentive compati-
bility constraints along the xed cost dimension are given by (3.14), boiled down
to a set of indierence condition for the threshold cost types
(
ωj, δˆj
)
in all skill
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groups. As argued above, the threshold worker type δˆj and the set of active work-
ers are uniquely determined by cj , yj and b for each skill level. Finally, (3.15)
and (3.16) represent the set of local downward and upward incentive compatibil-
ity constraints along the skill dimension. By the single-crossing property, local
incentive compatibility between all adjacent skill pairs ensures global incentive
compatibility within each skill group. Note that the problem stated above does
not explicitly take into account incentive-compatibility constraints between types
that dier both along the skill dimension and along the xed cost dimension. Due
to the additive separability of the xed cost component AFC, piece-wise incentive
compatibility along each dimension guarantees global incentive compatibility be-
tween all types (ω, δ) and (ω′, δ′) in Ω×∆.
In the interest of readability, but with some abuse of terminology, I will refer to
constraint (3.14) as participation constraint, and to (3.15) and (3.16) as incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints. The social objectiveU does not appear in any of the
constraints. Thus, it has no eect on the set of implementable and Pareto-ecient
allocations, a subset of which is given by the set of utilitarian allocations.
The IC constraints have the same immediate implications as in the intensive
model by Mirrlees (1971). First, both IC constraints can only simultaneously be
satised if output is monotonically increasing in the skill type, yj+1 ≥ yj . Second,
the single crossing property implies that the following inequality is truewhenever
yj+1 > yj > 0:
h
(
yj+1, ωj
)− h (yj, ωj) > h (yj+1, ωj+1)− h (yj, ωj+1) > 0
Thus, as long as there is no pooling across skill types with yj+1 = yj , high-skill
workers must enjoy strictly higher consumption than low-skill workers, and at
most one IC constraint can be binding with respect to each pair of adjacent skill
levels. In the model with labor supply responses at the intensive and extensive
margin, the downward IC constraint has a third implication that does not apply
in models with only one margin. The threshold cost types for high-skill groups
must be strictly higher than for low-skill groups, δˆj+1 > δˆj , as long as δˆj is below
the upper bound δ¯. This property holds because high-skill workers enjoy higher
utility than low-skill workers with the same xed cost type, whether or not there
is pooling.
As argued above, Lemma 3.2 implies that any implementable allocation involves
pooling of all active workers with the same skill type, and of all unemployed
agents. With other words, the social planner can only vary the allocations and
utility levels of agents in these n+1 (or less) sets simultaneously. The desirability
of all viable changes is thus entirely captured by the sequence of endogenous so-
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cial weights αU , which varies over the set of implementable allocations. Assump-
tion DUR requires this sequence to be strictly decreasing for any implementable
allocation.
In the following, I will be interested in the eciency properties of optimal al-
locations. For this purpose, it is convenient to introduce as an auxiliary function
the (gross) employment surplus
s(y, ω) = y − h(y, ω). (3.17)
By assumption QLC, function s(y, ωj) has a well-dened maximizer inR+, which
I denote as yˆj = argmaxy s(y, ωj) in the following. Furthermore, denote by sˆj =
s
(
yˆj, ωj
)
the maximum level of employment surplus for an agent with skill type
ωj . The single-crossing property SSC implies that yˆj+1 > yˆj and sˆj+1 > sˆj for all
ωj ∈ Ω.
For any type (ω, δ), the ecient labor supply y∗(ω, δ, v) and the ecient con-
sumption level c∗(ω, δ, v) are given as the pair of output and consumption that
requires the lowest transfer of net resources to provide an agent of this type with
utility level v, i.e., solves the problem
min
y,c
(c− y) subject to V (c, y, ω, δ) ≥ v
Lemma 3.3. For any v in the domain of V , ecient labor supply is given by
y∗(ωj, δ) =
{
yˆj for δ ≤ sˆj
0 for δ > sˆj
(3.18)
By the quasi-linearity of V , the required utility level v does not aect the level
of ecient labor supply. Using Lemma 3.1, distortions in labor supply can be
dened as follows.
Denition 3.3. At the intensive margin, labor supply by workers of skill group
ωj is said to be undistorted if yj = yˆj , downward distorted if yj ∈
(
0, yˆj
)
, and
upward distorted if yj > yˆj .
Denition 3.4. At the extensive margin, labor supply by workers of skill group
ωj is undistorted if δˆj = sˆj , downward distorted if δˆj < sˆj , and upward distorted
if δˆj > sˆj .
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3.5 Results
The results of this chapter are provided in the two following subsections. First,
subsection 3.5.1 provides the main results of this chapter, which hold under the
regularity assumptions imposed in section 3.3. The section mainly provides exis-
tence results, including an “anything-goes result” with respect to the sign of the
optimal utilitarian marginal tax.
Second, subsection 3.5.2 provides sucient conditions for the optimality of spe-
cic tax schedules, including an EITC-style tax schedule with negative marginal
tax rates and negative participation tax rates. For this purpose, I impose further
assumptions that allow me to focus on a smaller class of economies.
3.5.1 Main results
Proposition 3.1. For every regular economy, labor supply by the workers of the
highest skill groupωn is undistorted at the intensive margin, and distorted downward
at the extensive margin in any utilitarian allocation.
Proposition 3.1 claries that the famous “no distortion at the top” result, a ro-
bust property of optimal tax schedules in intensive models á la Mirrlees (1971),
continues to hold. However, it only applies to the intensive margin. At the exten-
sivemargin, labor supply of the highest skill group is strictly downwards distorted
in any Utilitarian allocation.
Proposition 3.2. For every regular economy, there is a utilitarian allocation in
which labor supply of all skill groups is undistorted at the intensive margin through-
out, and labor supply of some skill groups is distorted upward at the extensive mar-
gin.
Proposition 3.3. For some but not all regular economies, there is a utilitarian al-
location in which labor supply is distorted downward at the intensive margin every-
where below the top, and distorted downward at the extensive margin everywhere.
Proposition 3.4. For some but not all regular economies, there is a utilitarian al-
location in which labor supply of at least one skill group is distorted upward at both
margins, and undistorted at the intensive margin for all other skill groups.
Propositions 3.2 to 3.4 establish the indeterminacy of optimal marginal taxes in
utilitarian redistribution programs. Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 cover extreme cases
in which labor supply is either downward distorted at the intensive margin ev-
erywhere below the top, or undistorted throughout. Of course, there are also
utilitarian allocations in which labor supply is downward distorted for some, and
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undistorted for other skill groups at this margin. Proposition 3.4 conrms the po-
tential optimality of EITC-style tax-transfer schemes with upward distortions at
both margins for some skill groups for some economies that satisfy the imposed
regularity conditions. More precisely, it establishes the potential optimality of an
extreme version of the EITC, in which labor supply is weakly upward distorted
at the intensive margin for all skill groups. This result sharply contrasts with the
unambiguous positivity of optimal marginal taxes in the intensivemodel (see, e.g.,
Mirrlees 1971 and Hellwig 2007.
The proofs of Propositions 3.1 to 3.4 are based on the analysis of a relaxed prob-
lem in which the incentive compatibility constraints between workers of dierent
skill groups are not taken into account. In the solution to this relaxed problem,
labor supply is generally undistorted at the intensive margin, because the social
planner has no interest in slackening any IC constraints. In contrast to the inten-
sive model, the solution to this relaxed problem satises any pair of IC constraints
between skill levels ωj and ωj+1 if the utilitarian welfare function is only mildly
concave in the relevant range. For transformations U with suciently small sec-
ond derivative |U ′′|, the solution to the relaxed problem actually also solves the
full problem, including the complete set of IC constraints.
By Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, utilitarian allocations with downward or upward
distorted labor supply at the intensive margin do not exist for all regular econo-
mies. Rather, the existence of both the ”standard“ case with downward distortions
and of the ”non-standard“ case with upward distortions depend on details of the
economic environment, in particular, on properties of the type set and type dis-
tribution. In the following subsection 3.5.2, I take a closer look at this issue by
considering a class of economies with certain functional forms. Within this class
of economies, I then provide sucient conditions on the economic primitives–
the type space Ω × ∆, the joint type distribution Ψ, and the eort cost function
h–under which utilitarian allocations with especially interesting properties exist.
3.5.2 Sufficient conditions
By Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, utilitarian allocations with labor supply distortions
at the intensive margin exist for some, but not all regular economies. First, this
is true for the standard constellation with downward distortions at the intensive
margin everywhere below the top. Second, this also holds for extreme versions of
EITC-style allocations with upward distortions at the intensive margin for some
skill groups and no distortions for all other skill groups.
In this section, I provide sucient conditions for the existence of utilitarian
allocations with the discussed properties. For this purpose, I focus on a class of
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economies dened by the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. The economy satises the following conditions:
(i) The eort cost function is given by h(y, ω) = 12
y2
ω ,
(ii) the skill space is given byΩ = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn}with constant relative distances
ωj+1
ωj
= a > 1, and
(iii) in each skill group ωj ∈ Ω, xed costs are uniformly distributed on the interval[
0, δ¯
]
, with δ¯ > ωn2 .
By assumption 3.1, we focus on a class of economies with simple functional
forms that enable relatively simple expressions for the sucient conditions in
the remainder of this section. This includes the quadratic eort cost function,
the constant relative distances between all adjacent skill levels, and the uniform
distribution of xed costs. The lower bound on δ¯ guarantees that agents with
maximum skill and maximum xed cost do not work under laissez-faire, as re-
quired by assumption REM . Note that assumption 3.1 also restricts attention to
the benchmark case in which skills and xed costs are independently distributed.
First, I provide necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of a utilitar-
ian allocationwith standard properties, i.e., downward distortions at the intensive
margin everywhere below the top.
Proposition 3.5. If assumption 3.1 holds and a < 2, there is a utilitarian allocation
in which labor supply is downward distorted at the intensive margin everywhere
below the top, and downward distorted at the extensive margin everywhere.
Proposition 3.6. If assumption 3.1 holds, n = 2 and f1 >
1
2 , there is a threshold
aˆ(f1) ∈
(
2 +
√
2,∞) such that, if a > aˆ(f1), labor supply by workers of both skill
groups is undistorted at the intensive margin in every utilitarian allocation.
Note that the last result also extends to the Rawlsian (Maximin) welfare func-
tion. This is in contrast to the results by Jacquet, Lehmann, and Linden (2013)
for a model with continuous skill space, according to which the Rawlsian alloca-
tion always involves downwards distortions at the intensive margin. The dier-
ence results only due to the assumed skill space with only two skill types, while
all other assumption are nested in the model of Jacquet, Lehmann, and Linden
(2013).10
10More precisely, maximizing the Rawlsian welfare function involves undistorted labor supply
at the intensive margin under even slightly weaker conditions than those imposed in 3.6. In
particular, labor supply by all workers is undistorted at the intensive margin in the Rawlsian
allocation if a > 2 and assumption 3.1 holds.
106
3.6 Intuition: The tradeo between intensive and extensive eciency
Assumption 3.2. The cardinality of the skill space is large enough to satisfy n >
inf {z ∈ N : z > 2 + ln(a + 1)/ ln(a)}. The upper bound of the xed cost space sat-
ises δ¯ < γ0−γnγ0−1
ωn
2(2−γn)
, where γ0 = 2− 1a and γn = 2− a1+a2−n(a2−1) .
Assumption 3.3. The share of agents with top skill levelωn is high enough to satisfy
fn >
γ¯−n − 1
γ¯−n − γ¯n ∈ [0, 1)
where γ¯−n =
∑n−1
1 fj γ¯j
1−fn
and γ¯j = γ0− ωj2(2−γj)
(
γ0 − γj
)
with γ0 = γ1 = γ2 = 2− 1a
and γj = 2− a1+a2−j(a2−1) for j ≥ 3.
Assumption 3.2 excludes cases with particularly limited type heterogeneity.
First, it requires sucient heterogeneity in skills, depending on relative distance
between two adjacent skill levels, a = ωj+1ωj . Second, it imposes an upper limit on
δ¯, so that a majority of agents with top skill ωn participate on the labor market in
the optimal allocations identied below.
Assumption 3.3 requires that the share of high-skill workers is suciently large.
The exact level of the threshold share for fn depends on the complete set of pa-
rameters, including the share fj for all lower skill levels. However, it can be shown
that this threshold is always below 1, and may even be negative. An increasing
cardinality of the skill space, as measured by n, makes the assumption less de-
manding. Intuitively, assumption 3.3 seems more restrictive than Assumptions
3.1 and 3.2.
Proposition 3.7. If assumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 hold, there is a utilitarian allocation
in which labor supply by skill type ω2 is upward distorted at both margins, and labor
supply by all other agents is undistorted at the intensive margin.
The economic mechanism behind this result is studied in more detail in the
following section.
3.6 Intuition: The tradeoff between intensive
and extensive efficiency
Propositions 3.2 to 3.4 imply that a utilitarian desire for redistribution does not
pin down the direction of labor supply distortions at any margin, in contrast to
the classical result in the Mirrlees (1971) model. This section aims at developing
an economic intuition for the indeterminate sign of the optimal marginal tax, and
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its interdependence with the optimal participation tax.11 First, I show that an elas-
ticity rule helps to identify the optimal tax schedule. Second, I explain that, and
why, labor supply responses at two margins can give rise to a tradeo between
intensive eciency and extensive eciency, which drives the indeterminacy of
labor supply distortions. To work out this economic intuition, this section studies
a simple auxiliary problem in which redistributive concerns are eliminated.
Consider an economy with only two skill levels, ω1 and ω2 > ω1. The mass of
low-skill agents is given by f1 > 0, the mass of high-skill agents by f2. In the
social planner’s objective function, let transformation U be given by the identity
function. In contrast to assumption DUR, the social planner is thus interested in
maximizing social surplus, i.e., the unweighted sum of individual utilities. As-
sume moreover that the planner is restricted by incentive compatibility and two
additional constraints.12 First, the allocation must satisfy a (positive or negative)
exogenous revenue requirement A:
2∑
j=1
fj
∫ δ¯
δ
[
y(ωj, δ)− c(ωj, δ)
]
dGj(δ) ≥ A (3.19)
Second, every unemployed agent with y(ωj, δ) = 0 must receive an exogenously
determined benet b.13
As Lemma 3.1 applies, the social planner only has to consider allocations in
which all workers with the same skill type ωj provide identical output yj and
receive identical consumption cj = yj − TPj + b. Using the denition of the em-
ployment surplus s(yj, ωj) = yj − h(yj, ωj), the problem can be formally written
as follows:
Auxiliary Problem. Maximize over y1, y2, T
P
1 and T
P
2 social surplus
2∑
j=1
fj
[∫ δˆj
0
(
s
(
yj, ωj
)− TPj + b− δ) dGj(δ) + [1−Gj (δˆj)] b
]
(3.20)
11So far, the literature has only studied the potential optimality of upward distortions at the
extensive margin (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002; Choné and Laroque, 2011; Christiansen, 2012).
12Except DUR, all assumptions imposed in section 3.3 are taken to hold.
13In the following sense, the auxiliary problem can be interpreted as a part of the larger problem
of optimal tax problem, rewritten as a two-step problem. In the rst step, the social plan-
ner chooses (a) the amount of net resources A to be transferred from the group of high-skill
agents with ωj > ω2 to the group of low-skill agents with skill types ω1 and ω2, and (b)
the universal benet to each unemployed agent b. In the second step, the planner decides
how to redistribute resources within the low-skill and high-skill groups given A and b, sub-
ject to incentive-compatibility. This section focuses on the optimal amount of redistribution
within the low-skill group only, and considers the benchmark case without equity concerns,
i.e., U ′′ → 0 on the relevant interval.
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subject to the constraints
A˜ = A + (f1 + f2) b ≤
2∑
j=1
fjGj
(
δˆj
)
TPj , (3.21)
δˆj = s(yj, ωj)− TPj for j ∈ {1, 2} , (3.22)
s (y2, ω2)− s (y1, ω2) ≥ TP2 − TP1 , and (3.23)
s (y2, ω1)− s (y1, ω1) ≤ TP2 − TP1 (3.24)
Besides the existence of only two skill groups, there are two dierences to the
problem of optimal taxation dened above. First, the concave transformation U
in the objective function is replaced by the identity function, which eliminates
any redistributive concerns. Second, the feasibility constraint (3.21) contains the
exogenous revenue requirement A. Participation constraints (3.22) and incentive
compatibility constraints (3.23), (3.24) are given as before. To avoid irrelevant
complications, I assume here that δ¯ is large enough to exceed δˆj in every im-
plementable allocation. Finally, recall that the unemployment benet b is exoge-
nously determined in the auxiliary problem.
The formal analysis of this auxiliary problem is presented in subsection 3.6.1,
while subsection 3.6.2 illustrates the auxiliary problem and its solution graphi-
cally.
3.6.1 Formal analysis of the auxiliary problem
In the following, I refer to the solution of this problem,
(
yS1 , y
S
2 , T
PS
1 , T
PS
2
)
, as
the surplus-maximizing allocation. Lemmas 3.4 to 3.6 below imply that the level
of the adjusted revenue requirement A˜ = A + (f1 + f2) b determines important
properties of this solution, including the direction of labor supply distortions at
both margins.
Lemma 3.4. There are levels Amax > 0 and Amin < 0 such that
(a) the auxiliary problem has a solution in R4 if and only if A˜ ≤ Amax, and
(b) this solution involves threshold worker types δˆj < δ¯ for j ∈ {1, 2} if and only if
A˜ (Amin, Amax].
On the one hand, the existence of unemployment as an outside option implies
that the social planner can collect at most a tax revenue ofAmax, which is realized
if both skill groups are taxed at (incentive-compatible) Laer rates. On the other
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hand, the auxiliary problem has a solution for any negative revenue requirement
A˜ < 0. For very negative levels of A˜, however, all agents of the high-skill group
(or even of both groups) enter the labor market and the participation constraints
are not binding anymore, i.e., labor supply becomes completely inelastic at the
extensive margin. In the following, we focus on levels of the revenue requirement
in the interval [Amin, Amax].
Lemma 3.5. For all A˜ ∈ [Amin, Amax], surplus maximization involves higher out-
put by high-skill workers than by low-skill workers, yS2 > y
S
1 .
(i) If A˜ ∈ [Amin, 0), high-skill workers receive higher participation subsidies than
low-skill workers, TP
S
2 < T
PS
1 < 0.
(ii) If A˜ ∈ (0, Amax], high-skill workers pay higher participation taxes than low-
skill workers, TP
S
2 > T
PS
1 > 0.
Lemma 3.6. Let xed costs in both skill groups be distributed uniformly on the
interval
[
0, δ¯
]
, with δ¯ suciently large. There are values AU ∈ (Amin, 0) and AD ∈
(0, Amax] such that, in the surplus-maximizing allocation,
• high-skill labor is upward distorted at the intensive margin if A˜ ∈ [Amin, AU ),
and
• low-skill labor is downward distorted at the intensive margin if and only if
A˜ ∈ (AD, Amax).
Thus, the relevant properties of surplus-maximizing participation taxes depend
on the level of the revenue requirement A˜. Lemma 3.5 implies that optimal partic-
ipation taxes for both skill groups are non-negative, inducing labor supply distor-
tions at the extensive margin, whenever A˜ diers from zero. Moreover, high-skill
workers always face either higher participation taxes or higher participation sub-
sidies than low-skill workers. Lemma 3.6 focuses on the special case where xed
costs are distributed uniformly and identically across skill groups. For this case,
the surplus-maximizing allocation also involves labor supply distortions at the
intensive margin if the revenue requirement A˜ diers suciently from zero.
It will become clear below that these distortions at the intensive margin are op-
timal due to a tradeo between two aspects of eciency, in the following labeled
intensive eciency and extensive eciency. I will then show that this tradeo be-
tween intensive eciency and extensive eciency is the basis of the indeterminate
sign of the optimal marginal tax established in Propositions 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. In
the remainder of this section, I focus on the case of a negative requirement A˜, for
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which surplus can be maximized through an EITC-style tax schedule inducing
upward distortions in labor supply at both margins.14
The intuition behind both lemmas can be explained using an adapted version
of the inverse elasticity (Ramsey) rule for optimal commodity taxation. Consider
rst a relaxed version of the auxiliary problem in which both IC constraints are
ignored. For clarity, we denote by
(
y˜1, T˜
P
1 , y˜2, T˜
P
2
)
the relaxed problem’s solution
in the following. Without IC constraints, the social planner then treats high-
skill and low-skill labor just as two separate varieties of labor, or two distinct
tax bases. As there is no need to slacken an incentive constraint, optimal labor
supply is undistorted at the intensive margin, y˜j = yˆj = argmaxy s(y, ωj), and the
employment surplus equals its ecient level sˆj = maxy s(y, ωj). In the relaxed
problem, intensive eciency is consequently ensured. Thus, the social planner
only needs to care about maximizing extensive eciency, i.e., minimizing labor
supply distortions at the extensive margin.
The mathematical structure of the relaxed auxiliary problem coincides with the
classical Ramsey problem.15 Consequently, the optimal pattern of taxes follows
the familiar elasticity logic, according towhich higher taxes or subsidies should be
set for less elastic tax bases and vice versa. Formally, optimal participation taxes
for both skill groups are characterized by the following version of the inverse
elasticity rule
T˜Pj =
λ− 1
λ
Gj(sˆj − TPj )
gj(sˆj − TPj )
for j ∈ {1, 2} (3.25)
This condition relates the optimal participation tax liability for each skill group
to the semi-elasticity of its labor market participation,
gj(δˆj)
Gj(δˆj)
=
∂Gj(δˆj)/∂(yj−TPj )
Gj(δˆj)
.16
14The case of a negative A˜ is plausible, e.g., if the economy is additionally populated by workers
with higher skill types ωj > ω2, from which the utilitarian planner redistributed resources
towards workers with the lowest skill levels ω1 and ω2. More precisely, A˜ is negative if and
only if the social planner prefers negative participation taxes, i.e., higher transfers to be paid
to the working poor than to the unemployed. As Proposition 3.2 implies, there is always a
well-behaved utilitarian welfare function such that negative participation taxes to the lowest
skill levels are indeed optimal.
15A minor dierence between the commodity tax and the labor tax setting is given by the elas-
ticities of demand and supply functions. The assumptions on primitives taken here imply that
labor demand is completely elastic, while labor supply is upward sloping for rj ∈
[
0, δ¯
]
and
completely inelastic otherwise.
16The semi-elasticity of participation measures the percentage increase in the participation rate
that results if the net-of-tax labor income increases by one unit (instead of one percent as
with the standard elasticity). In the framework of optimal commodity taxation, the inverse
elasticity rule is usually expressed in terms of the standard elastity ǫPj =
yj−T
P
j
Gj(δˆj)
∂Gj(δˆj)
∂(yj−tPj )
.
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The intuition behind this rule rests on the social planner’s desire to reduce
distortions in labor supply as much as possible. Participation taxes diering from
zero induce extensive margin responses, giving rise to labor supply distortions as
agents enter (leave) the labor market which would stay unemployed (employed)
in the rst-best allocation. Thus, the surplus-maximizing social planner seeks to
keep both participation rates TP1 and T
P
2 as close as possible to zero. This requires
the optimal participation taxes for both skill groups to have the same sign, positive
for A˜ > 0 and negative for A˜ < 0.17 Otherwise, both participation taxes could be
decreased in absolute terms, thereby also reducing labor supply distortions.
Moreover, the higher the semi-elasticity of participation for skill group ωj , the
larger is the extensive margin response induced by distributing an additional unit
of resources toworkers of this skill group. Consequently, it is optimal to set higher
participation taxes (or higher subsidies) for the less responsive skill group.
Crucially, the relative sizes of these semi-elasticities are unambiguously pinned
down by the imposed assumptions LC and OFCD on the type distribution. Recall
that, in skill group ωj , only workers with xed cost types below some threshold
δˆj enter the labor market. As usually, incentive-compatibility implies that a high-
skill worker enjoys a higher utility than a low-skill worker with the same xed
cost type δ in every implementable allocation. In contrast, the outside option
of unemployment has the same value for all agents. Thus, agents in the high-
skill group enter the labor market even with higher xed costs than agents of
the low-skill group, implying a higher cost threshold δˆ2 > δˆ1. The assumption
of log-concavity implies that an increase in the threshold cost type δˆj decreases
the semi-elasticity
gj(δˆj)
Gj(δˆj)
. Thus, the semi-elasticity of high-skill labor is smaller
than the semi-elasticity of low-skill labor if skills and xed cost are independently
distributed,G1 = G2. AssumptionOFCD also allows for some correlation, as long
as the hazard rate for high-skill workers is larger, g2(δ)G2(δ) <
g1(δ)
G1(δ)
for all δ ∈ ∆. In
this case, the dierence between the semi-elasticities of high-skill participation
and low-skill participation is even larger than in the case of independence.
By the inverse elasticity rule, the optimal ratio of high-skill to low-skill partic-
ipation taxes thus exceeds unity in the solution to the relaxed problem whenever
the revenue requirement diers from zero:
T˜P2
T˜P1
=
G2(sˆ2 − TP2 )/g2(sˆ2 − TP2 )
G1(sˆ1 − TP1 )/g1(sˆ1 − TP1 )
> 1 for all A˜ 6= 0 (3.26)
For any negative revenue A˜, equation 3.26 implies that extensive eciency is maxi-
17Note that, for positive (negative) A˜, the Lagrange multiplier λ attains a level above (below)
unity.
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mized by setting a strictly higher participation subsidy for high-skill workers than
for low-skill workers: T˜P2 < T˜
P
1 < 0.
This implies that the solution to the relaxed problem satises the downward
IC constraint (3.24). Whether it also satises the upward IC constraint (3.23),
however, is in general unclear. If this is indeed true, the relaxed problem’s solu-
tion represents the surplus-maximizing allocation. Thus, it is possible to maxi-
mize extensive eciency and intensive eciency at the same time, and surplus-
maximization does not give rise to labor supply distortions at the intensive mar-
gin.
If the relaxed problem’s solution instead violates the upward IC constraint, a
tradeo between intensive eciency and extensive eciency arises. To maximize
extensive eciency according to the inverse elasticity rule, the social planner
would like to redistribute more resources to the high-skill workers than compat-
ible with the upward IC constraint. The upward IC constraint will consequently
be binding. Moreover, the social planner can only increase extensive eciency
if he slackens this constraint by distorting labor supply of high-skill workers up-
wards. As this initially involves only negligible losses in intensive eciency, sur-
plus maximization gives rise to strict upward distortions in high-skill labor supply
at the intensive margin, and strictly negative marginal taxes.18
The sign of the surplus-maximizing marginal tax thus depends on whether the
relaxed problem’s solution satises or violates the upward IC constraint. Without
further assumptions on the revenue requirement A˜ and the properties of the xed
cost distributions G1 and G2, this can not be determined though.
Lemma 3.6 considers the simple case of identical uniform distributions of xed
costs in both skill groups. For this case, the solution to the relaxed problem vio-
lates upward incentive compatibility if the revenue requirement A˜ is below some
threshold AU < 0.
19 As argued above, the surplus-maximizing allocation conse-
quently involves a binding upward IC and upward distorted labor supply at the
18The surplus-maximizing allocation then exactly balances marginal gains in extensive eciency
and marginal losses in intensive eciency. Formally, this intuition can be captured by a
generalized version of the inverse elasticity rule. For any A˜ ∈ [Amin, Amax], the surplus-
maximizing participation tax TP
S
j for j ∈ {1, 2} is characterized by
TP
S
j =
[
λ− 1
λ
+
s1 (yj , ωj)
s1 (yj , ωk)− s1 (yj , ωj)
] Gj (δˆj)
gj
(
δˆj
) − fk
fj
s1 (yk, ωk)
s1 (yj , ωj)− s1 (yk, ωk)
Gk
(
δˆk
)
gj
(
δˆj
) ,
where k 6= j refers to the other skill group, δˆj = s (yj , ωj)−TPj denotes the threshold worker
type in skill group ωj , and λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the planner’s
budget constraint (3.21). Note that s1 (yj , ωj) = 0 if and only if yj = yˆj , i.e., labor supply by
workers of skill group ωj is undistorted at the intensive margin.
19The same result holds ifG2 rst-order stochastically dominatesG1, i.e., if high-skill agents have
113
Chapter 3 On the Optimal Utilitarian Marginal Income Tax
intensive margin, y2 > yˆ2, in this case.
3.6.2 Graphical illustration of the auxiliary problem
Figures 3.6.2 and 3.6.2 on the following pages illustrate the tradeo between in-
tensive eciency and extensive eciency graphically for some negative revenue
requirement A˜.
Figure 3.6.2 depicts the Pareto frontiers for the relaxed and the non-relaxed ver-
sions of the auxiliary problem. More precisely, it plots the gross utility levels V˜j ≡
V˜
(
cj, yj, ωj
)
= cj − h (yˆ1, ω1) of low-skill workers and high-skill workers corre-
sponding to all (second-best) Pareto ecient allocations
(
y1, y2, T
P
1 , T
P
2
)
. Recall
that the utility level of a worker with type (ωj, δ) is given by V
(
cj, yj, ωj, δ
)
=
V˜j − δ, so that V˜j represents the common element for all workers with the same
skill type. In Figure 3.6.2, the gross utility V˜1 of low-skill workers is depicted
on the horizontal axis, while the gross utility V˜2 of high-skill workers is on the
vertical axis.
The dashed line P ′Q′ represents the Pareto-frontier for the relaxed auxiliary
problem, in which the social planner is not restricted by IC constraints. Moving
this line down and to the right corresponds to reductions in the low-skill par-
ticipation tax TP1 , nanced by an increasing level of the high-skill participation
tax TP2 . In the relaxed problem, these tax changes induce labor supply responses
at the extensive margin, pulling some unemployed low-skill agents into employ-
ment and forcing high-skill workers out of the labor market. As the IC constraints
can be ignored, labor supply by both skill groups is undistorted at the intensive
margin in the allocation corresponding to all points on the dashed line P ′Q′. Nev-
ertheless, the Pareto frontier for the relaxed problem is strictly concave due to the
extensive margin responses.
The solid line PQ represents the Pareto frontier for the non-relaxed auxiliary
problem, which encloses the set of implementable allocations. Between points
U and D, it coincides with the relaxed problem’s Pareto frontier P ′Q′. In the
allocations corresponding to this interval, the participation taxes TP1 and T
P
2 are
suciently close to each other to satisfy both IC constraints (3.23) and (3.24) even
without distortions at the intensive margin. This necessarily includes point A, in
which both participation taxes are identical TP1 = T
P
2 . The social planner can
implement the allocations in this interval without distorting labor supply at the
intensive margin. More generally, all combinations of V˜1 and V˜2 between both
overall lower xed costs than low-skill agents. In this case, we nd threshold values A′U and
A′D that are even closer to zero, implying a larger propensity of intensive margin distortions
in both directions.
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Figure 3.1: The Pareto frontier
T '=0,
T '=0
T '=0, T '<0
T '>0, T '=0
U
A
D
c -h(y ,w ) 
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c -h(y ,w ) 
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Q Q'
The gure shows the Pareto frontier for the auxiliary problem (solid line PQ) and the relaxed
auxiliary problem (dashed line P ′Q′). Horizontal axis: gross utility of low-skill workers,
c1 − h (y1, ω1). Vertical axis: gross utility of high-skill workers, c2 − h (y2, ω2).
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dashed lines can be implemented without intensive margin distortions, i.e., with
marginal taxes T ′1 = T
′
2 = 0.
To the left of point U , the solid Pareto frontier PQ for the non-relaxed problem
is below the dashed line P ′Q′. In this region, the gross utility V˜2 of high-skill
workers is so much higher than V˜1 that the upward IC constraint would be vio-
lated without intensive margin distortions. Thus, all points on the solid Pareto
frontier left of U correspond to allocations with a binding upward IC constraint,
and upwards distorted high-skill labor y2 at the intensive margin. These alloca-
tions can only be implemented with EITC-style tax schemes, involving negative
marginal taxes T ′2 for high-skill workers. Note also that movements along the
Pareto frontier PQ thus involve labor supply responses at the intensive and the
extensive margin. Moving up from point U , the upward IC constraint is tightened
more and more, and can only be restored through stronger upwards distortions
in y2.
Symmetrically, the solid Pareto frontier PQ is below the dashed line P ′Q′ to
the right of pointD, where the downward IC becomes binding. In the allocations
below D and the lower dashed line, positive marginal taxes T ′1 > 0 for low-skill
worker induce downwards distortions in y1, which are necessary to satisfy the
downward IC constraint. Altogether, Figure 3.6.2 allows to distinguish three parts
of the Pareto frontier with respect to the marginal eects on intensive eciency.
If agents would adjust their labor supply only at the intensive margin, surplus
would be maximized in every point between U andD. But this is only one aspect
of eciency if labor supply also respond at the extensive margin.
Figure 3.6.2 allows to take into account extensive eciency aspects as well. The
dotted line EF depicts the locus of allocations maximizing extensive eciency,
i.e., satisfying the inverse elasticity condition20
TP2
TP1
=
G2
(
s (y2, ω2)− TP2
)
/g2
(
s (y2, ω2)− TP2
)
G1
(
s (y1, ω1)− TP1
)
/g1
(
s (y1, ω1)− TP1
) > 1 for all A˜ 6= 0.
The intersection of this line with the Pareto frontier PQ is given by point E,
which would be optimal if movements along the Pareto frontier would only in-
duce labor supply responses at the extensive margin, but not at the intensive
margin. Thus, the dotted line EF allows to distinguish two parts of the Pareto
frontier with respect to the marginal eects on extensive margin. In particular,
extensive eciency is increased by movements down the Pareto frontier in the
region left of point E, and decreased in the region right of E.
20Note that, for the non-relaxed problem, this condition does not necessarily involve the rst-best
workload levels yˆ1 and yˆ2. In contrast, it involves the levels of y1 ≤ yˆ1 and yˆ2 ≥ y2 that are
required to ensure incentive-compatibility for the corresponding allocations.
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The properties of the surplus-maximizing allocations thus depend on the lo-
cation of point E, the intersection of this line with the Pareto frontier PQ. By
Lemma 3.5, E must be located above the uniform-taxation point A for any nega-
tive revenue requirement A˜. Depending on the exact level of A˜ and the properties
of G1 and G2, it may either lie to the left or to the right of point U , where the
upward IC constraint becomes binding.
Figure 3.2: The surplus-maximizing allocation
T '=0,
T '=0
T '=0, T '<0
T '>0, T '=0
U
A
D
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The gure shows the allocations maximizing social surplus (S), extensive
eciency (E) and intensive eciency (between U and D). Horizontal axis:
gross utility of low-skill workers, c1 − h (y1, ω1). Vertical axis: gross utility of
high-skill workers, c2 − h (y2, ω2).
Figure 3.6.2 illustrates the case in which this intersection is located to the left of
U . Lemma 3.6 implies that this case indeed occurs under reasonable assumptions.
For this case, a tradeo between intensive eciency and extensive eciency arises
between pointsE and U on the Pareto frontier. E maximizes extensive eciency,
but requires upward distortions in high-skill labor supply at the intensive margin.
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In contrast, intensive eciency is maximized at point U , which does not satisfy
the inverse elasticity condition.
Starting from U and moving the Pareto frontier up towards E initially induces
rst-order gains in extensive eciency, but only second-order losses in intensive
eciency. Starting instead from E and moving the Pareto frontier down towards
U initially induces rst-order gains in intensive eciency, but only second-order
losses in extensive eciency. Consequently, the surplus-maximizing allocation
must be located at some point S in the interior of this region, balancing marginal
gains in intensive eciency andmarginal losses in extensive eciency (see Figure
3.6.2).
Finally, the set of utilitarian allocations is given by the collection of all points
on the Pareto frontier between points S and Q in Figure 3.6.2. By assumption
DUR, the social planner would prefer to redistribute resources from high-skill
workers to low-skill workers if he were not restricted by incentive considerations.
Thus, any movement down the Pareto frontier induces a strict equity gain. At any
point to the right of the surplus-maximizing allocationS, however, it also involves
a loss in overall eciency (combining intensive and extensive aspects). Thus,
each point on the Pareto frontier below S corresponds to a utilitarian allocation.
With respect to the intensive margin, this set contains allocations with upwards
distortions in y2 (between S and U ), without distortions (between U and D) and
with downward distortions in y1 (between D and Q).
This claries that, andwhy, the existence of a utilitarian desire for redistribution
does not pin down the direction of intensive margin distortions, nor the sign of
the optimalmarginal income tax. In cases as the one illustrated in Figure 3.6.2, this
optimal sign instead depends on the intensity of the planner’s local redistributive
concerns. With a strong desire for redistribution between adjacent skill groups,
he will typically prefer tax schedules with positive marginal taxes, implementing
allocations in the lower right corner (between D and Q). If he instead values
additional resources in the hands of workers of both skill groups almost equally,
in contrast, an EITC-style tax scheme with negative marginal taxes is optimal,
implementing an allocation between (S and U ).21
In the latter case, the optimal upward distortion in labor supply cannot be un-
derstood in terms of the classical tradeo between equity and intensive eciency.
Above U , moving down the Pareto frontier instead induces gains both in equity
and intensive eciency, which are counteracted by losses in extensive eciency.
Thus, the potential optimality of upward distortions at the intensive margin is not
21Proposition 3.6 however implies that for some regular economies, labor supply is undistorted
in all utilitarian allocations. In these cases, the distance between points U and D is so large,
that they enclose all points on the Pareto frontier. Put dierently, the Pareto frontier for the
non-relaxed problem coincides with the one for the relaxed problem.
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driven, but rather reduced by local equity concerns, and can only be understood
in terms of the eciency-eciency tradeo studied in this section.
Along the same lines, it can be explained why low-skill labor yS1 is downwards
distorted in the surplus-maximizing allocation if and only if the revenue require-
ment A is large enough (above some threshold AD), but still below the maximal
tax revenue Amax. In this case, the surplus-maximizing allocation is located to
the right of point D. The same is true for the complete set of utilitarian alloca-
tions, which implies that optimal marginal taxes are unambiguously positive in
this case. One can conclude that negative participation taxes, which only arise for
negative revenue requirements A˜, represent a necessary but not sucient condi-
tion for the optimality of negative marginal taxes.
Summing up, I have shown that the problem of constrained surplus maximiza-
tion gives rise to a tension between labor supply distortions at the intensive mar-
gin and labor supply distortions at the extensive margin, which has not been dis-
cussed in the literature so far. To minimize eciency losses due to labor supply
responses at the extensive margin, the social planner would prefer implementing
an allocation that potentially violates upward incentive compatibility. Surplus-
maximization then gives rise to a tradeo between intensive eciency and exten-
sive eciency, while welfare maximization involves a threeway-tradeo between
equity, intensive eciency and extensive eciency.22
3.7 One-dimensional private information
In the Mirrlees (1971) framework, agents dier in and are privately informed
about their skill types only. In accordance with the recent literature on labor
supply responses at the extensive margin, or at both margins, I have studied a
model in which agents are heterogeneous with respect to skills and xed costs
of working (Saez, 2002; Choné and Laroque, 2011; Jacquet, Lehmann, and Lin-
den, 2013). In the previous sections of this chapter as in all previous studies, it is
moreover assumed that agents are privately informed about both dimensions of
heterogeneity, so that the social planner can exclusively observe the gross income
an agent earns on the labor market.
This gives rise to the question whether the derived results, in particular the
potential optimality of the EITC, are driven by multi-dimensional heterogeneity
or by multi-dimensional private information. From a theoretical perspective, this
is important to understand the economic mechanism behind this result. From an
applied perspective, one might argue that governments actually possess at least
some information about these individual characteristics. Notice for example that
22
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the US earned income tax credit (EITC) conditions tax liabilities on individual
characteristics and life circumstances such as family status and the number of
dependent children, which are commonly brought forward in the literature to
motivate the assumption of heterogeneity in xed costs of working. Similarly, tax
authorities in many countries make use of tagging with respect to, e.g., disabilities
or spatial distance between the place of residence and the workplace of tax payers.
This section aims at clarifying the importance of the imposed information struc-
ture. For this purpose, I study optimal taxation under the alternative assumptions
that the social planner is able to observe one individual parameter directly.
3.7.1 Observable fixed costs
The rst alternative to the information structure considered so far is to aban-
don the assumption of private information on xed cost types. Instead, assume
that the social planner is able to observe individual xed cost types, while agents
remain privately informed about their skill types. The information structure is
thus similar to the one in the classical Mirrlees (1971) framework. In contrast to
the latter, however, there is observable heterogeneity with respect to xed costs,
which can be used for tagging, i.e., to condition tax payments on individual xed
cost types. Nevertheless, changes in the tax schedule can give rise to labor supply
responses at both margins.
With observable xed costs, the planner only needs to take into account a lim-
ited set of incentive-compatibility constraints. In particular, only the incentive-
compatibility constraints between agents with alternative skills, but the same cost
parameter δ need to be satised:
c(ω, δ)− h (y(ω, δ), ω)− 1y>0δ ≥ c(ω′, δ)− h
(
y(ω′, δ), ω′
)− 1y>0δ
for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and δ ∈ ∆ (3.27)
With observable xed cost types, the social planner’s problem is to maximize
social welfare (3.3), subject to feasibility (3.1) and the reduced set of incentive com-
patibility constraints (3.27). However, this problem can be rewritten as a two-step
problem. In the rst step, the social planner maximizes overall welfare by redis-
tributing resources between all xed cost groups, without being constrained by
any IC constraints. In the second step, the planner maximizes the group-specic
welfare in each xed cost group, subject to the group-specic IC constraints (3.27)
and a group-specic feasibility constraint. Thus, he essentially solves separate
optimal tax problems for each groups of agents with each xed cost type δ ∈ ∆.
As AssumptionDUR does not pin down the redistributive concerns of the social
planner within the group of agents with xed cost type δ, we need to replace it
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with the following assumption.
Desirability of Utilitarian Redistribution with Observable Costs (DUR δ):
For each xed cost level δ ∈ ∆, the following is true in every implementable alloca-
tion (c, y):
0 < α′j+1(c, y, δ) < α
′
j(c, y, δ) < α
′
0(c, y, δ), (3.28)
where α′j(c, y, δ) = U
′
[
c(ωj+1, δ)− h
[
y(ωj+1, δ), δ
]− δ] and α′0(c, y, δ) =
Eωk [U
′ [c(ωk, δ)] |y(ωk, δ) = 0] denote the endogenous weights associated to work-
ing agents with type
(
ωj, δ
)
and to unemployed agents, respectively.
This assumption is clearly satised if functionU is strictly concave onR. Den-
ing the set of utilitarian allocation based on Assumption DUR δ instead of DUR,
the optimal structure of income tax schedule has similar eects on labor supply
distortions as in the Mirrlees (1971) model.
Proposition 3.8. With observable xed cost types, labor supply in any utilitarian
allocation is
(i) undistorted at the intensive margin at the top skill, i.e., for all agents with skill
type ωn,
(ii) strictly downwards distorted at the intensive margin for all agents with lower
skill types, and
(iii) weakly downwards distorted at the extensive margin for all types (ω, δ)
in all xed cost groups for any regular economy.
Proposition 3.8 is closely related to the main results by Mirrlees (1971) and sub-
sequent papers. In particular, parts (i) and (ii) correspond to the traditional results
on optimal distortions at the intensive margin. These papers do not provide in-
sights on optimal distortions at the extensive margin, though.23 Nevertheless,
similar arguments can be applied to show that all downward IC constraints in
each xed cost group must be binding in the optimal allocation. Distorting labor
supply downwards at the intensive margin then helps to slacken these downward
IC constraints, and to achieve further equity gains.
23Typically, Inada conditions ensure that all agents provide strictly positive output in the optimal
allocation, thereby ruling out extensive margin distortions.
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The crucial dierence to the model with two-dimensional dierence is directly
related to the dierent information structure. With two-dimensional private in-
formation, there are agents in all skill groups that are indierent between em-
ployment and unemployment. Thus, a small increase in the unemployment ben-
et induces unintended labor supply responses at the extensive margin in all skill
groups. With observable xed costs, only the least productive workers are indif-
ferent between employment and unemployment, while all workers with higher
skill types strictly prefer working. Consequently, a small increase in the benet
induces only extensive margin responses among the least productive workers, but
does not drive high-skill workers out of the labor market.
3.7.2 Observable skill types
The second alternative to the information structure in the main part of this chap-
ter involves observable skill types. In contrast, let the agents be privately in-
formed about their xed cost types. Thus, the social planner again faces a one-
dimensional screening problem. Given this information structure, an allocation
is incentive-compatible if and only if
c(ω, δ)− h (y(ω, δ), ω)− 1y>0δ ≥(¸ω, δ′)− h
(
y(ω, δ′), ω
)− 1y>0δ′
for all ω ∈ Ω and δ, δ′ ∈ ∆ (3.29)
With observable xed costs, the optimal tax problem is to maximize social wel-
fare (3.3), subject to feasibility (3.1) and the new set of incentive compatibility
constraints (3.29).
Again, Assumption DUR needs to be replaced with an assumption on the plan-
ner’s redistributive concerns within the group of agents with each skill type ωj .
Desirability of Utilitarian Redistribution with Observable Skills (DUR ω):
For every skill level ωj ∈ Ω, the following is true in every implementable allocation
(c, y)
0 < αUw(c, y, ωj) < α
U
0 (c, y, ωj), (3.30)
where αUw(c, y, ωj) = Eδ
[
U ′
(
c(ωj, δ)− h
[
y(ωj, δ), ωj
]− δ) |y(ωj, δ) > 0] and
αU0 (c, y, ωj) = Eδ
[
U ′
[
c(ωj, δ]
) |y(ωj, δ) > 0] denote the average weights associ-
ated to working agents and to unemployed agents, respectively.
Again, this assumption is satised whenever function U is strictly concave on
R. The following proposition claries that optimal utilitarian income taxation
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cannot give rise to upward distortions in labor supply at any margin, as long as
the social planner faces a one-dimensional screening problem.
Proposition 3.9. With observable skill types, labor supply in any utilitarian allo-
cation is
• undistorted at the intensive margin everywhere, and
• distorted downward at the extensive margin
in all skill groups ωj ∈ Ω for any regular economy.
This insight and the logic behind it dier more strongly from the results by
Mirrlees (1971) as well as Saez (2002) and Choné and Laroque (2011). Given this
information structure, the social planner only needs to consider incentive com-
patibility constraints between agents with identical skill types, but dierent cost
types. As there is no single-crossing condition imposed with respect to the xed
cost type δ, labor supply distortions at the intensivemargin cannot help to slacken
IC constraints and are thus never optimal. Because Assumption AFC imposes
additive separability of the xed cost component δ, every implementable alloca-
tion involves pooling by all workers with the same skill, and by all unemployed
agents with the same skill. Thus, the social planner’s problem is basically reduced
to choosing a benet level bj for unemployed agents and a consumption-output
bundle (cj, yj) for workers of each skill group ωj ∈ Ω.
In any skill group, redistributing additional resources from workers to unem-
ployed agents induces an equity gain, but also forces some previously indier-
ent workers out of the labor market. As long as labor supply is not downwards
distorted at the extensive margin, this also implies an eciency gain and, con-
sequently, a strict increase in social welfare. Thus, the optimal allocation must
involve a strict downward distortion at the extensive margin in each skill group.
To summarize, this section has claried that neither two-dimensional hetero-
geneity nor the existence of labor supply responses at the intensive and the ex-
tensive margin per se alter the main insights of Mirrlees (1971). As long as the
utilitarian planner is able to observe one dimension of heterogeneity, and needs to
solve a one-dimensional screening problem, the optimal allocation will never in-
volve upward distortions in labor supply. If agents are instead privately informed
about skill types as well as xed cost types, a utilitarian desire for redistribution
does not pin down the optimal direction of labor supply distortions as implied by
Propositions 3.2 to 3.4.
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3.8 Discussion of assumptions
This chapter studies optimal utilitarian income taxation under a number of reg-
ularity assumptions imposed in section 3.3. In the following, I discuss the impli-
cations of these assumptions for the results of this chapter, in particular for the
ambiguous sign of the optimal marginal income tax.
Assumption AFC and QLC restrict individual preferences. Assumption AFC
follows Jacquet, Lehmann, and Linden (2013), the most prominent previous pa-
per on optimal income taxation with labor supply responses at two margins. It
imposes additive separability of the xed cost component δ, which is required for
reasons of tractability, as it allows to study the model using the random partici-
pation approach due to Rochet and Stole (2002). Under AFC, the xed cost type δ
only aects an agent’s decision whether or not to enter the labor market. Condi-
tional on entering the labor market, in contrast, the individually optimal level of
workload y only depends on the skill type ω for any given tax schedule T . Thus,
all workers with the same skill type react identically to changes in T . In mech-
anism perspective, assumption AFC implies that an allocation is implementable
whenever it satises dimension-wise incentive compatibility, i.e., if no agent with
type (ω, δ) prefers the allocations of types that dier in only one type parameter.
Assumption QLC follows the seminal paper by Diamond (1998) and has two
implications. First, the imposed quasi-linearity in consumption considerably sim-
plies the optimal tax problem by eliminating income eects in labor supply. In
particular, assumption QLC implies that individually optimal choices of workload
y only depend on marginal income taxes, but are unaected by lump-sum taxes.
Thus, it simplies the denition and analysis of labor supply distortions at the
intensive margin.24
Second, the assumed quasi-linearity implies that the social planner’s desire for
redistribution only depends on the properties of the social objective function U
(and the joint type distribution Ψ). This simplies the analysis of sucient con-
ditions for condition DUR to be satised. In particular, the limit-case of a social
planner without redistribute concerns is attained forU equaling the identity func-
tion.
By assumption REM , there would be unemployed as well as employed agents
with each skill type under laissez-faire. This guarantees that variations in tax
liabilities induce labor supply responses at the extensivemargin in all skill groups,
as long as the highest skill group faces a positive participation tax. By Proposition
3.1, this is always true for the optimal tax schedule. From a theoretical perspective,
24In a slightly weaker version of assumption QLC, income eects could also be ruled out by
assuming that the utility function is given by V (c, y, ω, δ) = Φ [c− h(y, ω)− 1y>0δ], where
Φ is some strictly increasing function.
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this assumption simplies the comparison between the model studied here and
the Mirrlees (1971) model, where no extensive margin responses occur.
The main results of this chapter survive, however, under the weaker condition
that extensive margin responses occur for more than two skill groups. Consider
an intermediate model in which extensive margin responses in labor supply only
occur up to some threshold skill level ωk < ωn. Then, labor supply by all agents
with skill types ωj ∈ [ωk, ωn−1] is strictly downward distorted at the intensive
margin in every utilitarian allocation, just as in the intensive model á la Mirrlees
(1971). In contrast, the direction of optimal distortions at the intensive margin is
ambiguous for all skill groups below ωk, as in the model studied here.
Finally, assumption LC requires that the xed cost distribution Gj for each
skill group is strictly log-concave, i.e., has a strictly increasing reverse hazard
rate, which is true for most commonly used distribution functions, including the
uniform, normal, log-normal, Pareto and exponential distributions. Assumption
OFCD imposes two conditions on the joint type distribution. By part (i), xed costs
must be larger among low-skill workers than among high-skill workers in the
sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. By part (ii), the hazard rateGj(δ)/gj(δ)
must beweakly lower for low-skill groups than for high-skill groups. Clearly, both
properties are closely related, although not equivalent in general. However, they
have two separate, crucial implications.
First, LC and Assumption OFCD (ii) jointly imply that the semi-elasticity of
the participation rate is strictly lower for low-skill types than for high-skill types
in every implementable allocation. As the analysis of the auxiliary problem in
section 3.6 has revealed, this is a necessary condition for the ambiguous sign of the
optimal marginal tax for the working poor, who receive employment subsidies.
Crucially, strong empirical evidence conrms that low-skill workers indeed react
more responsively on the extensivemargin (see, e.g., Juhn et al. 1991; Immervoll et
al. 2007; Meghir and Phillips 2010).25 Thus, assumptions LC and OFCD guarantee
the empirical relevance of the derived results.26
Second, LC and OFCD (i) jointly ensure that condition DUR does not restrict
25More precisely, these studies nd that the elasticity of participation, [yj − T (yj)] gj [yj−T (yj)]gj [yj−T (yj)]
is decreasing along the skill dimension. The same must be true for the semi-elasticities of
participation, however, as all estimated elasticities are positive and yj − T (yj) is strictly in-
creasing in the skill type. Note, however, that these empirical studies only reveal relative
semi-elasticities under the current tax schedules, which will typically dier from the optimal
tax schedule.
26It is nevertheless interesting to note that the sign of the optimal marginal tax would even be
ambiguous in the opposite case, in which high-skill groups would react more strongly at the
extensive margin. Then, however, optimal marginal taxes would be strictly positive for low-
skill workers and potentially negative for high-skill workers. I am not aware of real-world tax
schedules with this property, however.
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the analysis to the empty set. Although the planner’s desire for redistribution
from high-skill to low-skill workers is imposed directly through DUR, it actually
represents a joint assumption on properties of the joint type distribution and the
social objective U . It can be shown that the sequence of social weights is strictly
decreasing whenever the social objective U is strictly concave and LC and OFCD
(ii) hold. In contrast, concavity of U would neither be sucient nor necessary if
LC or OFCD (ii) would be violated.27
Intuitively, concavity of U implies that the planner prefers to redistribute from
skill groups with high average utility to skill groups with lower average utility.
With a strong positive correlation between skills and xed costs, however, high-
skill workers might be on average worse o than low-skill workers. Thus, the
social planner might hold an anti-utilitarian desire to redistribute from low-skill
to high-skill workers. More generally, there might exist joint type distributions
Ψ such that Assumption DUR would not be satised for any strictly increasing
function U .28
3.9 Related Literature
The chapter studies the implications of optimal utilitarian income taxation in a
model with labor supply responses at two margins. Thus, it builds on the rich
literature on optimal taxation with labor supply responses at the intensive mar-
gin only, starting with the seminal paper by Mirrlees (1971). Further important
studies include Seade (1977) and Seade (1982) and Hellwig (2007). In their models,
a utilitarian desire for redistribution leads to the optimality of strictly positive
marginal taxes everywhere below the very top. In contrast, the optimal sign of
marginal taxes is ambiguous in my chapter, which is a joint result of, rst, the
existence of two margins of labor supply responses, and second, individual het-
erogeneity in two dimensions that are both associated with private information.
Regarding the theoretical model, this chapter is more closely related to the lit-
erature on optimal taxation with labor supply responses at the extensive margin.
This strand of the literature was initiated by Saez (2002), building on previous
27See Propositions 2 and 3 by Choné and Laroque (2011) for the same result in a model with labor
supply responses at the extensive margin only. In the Mirrlees (1971) framework with one-
dimensional heterogeneity, in contrast, concavity of U is a sucient condition for a standard
utilitarian desire for redistribution, irrespective of the properties of the type distribution.
28Choné and Laroque (2010) study the roots and eects of increasing social weight functions in a
model with labor supply responses at the intensive margin only, also referring to settings with
two-dimensional heterogeneity and strong correlation between both private parameters. In
particular, they use this logic to rationalize an EITC-style income tax schedule with negative
marginal taxes.
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work by Diamond (1980). A rigorous theoretical treatment of the extensive model
is provided by Choné and Laroque (2011). In these papers, agents dier in two
individual parameter, interpreted as skills and xed costs or opportunity costs of
employment. Thus, the social planner faces a multi-dimensional screening prob-
lem. In contrast to this chapter, however, they focus onmodels inwhich the agents
only face xed costs of working, but no continuous cost of increasing their work-
load as in Mirrlees (1971).29 Thus, agents only choose whether or not to work
at all; if an agent enters the labor market, he always produces at full capacity.
Consequently, distortions in labor supply can only occur at the extensive margin.
The main nding of these models is that negative participation taxes for low-
skill workers are optimal if and only if the utilitarian planner associates to them
a social weight above the population average. The intuition for this result rests
on an eciency argument, comparing the eciency costs of two changes in the
allocation: redistributing resources towards the working poor induces some up-
wards distortions in the labor supply of these groups, but redistributing resources
towards the unemployed leads to adverse labor supply responses by workers of
all skill groups.30
In the extensivemodels byDiamond (1980), Saez (2002), and Choné and Laroque
(2011), the economic role of marginal income taxes diers strongly from the one
in the Mirrlees (1971) model and in my model. First, non-zero marginal taxes do
not induce labor supply distortions at the intensive margin. Second, labor sup-
ply distortions do not help to relax incentive compatibility contraints. In their
models, there are no upward incentive compatibility constraints, and only degen-
erate downward incentive compatibility constraints.31 In my model, negative (or
positive) marginal taxes can in contrast only be optimal because they induce in-
tensive margin distortions that help to relax incentive compatibility constraints.
While Diamond (1980) and Choné and Laroque (2011) also provide examples un-
der which negative marginal taxes for the working poor are optimal, the math-
ematical and theoretical arguments explaining these phenomena consequently
dier from those provided above.32
29While focusing on models with one margin only, Saez (2002) also discusses the general model
with labor supply responses at both margins. He simulates the optimal tax schedule for this
general model, but does not study the properties of optimal tax schedule analytically.
30Christiansen (2012) studies in detail the economic mechanism giving rise to the optimality of
negative participation taxes.
31In the paper by Choné and Laroque (2011), the optimal allocation always involves slack down-
ward incentive compatibility constraints for all skill levels with relevant extensive margin, i.e.,
with positive shares of unemployed agents.
32The example provided in Choné and Laroque (2011) is based on the assumptions that rst,
the skill space is continuous and second, no agent of the lowest skill type would work under
laissez-faire. Both assumptions do not hold in my chapter.
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More generally, the social planner in my model needs to take into account la-
bor supply responses at the intensive and the extensive margin responses. As
shown above, the maximization of a utilitarian welfare function can give rise to
a tradeo between intensive eciency and extensive eciency, which is key to
understand the ambiguous sign of optimal marginal taxes. This tradeo is absent
in the extensive models as well as the intensive models discussed above.
Most closely related to this chapter is the analysis by Jacquet, Lehmann, and
Linden (2013), who also study optimal income taxation with labor supply re-
sponses at both margins. As in my model, agents face xed costs of employment
(as in the extensive model) as well as variable costs of providing eort in the job
(as in the intensive model). The research questions of both papers dier strongly.
This chapter contributes to the literature by showing that, and why, the opti-
mal signs of marginal income taxes and participation taxes are ambiguous even
if the social planner has a desire for utilitarian redistribution. Jacquet, Lehmann,
and Linden (2013) focus on identifying conditions under which optimal marginal
taxes are unambiguously positive. In particular, they provide a sucient condi-
tion under which marginal taxes are throughout positive, expressed in terms of
endogenous social weights and of the optimal allocation itself. They argue that
this sucient condition does not seem very restrictive, and provide some exam-
ples under which is is certainly satised. In contrast, I show that the optimal
sign of marginal income taxes and participation taxes is in general ambiguous,
and provide a sucient condition for the optimality of negative marginal taxes,
which is expressed in terms of the primitives, i.e., the type set, the type distribu-
tion and utility functions. One interpretation of my results is that, for a large class
of economies, it mainly depends on the intensity of the planner’s redistributive
concerns whether or not the condition identied by Jacquet, Lehmann, and Lin-
den (2013) is satised. As Jacquet, Lehmann, and Linden (2013) concentrate on
cases in which the optimal marginal tax can be signed unambiguously, they are
not concerned with working out the economic mechanism underlying the inde-
terminacy of this sign. Correspondingly, they do not discuss the tradeo between
intensive eciency and extensive eciency, which is identied as the source of
ambiguity in my model.
There are two minor dierences between this chapter and Jacquet, Lehmann,
and Linden (2013). First, their model is more general as they allow for income
eects in labor supply which are assumed away in this chapter. Second, the skill
space in their model is given by an interval, while I study a nite set of skill types.
Reecting this dierence, the mathematical proofs applied in both papers dier
considerably.33
33In a related paper, Lorenz and Sachs (2011) study optimal income taxation with two margins
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Two further papers aim at rationalizing negative marginal income taxes, both
based on a desire to redistribute resources locally upwards. Choné and Laroque
(2010) study a model á la Mirrlees (1971) with labor supply reponses at the inten-
sive margin only, but with two-dimensional heterogeneity in individual charac-
teristics. They argue that, if there is a specic correlation between both dimen-
sions of heterogeneity, the social planner might want to redistribute resources lo-
cally upwards to the group of more skilled, but more disadvantaged (in the second
dimension) agents. In this case, the anti-utilitarian desire to redistribute resources
from low-skill to high-skill agents gives rise to a reversed equity-eciency trade-
o, and to optimal upward distortions in labor supply by high-skill workers. In
contrast, I assume the social planner to be a utilitarian who would strictly prefer
to transfer resources from high-skill to low-skill workers, if he could ignore incen-
tive considerations. In my framework, optimal upward distortions can thus result
for eciency reasons only, more precisely due to the tradeo between intensive
eciency and extensive eciency.
In the model by Beaudry, Blackorby, and Szalay (2009), agents dier in and are
privately informed about their productivities in the formal sector as well as in
the informal sector. Within each group of workers with identical productivity
in the formal sector, the ones with highest informal productivity choose to stay
ocially unemployed in order to maximize their income. Thus, the social plan-
ner assigns lower social weights to the unemployed than to the employed within
the same skill group, which again conicts with the assumed desire for utilitar-
ian redistribution in this chapter. In Beaudry, Blackorby, and Szalay (2009), the
non-monotonic weight sequence implies that employment subsidies up to some
threshold skill level are optimal. Their model diers in two further aspects from
the classical Mirrlees (1971) setting. First, eort costs are linear so that all agents
choose either to work at full capacity in the formal sector or to move towards
the informal sector (except one threshold skill type). As in the extensive mod-
els discussed above, the optimal allocation cannot involve upward distortions at
the intensive margin by construction. Second, they assume that the social plan-
ner can observe hours worked in the formal sector, thereby deviating from the
conventional information structure.
of labor supply responses, where the extensive margin results from an minimum-hours con-
straint. While they do not study the sign of optimal marginal taxes, they provide a sucient
condition for the positivity of optimal participation taxes.
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3.10 Conclusion
The largest US program transferring resources towards the poor, the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC), involves negative marginal taxes and negative partici-
pation taxes for the working poor. Given a utilitarian desire for redistribution,
this cannot be rationalized in a model in which agents adjust their labor supply
only at the intensive margin as in the classical Mirrlees (1971) framework; the
optimalmarginal tax is then positive everywhere below the very top. In contrast,
recent research nds that optimal participation taxes can be negative if agents
adjust their labor supply at the extensive instead of the intensive margin (Saez,
2002; Choné and Laroque, 2011). This chapter is the rst paper to show that, and
explain why, EITC-style tax schemes with negative marginal taxes and negative
participation taxes can indeed be optimal if labor supply responses take place at
the intensive and the extensive margin, which is arguably the most appropriate
assumption from an empirical perspective.
More generally, I show that the existence of a utilitarian desire to redistribute
resources from high-skill to low-skill workers does neither pin down the optimal
signs of marginal and participation taxes nor the optimal directions of labor sup-
ply distortions at both margins. Instead, the properties of the optimal tax scheme
depend on the intensities of the social planner’s concerns for redistribution, rst,
from the very rich to the very poor, and second, within the group of the work-
ing poor. The chapter works out the economic intuition behind this ambiguity,
which is driven by an inherent, but yet undiscussed, tradeo between intensive
eciency and extensive eciency aspects. Negative marginal taxes create ef-
ciency losses at the intensive margin; in certain situation, they can however
help to increase extensive eciency by slackening upward incentive compatibil-
ity constraints.
A number of questions remain unresolved. First, the theoretical analysis clari-
es that the properties of the optimal tax scheme depend strongly on the relative
(semi-)elasticities of labor market participation shares in dierent skill groups.
While there is already some empirical evidence on this issue, future research
should focus more strongly on the heterogeneity of labor supply responses, in-
stead of mainly estimating average elasticities. Second, the analysis has been sim-
plied considerably by a number of assumptions. In my view, the most restrictive
of these assumptions are given by the quasi-linearity of preferences in consump-
tion, which rules out any income eects in labor supply, and the discreteness of
the skill type space. Although I conjecture that the basic insights would remain
valid, relaxing these assumptions could improve the economic understanding of
the mechanisms at work and complete the picture.
130
3.A Proofs for Sections 3.4 to 3.6
Appendix 3.A Proofs for Sections 3.4 to 3.6
Proof of Lemma 3.1 An allocation (c, y) is incentive compatible if it satises
the following inequality for all pairs of (ω, δ) and (ω′, δ′) in Ω×∆:
c(ω, δ)− h [y(ω, δ), ω]− 1y(ω,δ)>0δ ≥ c(ω′, δ′)− h
[
y(ω′, δ′), ω
]− 1y(ω′,δ′)>0δ
The proof of Lemma 3.1 requires to distinguish between several cases. First, con-
sider two agents of types (ω, δ) and (ω′, δ′) such that both provide zero output.
Incentive compatibility requires identical consumption c(ω, δ) = c(ω′, δ′) ≡ b.
Second, consider two agents with identical skill type ωj and dierent cost types
δ 6= δ′ such that both provide positive eort. As both IC constraints need to be
satised, both agents need to receive the same gross (of xed costs) utility level
c(ωj, δ)−h
[
y(ωj, δ), ωj
]
= c(ωj, δ
′)−h [y(ωj, δ′), ωj] = zj . In general, incentive
compatibility does not imply c(ωj, δ) = c(ωj, δ
′) and y(ωj, δ) = y(ωj, δ
′), because
dierent consumption bundles provide the same gross utility level zj to workers
with identical skill types. Incentive compatibility only requires that non of the
bundles meant for some worker with skill ωj is preferred by some worker with
skill ωk, i.e., that c(ωj, δ)− h
[
y(ωj, δ), ωk
] ≤ zk holds.
Second-best Pareto eciency, however, requires identical bundles (cj, yj) for
all workers of skill level ωj . By the properties of eort cost function h, there is
always a unique bundle (cj, yj) that minimizes the net transfer c − y subject to
incentive compatibility, i.e., subject to c − h(y, ωj) = zj and c − h(y, ωk) < zk.
This may either involve the ecient level yˆj or the closest level to yˆj that is still
consistent with all IC constraints. If some agent with type (ωj, δ) receives bundle
(c′, y′) 6= (cj, yj) with positive output y′ 6= yj , then net resources can be saved
by changing his allocation to (cj, yj) without changing his utility level. But then,
redistributing these resources lump-sum to all agents in the economy leads to a
strict (incentive-compatible) Pareto improvement.
Finally, consider two agents with the same skill type ωj and dierent cost types
δ, δ′ such that y(ωj, δ) > 0 and y(ωj, δ
′) = 0. By incentive compatibility, δ ≤
cj − h
(
yj, ωj
)− b ≡ δˆj and δ′ ≥ δˆj .
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Assumption DUR ensures that the social planner asso-
ciates positive weight to all skill groups. By standard arguments, any utilitarian
allocation must then be Pareto-ecient, which implies identical bundles (cj, yj)
for all workers of each skill group ωj , and all unemployed agents. The welfare
function (3.12) and the feasibility constraint (3.13) directly follow from inserting
the skill-conditional levels cj and yj and the universal benet b.
Incentive compatibility along the xed cost dimension, i.e., between types with
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identical skills ωj and dierent cost types δ, δ
′ is given if and only if the partici-
pation constraint (3.14) is satised. It takes into account the possibility of corner
solutions, in which all agents of some skill groups are either unemployed, δˆj = δ¯,
or employed, δˆj = δ. As all unemployed agents receive the same benet, con-
straint (3.14) also ensures that no worker of skill group ωj wants to mimic an
unemployed agent of some other skill group.
Incentive compatibility between two workers with adjacent skill types ωj , ωj+1
and arbitrary xed cost types δ ≤ δˆj , δ′ ≤ δˆj+1 is satised if and only if
V˜ (cj+1, yj+1, ωj+1)− δ′ ≥ V˜ (cj, yj, ωj+1)− δ′ and
V˜ (cj, yj, ωj)− δ ≥ V˜ (cj+1, y+1, ωj)− δ ,
which is equivalent to constraints (3.15) and (3.16). By the single-crossing prop-
erty, they also ensures incentive compatibility between non-adjacent skill types.
Finally, (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) jointly guarantee that no unemployed agent of
skill type ωj wants to mimic some worker with some other skill type ωk, because
b > V˜ (cj, yj, ωj) − δ ≥ V˜ (ck, yk, ωj) − δ for all unemployed agents with δ > δˆj
and any k 6= j.
Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. For any type (ωj, δ), ecient labor supply is given by the minimizer of the
net transfer of resources (c− y) subject to the constraint V (c, y, ωj, δ) ≥ v. This
problem is equivalent to maximizing the following Lagrangian
L(c, y) = y − c + λ [c− h(y, ωj)− 1j>0δ − v]
The discontinuity at y = 0 requires a case distinction. For the corner solution
y = 0, the required net transfer trivially follows as c0(v) = v.
For the interior solution y > 0, monotonicity and convexity of h ensure a
unique solution, given by y = yˆj and c = cˆj(v) = h
(
yˆj, ωj
)
+ δ + v, where
yˆj is implicitly dened by the rst-order condition 1 − h1
(
yˆj, ωj
)
= 0. The net
transfer is given by cˆj(v) − yˆj = v − sˆj + δ. If and only if δ ≤ sˆj , the interior
solution dominates the corner solution, so that y∗(ωj, δ) = yˆj .
Proofs of Propositions 3.1-3.2
Proposition 3.1 implies that the famous no-distortion-at-the-top result still holds
with labor supply responses at the intensive margin, although only with respect
to the intensive margin. At the extensive margin, labor supply is instead strictly
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downward distorted at the top. Proposition 3.2 derives the existence of utilitarian
allocations without distortions at the intensive margin for any regular economy.
Both propositions are proven through a series of lemmas. To simplify notation
in the following, I nd it convenient to dene the employment rent rj = cj −
h
(
yj, ωj
)−b as an auxiliary function. It measures the utility gain that a worker of
skill level ωj receives if he provides output yj > 0 instead of staying unemployed,
conditional on the mechanism (c, y, b) and gross of xed costs.
First, consider a relaxed problem in which the incentive compatibility con-
straints (3.15 and (3.16) between active workers of dierent skill types are not
taken into account. However, we still include the constraint that unemployed
agents of all skill types must receive the same benet b. Moreover, the planner is
still restricted by the set of participation constraints (3.14), i.e., needs to take into
account labor supply responses at the extensive margin. Note that this relaxed
problem corresponds to the rst-and-half problem in Jacquet, Lehmann, and Lin-
den (2013), which is however studied under the assumption of a continuous skill
space. Given the denition of the employment rent, the social planner’s problem
can be dened as follows
Relaxed Problem. Maximize over y =
(
yj
)n
j=1
, r =
(
rj
)n
j=1
, and b the welfare
function
n∑
j=1
fj
[∫ δˆj
δ
U
(
rj + b− δ
)
dGj(δ) +
[
1−Gj
(
δˆj
)]
U(b)
]
subject to the constraints
b =
n∑
j=1
fjGj
(
δˆj
) [
s
(
yj, ωj
)− rj] ,
δˆj =max
{
δ,min
{
rj, δ¯
}}
for all ωj ∈ Ω
In this model, the planner’s objective is not necessarily globally concave in all
choice variables. The same problem arises in the model with labor supply re-
sponses at the extensive margin only, Choné and Laroque (2011) show that the
Lagrangian can become convex in consumption levels if social weights are par-
ticularly high. The following assumption assumes away this irregularity in order
to concentrate on the economic problem.
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Assumption 3.4. For any skill level ωj , the social weight α
U
j (c, y) associated to
workers with this skill type satises
αUj (c, y) < χj(δ) =
(
2− Gj(δ)g
′
j(δ)
gj(δ)2
)
/
(
1− Gj(δ)g
′
j(δ)
gj(δ)2
)
for all δ ∈ ∆. Moreover, αUj (c, y) is weakly decreasing in cj .
The log-concavity of Gj imposed by assumption LC ensures that gj(δ)
2 >
Gj(δ)g
′
j(δ). Thus, the upper bound χj(δ) exceeds unity for ωj ∈ Ω and δ ∈ ∆. For
uniformly distributed xed costs, χj(δ) = 2 for all δ and ωj . All results derived in
this chapter follow for utilitarian welfare functions that satisfy this assumption.
Lemma 3.7. Let the relative social weight αUj (c
R, yR) be dened as in equation 3.8
on page 98. In the solution to the relaxed problem, (rR, yR, bR), all workers of skill
type ωj
• provide the ecient output level yRj = yˆj , and
• receive an employment rent that is implicitly dened by
g(rRj )
[
rRj − sˆj
]
= Gj(r
R
j )
(
αUj (c
R, yR)− 1) .
The unemployment benet is given by
bR =
n∑
j=1
fjGj
(
rRj
) (
sˆj − rRj
)
Proof. Assume that rj ∈
(
δ, δ¯
)
for all skill levels ωj ∈ Ω. Then, the Lagrangian of
the relaxed problem is given by
L =
n∑
j=1
fj
[∫ rj
δ
gj(δ)U
(
rj + b− δ
)
dδ +
(
1−Gj(rj)
)
U(b)
]
+ λ
[
n∑
j=1
fjGj(rj)
(
s
(
yj, ωj
)− rj)− b
]
The rst-order conditions with respect to rj , yj and b are given by
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Lrj = fj
[∫ rRj
δ
gj(δ)U
′
(
rRj + b
R − δ) dδ − λGj(rRj )
+λgj(r
R
j )
(
s
(
yRj , ωj
)− rRj )] = 0
Lyj = λfjGj(rRj )s1(yRj , ωj) = 0
Lb =
n∑
j=1
fj
[∫ rRj
δ
gj(δ)U
′
(
rRj + b
R − δ) dδ + (1−Gj(rRj ))U ′(bR)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α¯(cR,yR)
−λ = 0
By the last FOC, the value of multiplier λ equals the average marginal utility
α¯(cR, yR) in the optimal allocation. The same will be true for the full problem.
By the FOC with respect to yj , s1(y
R
j , ωj) must be zero in the solution to the
relaxed problem. Thus, workers of all skill levels provide ecient output yj =
yˆj . Rearranging the FOC with respect to rj and substituting in α
U
j (c
R, yR) =[∫ rRj
δ gj(δ)U
′
(
rRj + b
R − δ) dδ] /α¯(cR, yR) gives the expression in Lemma 3.7. By
assumption REM , the rst derivative is strictly positive for rj → δ. For rj →
∞, it is strictly negative by limz→∞ U ′(z) < 1. By the continuity of the rst-
order condition in rj , it must have at least one root. Assumption 3.4 guarantees
concavity of the Lagrangian in rj is for all rj ≥ δ. Thus, the rst-order condition
with respect to rj has a unique root, which involves r
R
j > δ.
The conditions dening the relaxed problem’s solution have the same structure
as those dening the optimal allocations in the extensive models by Saez (2002)
and Choné and Laroque (2011), and the solution to the rst-and-half problem in
Jacquet, Lehmann, and Linden (2013). Due to the lack of IC constraints, labor sup-
ply is generally undistorted in the solution to the relaxed problem. The optimal
vector of employment rents is determined by the sequence of endogenous social
weights αU . For αj > 1, workers of skill type ωj receive an employment rent
that exceeds the ecient surplus sˆj = maxy
[
y − h(y, ωj)
]
. For αj < 1, workers
of skill type ωj receive an employment rent below sˆj . By assumption REM , this
implies an interior solution rj < sˆj ≤ sˆn < δ¯. Note that αn < 1 is ensures for all
utilitarian allocations.
Next, we identify conditions on the pair of social weights αj and αj+1 such that
the solution to the relaxed problem satises both IC constraints. For this purpose,
I ignore the endogeneity of the weight sequence αU for a while. In particular,
assume that αU equals some exogenous sequence β = (β0, β1, . . . , βn), which
determines the optimal employment rent r˜j(βj) in the relaxed problem.
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Lemma 3.8. For any skill level ωj , there is a threshold γ
E
j > 1 such that the function
Zj(βj, r) = g(r)
[
r − sˆj
]−Gj(r) (βj − 1) has a unique root r˜j (βj) ∈ (δ, δ¯) in r
if and only if βj < γ
E
j . Moreover, r˜j
(
βj
)
is strictly increasing in its argument for
all βj < γ
E
j .
Proof. First, note that limr→δ Zj(r) < 0 for all βj . Second, for r ∈
(
δ, δ¯
)
, the
derivative of Zj with respect to r is given by
∂Zj(r, βj)
∂r
= gj(r)
(
2− βj
)
+ g′(rj)
(
r − sˆj
)
Assumption 3.4 ensures that this derivative is strictly positive at any root of Z in
r. By continuity, there is consequently at most one root in the interval
(
δ, δ¯
)
. For
r → δ¯, Z approaches 1+ gj
(
δ¯
) (
δ¯ − sˆj
)−βj . Thus, a unique root in r exists if βj
is smaller than the minimum of 1+ gj
(
δ¯
) (
δ¯ − sˆj
)
> 1 and χj
(
δ¯
)
> 1 as dened
in Assumption 3.4. The derivative of r˜j with respect to βj is given by
dr˜j
dβj
=
Gj
(
r˜j
)(
∂Zj(r˜j, βj)
)
/(∂r)
> 0.
The numerator is positive for all βj < γ
E
j , where r˜j < δ¯. As argued above,
Assumption 3.4 ensures the same for the denominator.
Lemma 3.9. Consider any two adjacent skill groups ωj and ωj+1 in Ω with weights
βj and βj+1. There are a value γ
D
j ∈
(
1, γEj
)
and a strictly increasing function βDj :(−∞, γDj )→ (−∞, γEj+1)such that the solution to the relaxed problem satises the
downward IC constraint if and only if βj < γ
D
j and βj+1 ∈
[
βDj
(
βj
)
, γEj+1
)
. There
is a threshold level β
j
< 1 such that βDj (x) < x for all x ∈
(
β
j
, γDj
)
.
Proof. Using the denition of the employment rent, the downward IC constraint
(3.15) reads r˜j+1
(
βj+1
) − r˜j (βj) ≥ h(yˆj, ωj) − h(yˆj, ωj+1). Note that the right-
hand side does not depend on the weights βj , βj+1. By Lemma 3.8, r˜j and r˜j+1
are dened and below δ¯ if and only if βj < γ
E
j and βj+1 < γ
E
j+1.
First, dene γDj implicitly by r˜j
(
γDj
)
= δ¯ − h(yˆj, ωj) + h(yˆj, ωj+1) < δ¯. We
have γDj > 1 due to r˜j(1) < sˆj+1 − h(yˆj, ωj) + h(yˆj, ωj+1) and sˆj+1 < δ¯. By
the monotonicity of r˜k in βk for k ∈ {j, j + 1}, the downward IC can only be
satised for βj+1 → γEj+1 if βj < γDj . For any βj < γDj , there is moreover a
unique level βDj (βj) < γ
E
j+1 such that r˜j+1 (x)− r˜j
(
βj
) ≥ h(yˆj, ωj)−h(yˆj, ωj+1)
is satised with equality if and only if x = βDj (βj), and with strict inequality if
and only if x ∈ [βDj (βj), γEj+1). Moreover, βDj is strictly increasing in βj due to
the monotonicity of r˜k in βk.
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For the threshold β
j
, consider the case where βj = βj+1 = x. As the derivative
of r˜j(x) with respect to ωj is strictly positive, we have r˜j+1(x) > r˜j(x). Combin-
ing both rst-order conditions, we have
r˜j+1(x)− r˜j(x) = sˆj+1 − sˆj + (x− 1)
[
Gj+1(r˜j+1(x))
gj+1(r˜j+1(x))
− Gj(r˜j(x))
gj(r˜j(x))
]
By assumptions LC and OFCD, the inequality r˜j+1 > r˜j implies that the last term
in brackets is strictly positive. Moreover, note that
sˆj+1 − sˆj > s
(
yˆj, ωj+1
)− s (yˆj, ωj) = h(yˆj, ωj)− h(yˆj, ωj+1).
Thus, the downward IC constraint is satised with strict inequality for all x ≥ 1.
On the other hand, limx→−∞ r˜j+1(x) = limx→−∞ r˜j(x) = δ. Thus, the downward
IC constraint is violated for suciently small x → −∞. By continuity, there
must be at least one value x < 1 such that the downward IC is satised with
equality for βj+1 = βj = x. The threshold βj is given by the highest value with
this property. Thus, the downward IC constraint is satised with strict inequality
for all βj = βj+1 > βj . By the continuity of r˜j+1 in βj+1, β
D
j (βj) < βj must be
satised for all βj ∈
(
β
j
, γDj
)
.
Lemma 3.10. Consider any two adjacent skill groups ωj and ωj+1 inΩwith weights
βj and βj+1. There are a value γ
U
j < γ
E
j and a strictly increasing function β
U
j :(−∞, γUj )→ (−∞, γEj+1) such that the solution to the relaxed problem violates the
upward incentive compatibility constraint between groups ωj and ωj+1 if and only
if βj < γ
U
j and βj+1 ∈
[
βUj
(
βj
)
, γEj+1
)
. There is a threshold level β¯j ∈
(
1, γDj
]
such that βUj (x) > x for all x < β¯j .
Proof. The upward IC constraint (3.16) can be rewritten r˜j+1
(
βj+1
) − r˜j (βj) ≤
h(yˆj+1, ωj) − h(yˆj+1, ωj+1). By the monotonicity of r˜j in βj , there is a unique
γUj < γ
E
j such that r˜j
(
γDj
)
= δ¯ − h(yˆj+1, ωj) + h(yˆj+1, ωj+1) < δ¯. The upward
IC is satised for all βj ≥ γUj and βj+1 < γEj+1. For all βj < γUj , there is in
contrast a unique level βUj such that r˜j+1 (x)− r˜j
(
βj
) ≤ h(yˆj, ωj)− h(yˆj, ωj+1)
is satised with equality if and only if x = βUj (βj), and violated if and only if x ∈[
βUj (βj), γ
E
j+1
)
. Moreover, βUj is strictly increasing in βj due to the monotonicity
of r˜j and r˜j+1.
For the threshold β¯j , consider the case where βj = βj+1 = x. Combining both
rst-order conditions, we have
r˜j+1(x)− r˜j(x) = sˆj+1 − sˆj + (x− 1)
[
Gj+1(r˜j+1(x))
gj+1(r˜j+1(x))
− Gj(r˜j(x))
gj(r˜j(x))
]
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Recall that the last term in brackets is strictly positive. Moreover, note that
sˆj+1 − sˆj < s
(
yˆj+1, ωj+1
)− s (yˆj+1, ωj) = h(yˆj, ωj)− h(yˆj, ωj+1).
Thus, the upward IC constraint is satised with strict inequality for all x ≤ 1.
Depending on parameters and the properties of Gj and Gj+1, it is possible that
either the upward IC is satised for all levels of x < γUj so that β¯j = γ
U
j , or the
upward IC is violated for some x ∈ (1, γUj ). In the latter case, β¯j < 1 is given
by the lowest level x < γUj such that the upward is satised with equality for
βj = βj+1 = x and violated for βj = βj+1 = x + ε with ε approaching 0 from
above. By continuity, βUj (βj) > βj for all βj < β¯j .
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. The sequence of endogenous social weights must be strictly decreasing in
every implementable allocation for every Utilitarian objective as dened in DUR.
Thus, αUn (c, y) < 1 must be true in every utilitarian allocation. By Lemma 3.7,
this implies rn < sˆn in the solution to the relaxed problem.
First, consider the intensive margin. By assumption REM , sˆn < δ¯ so that the ex-
tensive margin is relevant in each utilitarian allocation. By Lemma 3.10, αUn < 1
then implies that the relaxed problem’s solution cannot violate the upward IC
constraint. The same is true for the solution to a semi-relaxed problem in which
all IC constraints below skill level ωn−1 are taken into account. By standard ar-
guments, labor supply yn is undistorted at the intensive margin, whether or not
the downward IC constraint between skill types ωn−1 and ωn is binding.
Second, consider the extensive margin. Labor supply by workers with skill ωn
is downward distorted at the extensive margin if and only if rn < sˆn. Because
yn = yˆn as argued above, this is equivalent to T (yn) > −b, where b ≥ 0. If the
downward IC between skill types ωn and ωn−1 is not binding, αn < 1 and sˆn < δ¯
jointly imply that δˆj = rj < sˆj .
Assume instead that the downward ICs between ωn and some skill type ωk with
k ∈ [1, n− 1] are binding, while the downward IC between ωk and ωk−1 is not
binding. By standard arguments, this implies that rk < r˜k = sˆk +
Gk(r˜k)
gk(r˜k)
(βk − 1).
If rk < sˆk, then this implies that T (yk) > −b. The binding downward ICs imply
that T (yn) > T (yn−1) > · · · > T (yk). Thus, labor supply is downwards distorted
at skill level ωn.
If instead rk > sˆk, this requires that βj > 1 for all j ≤ k. Then, workers of all
skill levels ωj < ωk upward distorted labor supply at the extensive margin, and
T (yj) < −b < 0. This would directly be true for all skill levels for which either no
IC is binding, and forwhich the downward IC is binding. Assume nally that there
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are skill types ωa and ωb between all upward IC constraints are binding. Then, ra
must exceed r˜a = sˆa +
Ga(r˜a)
ga(r˜a)
(βa − 1) > sˆa, so that T (ya) < −b. Moreover, the
binding upward ICs imply that T (yb) < T (yb−1 < · · · < T (ya) < −b. Altogether,
this implies that T (yn) can only be below −b if T (yj) < −b is also true for all
other skill levels. But this is clearly not consistent with the feasibility constraint.
More concretely, budget balance requires that T (yn) > 0 so that labor supply is
strictly downward distorted at the extensive margin.
Lemma 3.11. There is a strictly decreasing sequence β = (β0, β1, . . . , βn) such that
the following conditions are satised
1.
∑n
j=1 fj
[
Gj
(
xj
)
βj +
(
1−Gj
(
xj
))
β0
]
= 1 with xj implicitly dened by
xj − sˆj = Gj(xj)gj(xj)
(
βj − 1
)
for all ωj ∈ Ω,
2. βj+1 ∈
[
βDj (βj), β
U
j (βj)
]
for all ωj ∈ Ω, and
3. β0 > β1 > 1.
Proof. Consider the following family of sequences: Let β˜1(ε, φ) = 1 + φ, while
β˜j(ε, φ) = 1− (j − 1)ε for all j ∈ [2, n], and
β˜0(ε, φ) =
1−∑nj=1 fjGj(xj)β˜j(ε, φ)∑n
j=1 fj
[
1−G(xj)
]
For any ε and φ, the sequence has average 1. For any ε > 0 and φ > 0, the
sequence is strictly decreasing from α1 on, and α1 > 1. If φ is small enough
compared to ε, the sequence satises α0 > α1. Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10 imply that
βUj (x) > x > β
D
j (x) for all x close enough to 1 and all ωj ∈ Ω. This implies
that there is some threshold ε1 > 0 such that β˜j+1 ∈
[
βDj (β˜j), β
U
j (β˜j
]
for all
j ∈ [2, n− 1] for any ε ∈ (0, ε1]. If ε > 0 is small enough, there is moreover a
threshold φ1 > 0 such that β˜2 ∈
[
βD1 (β˜1), β
U
1 (β˜1
]
for all φ ∈ (0, φ1]. If φ is small
enough compared to ε, the sequence nally satises β˜0 > β˜1.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. By Lemma 3.11, there exists a strictly decreasing sequence β such that (a)
the solution to the relaxed problem also solves the full problem because βj ∈[
αDj (βj−1), α
U
j (βj−1)
]
for all ωj ∈ Ω, and (b) the social weight associated to work-
ers of skill level ω1 is above the population average of 1. By Lemma 3.7, labor sup-
ply is undistorted at the intensive margin for all workers in the relaxed problem’s
solution. Moreover, αUj > 1 implies that δˆ1 = r1 > sˆ1. Thus, labor supply by
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workers of skill group 1 is strictly upward distorted at the extensive margin. By
construction, any strictly decreasing weight sequence satises Assumption DUR.
For an example with endogenous social weights, assume that the social objec-
tive is given by amember of some family of functionsK such thatU(x) = K(a, x),
where K is twice continuously dierentiable in both arguments and satises for
all x ∈ R the following properties: a) K ′(a, x) > 0 for all a ≥ 0 and x ∈ R,
and b) K ′′(a, x) < 0 for all a > 0 and lima→0K
′′(a, x) = 0. If assumptions LC
and OFCD hold and Gj+1(δ) ≥ Gj(δ) for all skill levels, the endogenous weight
sequence αU is strictly decreasing for all a > 0 (see Proposition 3 in Choné and
Laroque 2011). Moreover, there exists again some a¯ > 0 such that the optimal
utilitarian allocation involves no distortions at the intensive margin at any skill
level for all a ∈ (0, a¯). If the curvature of K(a, x) is suciently small on the in-
terval x ∈ [0, sˆ1] relative to the interval [sˆ1, sˆn], then the resulting social weight
αU1 will certainly be below unity, giving again rise to upward distortions at the
extensive margin.
Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 are proven by example in section 3.5.2.
Proofs of Propositions 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 Proposition 3.5 is proven by a series of
lemmas. In particular, a redistributive weight sequence is constructed for which
the upward incentive compatibility constraint between skill groups 1 and 2 is
binding and y2 is upwards distorted in the optimal second-best allocation, while
labor supply by all other skill groups is undistorted at the intensive margin. The
strategy taken is, rst, to solve a relaxed problem in which all incentive compati-
bility constraints are ignored, and second, to construct a sequence of decreasing
exogenous weights such that the solution to the relaxed problem also solves the
full problem in which the local incentive compatibility constraints are taken into
account if and only if Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 are met. However, the average
weight implied by this weight sequence will generally dier from unity. In the
third step, we prove that a redistributive weight sequence (with unity average)
with the same properties exists, if additionally fn exceeds some threshold level
fˆn. The nal step is then to construct a redistributive weight sequence for which
y2 is upwards distorted in the second-best allocation.
Lemma 3.12. Under assumption 3.1, the solution to the relaxed problem involves
• an employment rent of rRj =
ωj/2
2−αj(rj ,b)
if δ¯ > rRj , and
• the ecient output level yRj = ωj for all skill levels ωj ∈ Ω.
Proof. For the quadratic eort cost function, the ecient levels of output and
employment surplus are given by yˆj = ωj and sˆj = yˆj − yˆ
2
j
2ωj
=
ωj
2 . For the
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uniform distribution on some interval
[
0, δ¯
]
, we have
Gj(rj)
gj(rj)
= rj for any rj < δ¯.
For all rRj < δ¯, the rst-order condition with respect to rj can thus be rearranged
to have rRj − sˆj = rRj
(
αUj − 1
)
. Solving for rRj then gives the equation in Lemma
3.12.
Lemma 3.13. Under assumptions 3.1, the thresholds introduced in Lemmas 3.9 and
3.10 are given by β
j
= 2− a < 1 and β¯j = 2− 1a > 1 for all ωj ∈ Ω. Furthermore,
βDj (β) = 2 − a1
2−β+1−
1
a
and βUj (β) = 2 − a1
2−β+a(a−1)
for all skill levels in Ω. This
implies that βDj (x) > x for all x < βj and β
U
j (x) < x for all x > β¯j .
Proof. First, note that under Assumption 3.1,
sˆj+1
sˆj
=
yˆj+1
yˆj
=
ωj+1
ωj
= a > 1. Thus,
the IC constraints are given by
rj+1 − rj ≥
y2j
2
(
1
ωj
− 1
ωj+1
)
, and
rj+1 − rj ≤
y2j+1
2
(
1
ωj
− 1
ωj+1
)
Plugging in the solution to the relaxed problem gives
ωj
2
(
a
2− βj+1 −
1
2− βj
)
≥ ωj
2
a− 1
a
, and
ωj
2
(
a
2− βj+1 −
1
2− βj
)
≤ aωj
2
(a− 1)
Solving for βj+1 in both constraints gives the functions β
D
j and β
U
j . Setting βj+1 =
βj = β, the downward IC is satised if β ∈
[
2− a, γjD
]
, and violated for all
β < 2 − a = β
j
. The upward IC is satised for all β ≤ min{2− 1a , γUj }, and
violated for all β ∈ (2− 1a , γUj ), if the latter interval is non-empty.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof. If assumption 3.1 holds, the downward IC constraint is binding whenever
βj+1 < βj ≤ 2− a. As a ∈ (1, 2), this is compatible with strictly positive weights
for all skill types. Consider for example weight function β′ with β′1 = 2 − a ∈
(0, 1) and β′j+1 = βj − 2−an for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Given these weight function,
there is a unique weight β′0 > 1 associated to the unemployed such that average
social weight is one. By construction, the social objective corresponding toweight
function β′ satises assumption DUR. The social weight of all worker groups is
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below unity, thus giving rise to downward distortions at the extensive margin. In
particular, the optimal level of r1 will be below r
R
1 < sˆ1 because the downward
IC between skill levels ω1 and ω2 is binding. Thus, workers of skill level ω1 will
pay positive participation taxes and have downward distorted labor supply at
the extensive margin. As all downward IC constraints are binding, workers of
all higher skill levels pay even higher participation taxes and have downward
distortions at the extensive margin, too. Thus, there is a utilitarian allocation in
which labor supply is distorted downward at the intensive margin everywhere
below the very top, and at the extensive margin everywhere. Note that, with
a < 2, the same pattern of distortions arises in the Rawlsian allocation, which
results for social weights αj = 0 for all worker types and α0 > 1 for unemployed
agents.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof. In the following, I proof that there is a threshold aˆ(f1) such that, if a >
aˆ(f1) both IC constraints are slack for all welfare functions satisfying Assump-
tion DUR. First, note that αU2 < 1 < β¯2 = 2 − 1a for all a > 1 and all utilitarian
welfare functions. Thus, the upward IC cannot be violated by the relaxed prob-
lem’s solution (this is a corollary of Proposition 3.1).
Second, the downward IC is slack for all utilitarian welfare function. By the
monotonicity of r˜j in βj , it suces to show that the downward IC is still slack
if αU1 is at the highest possible level and α
U
2 is at the lowest possible level. The
lower bound of αU2 is clearly given by 0. For the upper bound of α
U
1 , α
U
0 > α
U
1
implies that
f1
[
G1(r1)α
U
1 + [1−G1(r1)]αU0
]
+ f2
[
G2(r2)α
U
2 + [1−G2(r2)]αU0
]
= 1
⇔ αU1 <
1
f1 + f2 [1−G2(r2)] ≤
1
f1
.
Using function βDj (β) as given in Lemma 3.13, the downward IC constraint is
satised for all combinations
(
αU1 , α
U
2
)
compatible with DUR if
βDj (ζ) = 2−
a
1
2−1/f1
+ 1− 1a
< 0
⇔ a2 − 23f1 − 1
2f1 − 1a + 2 > 0
⇒ a > 3f1 − 1
2f1 − 1 +
√(
3f1 − 1
2f1 − 1
)2
− 2 = aˆ (f1)
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Note that the lower root of this quadratic function is below 1, and thus irrelevant
due to a > 1. Finally, note that aˆ (f1) goes to ∞ for f1 approaching 1/2 (from
above) and to 2 +
√
2 for f1 approaching 1.
Lemma 3.14. Under assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, and with the social weight associated
to unemployed agents and workers of the highest skill type ωn given by γ0 = 2− 1a
and γn = 2 − a1+a2−n(a2−1) , respectively, the average weight γ¯n = Gn (r˜n) γn +
[1−Gn (r˜n)] γ0 associated to agents of skill type ωn is below unity.
Proof. First, the average Gn (r˜n) γn + [1−Gn (r˜n)] γ0 can only be below 1 if γn is
below 1. Given the denition of n, this is true if and only if
γn = 2− a
1 + a2−n (a2 − 1) < 1
⇔ a2−n (a2 − 1) < a− 1
⇔ (n− 2) ln(a) > ln(a + 1)
⇔ n >2 + ln(a + 1)
ln(a)
,
which is identical to the lower bound imposed on n. Then, the average is negative
if the share of workers Gn (r˜n) is above
γ0−1
γ0−γn
< 1. By Lemma 3.12, Gn(rn) =
1
δ¯
ωn
2(2−γn)
for αUn = γn. Solving for δ¯ gives the upper bound imposed on the length
of the xed cost space
[
0, δ¯
]
.
Lemma 3.15. Under assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, and with the social weight sequence β
equaling sequence γ as dened in Assumption 3.3, the upward IC constraint between
skill types ω1 and ω2, and the downward IC constraints between all other skill types
are satised with equality. Moreover, γj > βj = 2− a for all ωj ∈ Ω.
Proof. The elements of sequence γ are dened as γ0 = γ1 = γ2 = β¯j = 2− 1a and
γj = 2− a1+a2−j(a2−1) for all j ≥ 3. This sequence is designed in such a way that,
by functions βDj and β
U
j dened in Lemma 3.13, γ2 = β
U
1 (γ1) and γj = β
D
j (γj−1)
for all j ≥ 3. As long as r˜j
(
γj
)
< δ¯ for all skill types, this implies that the relaxed
problem’s solution satises with equality one of the IC constraints for each pair
ωj , ωj+1 in Ω. By the construction of sequence γ, r˜n(γn) > r˜j(γj) for all j < n
(otherwise, the downward ICs could not be satised). As γn < 1 by Lemma 3.14,
r˜n(γn) < sˆn < δ¯, where the last inequality follows from assumption REM .
Thus, if the weight sequence αU would be identical to γ, then the upward IC
constraint between skill types ω1 and ω2 would be satised with equality. More-
over, it would be violated for any αU1 = α
U
2 > γ1. Furthermore, if α
U = γ,
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the downward IC constraints between all pairs ωj and ωj+1 in Ω with j ≥ 2 are
satised with equality.
Finally, βDj (β) ∈ (2− a, β) holds if and only if β > 2−a. Thus, γj > βj = 2−a
for all j and the sequence is strictly decreasing with γj+1 < γj for all j ≥ 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof. Under Assumption 3.3, the population average over sequence γ in the re-
laxed problem’s solution is below unity:
γ¯ =
n∑
j=1
fj
[
Gj(r˜j)γj +
[
1−Gj(r˜j)
]
γ0
]
=
n∑
j=1
fj γ¯j = (1− fn) γ¯−n + fnγ¯n
<1
Thus, the sequence γ as dened above cannot be a sequence of social weights.
It is however possible to construct a similar sequence γ˜ with γ˜0 > γ˜1 > γ1,
γ˜2 ∈
(
βU1 (γ˜1), γ˜1
)
, γ˜3 > β
D
2 (γ˜2) and γ˜j+1 = β
D
j (γj) for all j ≥ 3 such that the
average weight is given by 1. Recall that βU1 (x) < x for all x > γ1 = 2 − 1a by
Lemma 3.13.
By construction, the sequence γ˜ is strictly decreasing throughout and thus sat-
ises assumption DUR. Furthermore, the relaxed problem’s solution satises all
downward ICs between skill types ω2 and ωn, but violates the upward IC con-
straint between skill types ω1 and ω2. The solution to the optimal tax problem
thus involves an upward distortion in y2 at the intensive margin (the proof of
Lemma 3.6 below shows in more detail that a binding upward IC constraint gives
rise to an upward distortions at the intensive margin). Labor supply by all other
skill groups is undistorted at the intensive margin. In particular, as γ˜ is designed
so that the downward IC between skill types ω2 and ω3 is slack, it clearly is still
slack with a small upward distortion in y2.
Furthermore, labor supply by skill types ω1 and ω2 is upward distorted at the
extensive margin, as r˜1 > sˆ1 by α1 > 1 and r1 > r˜1 due to the binding upward
IC, while r2 = r1 + h (y2, ω1)− h (y2, ω2) > r˜1 + h (yˆ2, ω1)− h (yˆ2, ω2) > sˆ2.
Under Assumption 3.1, a social objectiveU giving rise to social weight sequence
αU = γ˜ can be derived explicitly. Given the uniform distribution of xed costs,
the social weights are given byαUj (c, y) =
1
rj
[
U
(
rj + b
)− U(0)] for all j ∈ [1, n],
while αU0 (c, y) = U
′(b). Thus, αU = γ˜ if and only if U
(
rj + b
)
= U(b) + rj γ˜j
and U ′(b) = γ˜0, where
(
rj
)n
j=1
and b solve the set of rst-order conditions of the
optimal tax problem setting weights according to sequence γ˜.
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Proof of Lemma 3.4 For A˜ = 0, the auxiliary problem is solved by setting
TP1 = T
P
2 = 0. Consider a relaxed problem in which both IC constraints (3.23)
and (3.23) are ignored. Then, yj = yˆj for j ∈ {1, 2}. For δˆj < δ¯, the rst-order
condition with respect to TPj is given by
LTPj = fj
[
Gj(δˆj) (−1 + λ)− λgj(δˆj)TPj
]
= 0,
where λ is the Lagrange parameter associatedwith the feasibility condition. Com-
bining the FOCs with respect to TP1 and T
P
2 , both need to have the same sign.
Thus, the feasibility constraint (3.21) can only be satised if TP1 = T
P
2 = 0,
which also satises the second-order condition. This solution satises both IC
constraints (3.23) and (3.23), and involves δˆ1 < δˆ2 < δ¯ by Assumption REM .
Thus, the solution to the relaxed problem is given by TPj = 0 and yj = yˆj for both
skill groups.
With respect to the upper bound Amax, consider rst the problem of maximiz-
ing revenue from participation taxes,
∑2
j=1 fjGj
[
s
(
(yj, ωj
)− TPj ]TPj , if the so-
cial planner is not restricted by IC constraints. The rst-order conditions with
respect to TPj is given by
fj
[
Gj
(
s
(
yj, ωj
)− TPj )− gj (s (yj, ωj)− TPj )TPj ] = 0
⇔ TPj =
Gj
(
s
(
yj, ωj
)− TPj )
gj
(
s
(
yj, ωj
)− TPj )
While the left-hand side is increasing in TPj , the right-hand side is strictly de-
creasing by the log-concavity of Gj . As the left-hand side is smaller than the
right-hand side for TPj = 0 and larger for T
P
j ≤ s(yj, ωj) − δ, the tax maxi-
mization problem has a unique maximizer
(
TP
∗
1 , T
P ∗
2
)
and a unique maximum
A¯ <
∑2
j=1 fj
(
s(yj, ωj)− δ
)
. Taking the IC constraints into account, this max-
imum is weakly lower, given by some level Amax ≤ A¯. By the construction of
Amax, the auxiliary problem has no solution in reals for revenue requirements
A˜ > Amax.
With respect to the lower boundAmin, note rst that, for any level A˜, one Pareto
ecient allocation involves uniform taxation TP1 = T
P
2 = TE . In this point, no IC
is binding, so that yj = yˆj for both groups of workers. If TE < sˆ1−δ¯ < sˆ2−δ¯, then
all workers of both skill levels would work under uniform taxation, i.e., δˆj = δ¯
for j ∈ {1, 2}. Then, the negative revenue created by tax level TE is given by
[f1 + f2]TE . In every other allocation on the Pareto frontier, workers of one skill
group must be better o. Thus, s(yj, ωj) − TPj > δˆj = δ¯ for at least one skill
group and any A˜ < [f1 + f2]
(
sˆ1 − δ¯
) ≡ A. One can conclude that there must be
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some Amin ∈ (A, 0) such that δˆj < δ¯ for both skill levels is true in the surplus-
maximizing allocation only if A˜ < Amin.
It remains to show the if part, i.e., uniqueness of the threshold Amin satisfying
s(yj, ωj) − TPj = δˆj = δ¯ for one group and δˆk < δ¯ for the other group. By the
downward IC constraint, δˆ2 > δˆ1 as long as both are below δ¯. Reducing A˜ further
requires either reducing TP1 or T
P
2 . While the former induces further distortions
at the extensive margin, the latter has no eect on labor market participation.
Thus, the social planner will choose sˆ2 − T 2j strictly above δ¯ for any A˜ < Amin.
This implies that δˆ2 = δ¯ for all A˜ < Amin, which is consequently unique.
Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof. Again, I rst solve the auxiliary problem in terms of employment rents
(r1, r2) and workloads (y1, y2). Then, I substitute in the participation tax levels
TPj = s(yj, ωj) − rj . By Lemma 3.4, rj = δˆj = s(yj, ωj) − TPj < δ¯ for all
A˜ ∈ (Amin, Amax). Thus, the Lagrangian of the auxiliary problem can be written
L =
2∑
j=1
fj
[∫ rj
δ
gj(δ)
(
rj + b− δ
)
dδ +
(
1−Gj(rj)
)
b
]
+ λ
[
2∑
j=1
fjGj(rj)
[
s
(
yj, ωj
)− rj]− A− (f1 + f2) b
]
+ µD [r2 − r1 − h (y1, ω1) + h (y1, ω2)]
+ µU [r1 − r2 + h (y2, ω1)− h (y2, ω2)] ,
where µD > 0 (µD = 0) if the downward IC is binding (not binding), and µU > 0
(µU = 0) if the upward IC is binding (not binding). The rst-order conditions with
respect to TP1 , T
P
2 , y1, y2 are given as
Lr1 = f1 [G1(r1) (1− λ)− λg1(r1) [s (y1, ω1)− r1]]− µD + µU = 0
Lr2 = f2 [G2(r2) (1− λ)− λg2(r2) [s (y2, ω2)− r2]] + µD − µU = 0
Ly1 = λf1G1(r1)sy (y1, ω1)− µD
[
hy(y1, ω1)− hy(y1, ω2)
]
= 0
Ly2 = λf2G2(r2)sy (y2, ω2) + µU
[
hy(y2, ω1)− hy(y2, ω2)
]
= 0
By the Lagrange theorem, the multipliers µ1 and µ2 are positive if the correspond-
ing IC constraint is binding. If the downward IC constraint is not binding, µD = 0,
then the rst-order condition with respect to Y1 implies that sy (y1, ω1) = 0, i.e.,
labor supply by low-skill workers is undistorted at the intensive margin with
y1 = yˆ1. If the downward IC constraint is instead binding, µD > 0, then the
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single-crossing condition implies that sy (y1, ω1) > 0 must be true, i.e., y1 is
strictly downward distorted. By the corresponding arguments, high-skill labor
supply is undistorted if the upward IC is not binding, µU = 0, and strictly upward
distorted if it is binding.
Thus, we have y2 ≥ yˆ2 > yˆ1 ≥ y1 in every solution to this problem, implying
that there cannot be pooling of high-skill workers and low-skill workers. The
single-crossing condition then implies that h(y2, ω1) − h(y2, ω2) > h(y1, ω1) −
h(y1, ω2) holds. Consequently, at most one IC constraint is binding in any imple-
mentable allocation.
Themain question then is which, if any, of the IC constraints is actually binding
in the surplus-maximizing allocation. I rst study a relaxed problem inwhich both
incentive compatibility constraints are ignored, and then check explicitly whether
the solution to this relaxed problem violates one of the ignored constraints. For
clarity, we denote the relaxed problem’s solution for variable x by x˜.
The FOCs of this relaxed problem equal the ones of the auxiliary problem, set-
ting µ1 = µ2 = 0. As argued above, the FOC with respect to yj then requires
sy(yj, ωj) = 0. Thus, labor supply is undistorted at the intensive margin, with
yj = yˆj and s(yj, ωj) = sˆj for both skill groups. Second, rearranging the rst-
order conditions with respect to rj gives
sˆj − r˜j = λ− 1
λ
Gj(r˜j)
gj(r˜j)
Recall that rj = cj − h
(
yj, ωj
) − b, so that ∂Gj(rj)∂cj = gj(rj). Thus, the semi-
elasticity of the participation share of type ωj workers with respect to the net
labor income cj is given by the fraction
gj(rj)
Gj(rj)
. Replacing rj by s
(
yj, ωj
) − TPj
gives the inverse elasticity rule (3.25).
The inverse elasticity rule has the following two implications for the relaxed
auxiliary problem. First, both participation taxes have the same sign as the semi-
elasticities of both skill groups are strictly positive for any A˜ ∈ [Amin, Amax].
To satisfy the feasibility constraint (3.21), they have to be positive (negative) if
A˜ = A + (f1 + f2)b is positive (negative). For A˜, both participation taxes have to
equal zero.
Second, the higher the semi-elasticity of participation, the lower is the abso-
lute value of the surplus-maximizing participation tax T˜Pj . Thus, the surplus-
maximizing taxes satisfy
T˜P2
T˜P1
=
G2(r˜2)
g2(r˜2)
g1(r˜1)
G1(r˜1)
.
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Thus, the optimal participation taxes depend crucially on the relative sizes of both
semi-elasticities. For any allocation with r2 > r1, Assumptions LC and OFCD
imply that the semi-elasticity for low-skill workers must be larger than the one for
high-skill workers. More precisely, Assumption LC ensures that G2(r˜2)g2(r˜2) >
G2(r˜1)
g2(r˜1)
if r2 > r1. Assumption OFCD implies that
G2(r˜1)
g2(r˜1)
≥ G1(r˜1)g1(r˜1) .
For the non-relaxed auxiliary problem, the inequality r2 > r1 is ensured for
all levels of A˜ by the downward IC constraint. For the relaxed problem, this is
immediately clear only for A˜ = 0, where TP2 = T
P
1 = 0 ensures r2 = sˆ2 > r1 = sˆ1.
It can be shown, however, that there is no level A˜ for which G2(r˜2)g2(r˜2) =
G1(r˜1)
g1(r˜1)
. By the
inverse elasticity rule, it would then be optimal to set identical taxes, TP2 = T
P
1 .
But then, we would again have r2 = sˆ2 − TP2 > r1 = sˆ1 − TP1 , which implies
G2(r˜2)
g2(r˜2)
> G1(r˜1)g1(r˜1) . Because the solution (r˜2, r˜1) is continuous in A˜, this also rules
out G2(r˜2)g2(r˜2) <
G1(r˜1)
g1(r˜1)
for any levels of A˜. We can conclude that the semi-elasticity
of low-skill workers is larger than the one of high-skill workers in every solution
to the relaxed auxiliary problem as well.
Thus, the optimal ratio of participation taxes always satises T˜
P
2
T˜P1
> 1. For all
A˜ < 0, this implies T˜P2 < T˜
P
1 < 0. Thus, the relaxed problem’s solution satises
the downward IC TP2 − TP1 ≤ s (y2, ω2) − s (y1, ω2), where the right-hand side
is strictly positive. Without further assumptions on the properties of G1 and G2,
it cannot be determined whether relaxed problem satises the upward IC con-
straint. If it does, the relaxed problem’s solution (T˜P1 , T˜
P
2 , yˆ1, yˆ2) also solves the
non-relaxed problem. Then, no IC constraint is binding in the surplus-maximizing
allocation, which furthermore involves TP
S
2 < T
PS
1 < 0 and rj > sˆj for both skill
levels, as claimed in Lemma 3.5. This will certainly be true in some neighborhood
of A˜ = 0, where TP2 ≈ TP1 .
If the relaxed problem’s solution instead violates the upward IC constraint, this
constraint will be binding, and its Lagrange multiplier µU will be strictly positive
in the surplus-maximizing allocation. Then, the rst-order condition with respect
to y2 implies
sy(y2, ω2) = − µU
λf2G2(r2)
[
hy(y2, ω1)− hy(y2, ω2)
]
< 0 ,
where the term
[
hy(y2, ω1)− hy(y2, ω2)
]
is strictly positive by the single-crossing
property. By the strict concavity of s in y, we have y2 > yˆ2 > yˆ1 and, by standard
arguments, TP
S
1 < T˜
P
1 < 0. Jointly, this implies T
PS
2 = T
PS
1 + s(y2, ω1) −
s(yˆ1, ω1) < T
PS
1 < 0.
In the second case, A˜ > 0, a similar argument implies that either the relaxed
problem’s solution also solves the non-relaxed problem, so that TP
S
2 = T˜
P
2 >
148
3.A Proofs for Sections 3.4 to 3.6
TP
S
1 = T˜
P
1 > 0, or the downward IC is binding, y1 < yˆ1 < yˆ2. Then, we have
TP
S
1 > T˜
P
1 > 0, and T
PS
2 = T
PS
1 + s(yˆ2, ω2)− s(y1, ω2) > TP
S
1 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof. First, consider again the relaxed problem. With the assumed uniform dis-
tribution on
[
0, δ¯
]
, we have
Gj(rj)
gj(rj)
= rj = sˆj − TPj . Inserting this into the inverse
elasticity formulas for optimal tax rates (3.25), the optimal ratio of participation
tax rates is given by
T˜P2
T˜P1
=
sˆ2 − TP2
sˆ1 − TP1
=
sˆ2
sˆ1
> 1
This implies that both participation tax levels are strictly increasing in A˜, and that
dTP2
dA˜
> dT
P
1
dA˜
on the interval [Amin, Amax]. Thus, if there is some level of A˜ at which
the upward (downward) IC is violated by the relaxed problem’s solution, then the
same is also true for all lower (higher) levels.
For ease of notation, dene the auxiliary parameter q ≡ sˆ1sˆ2 < 1. Thus, the
dierence in participation taxes is given by T˜P2 − T˜P1 = (1− q)T˜P2 . For any level
A˜ < 0, this dierence is negative by Lemma 3.5. The relaxed problem’s solution
violates the upward IC if
T˜P2 − T˜P1 = (1− q)T˜P2 < s (y2, ω1)− s (y1, ω1)
⇔ T˜P2 <
s (yˆ2, ω1)− sˆ1
1− q ≡ zU
Note that term z on the right-hand side of this inequality only depends on ex-
ogenous parameters, while the left-hand side is strictly increasing in A˜. On the
Pareto-frontier, the feasibility condition holds with equality. Substituting in the
optimal ratio of participation tax levels then gives
A˜ = f1G1
(
δˆ1
)
TP1 + f1G2
(
δˆ2
)
TP2 =
(
f1q
2 + f2
) sˆ2 − TP2
δ¯
TP2 .
By Lemma 3.6, if the highest xed cost type δ¯ is suciently large, there is a thresh-
old AU ∈ (Amin, 0) such that the surplus-maximizing allocation involves upward
distortions in y2 for all A˜ ∈ (Amin, AU ). In particular, AU > Amin holds if and
only if δ¯ > sˆ2 − zU is true.
First, the solution to the relaxed problem involves δˆ2 < δ¯ if and only if T˜
P
2 >
sˆ2 − δ¯. Second, it violates the upward IC constraint if and only if T˜P2 < zU .
If δ¯ < sˆ2 − z, both conditions cannot hold at the same time. Then, the lower
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bound of A˜ for interior solutions is given by Amin =
(
f1q
2 + f2
) [
sˆ2 − δ¯
]
, and
the upward IC constraint is satised for all A˜ > Amin.
If instead δ¯ > sˆ2 − zU , then both conditions can hold simultaneously. In
this case, the upward IC constrained is satised by the relaxed problem’s solu-
tion, and is slack in the surplus-maximizing allocation if and only if A˜ ≥ AU =(
f1q
2 + f2
)
sˆ2−z
δ¯
z. If A˜ is betweenAU and
(
f1q
2 + f2
) [
sˆ2 − δ¯
]
, the relaxed prob-
lem has an interior solution with δˆ = qδˆ2 < δˆ2 < δ¯ and violated the upward IC
constraint.
In the non-relaxed problem, the upward IC is thus binding and high-skill labor
supply is upwards distorted at the intensive margin, y2 > yˆ2. Moreover, T
P
2 > T˜
P
2
because further reductions in TP2 would require even stronger upward distortions
in y2. Thus, the threshold Amin for an interior solution with δˆ2 < δ¯ is given by
some level Amin <
(
f1q
2 + f2
) [
sˆ2 − δ¯
]
< AU .
Similar arguments can be made with respect to the threshold AD above which
the downward IC becomes binding. With uniformly distributed taxes, the down-
ward IC constraint is given by
TP2 − TP1 ≤ s (y2, ω2)− s (y1, ω2)
For the relaxed problem, the Laer rates are given by T˜2 =
sˆ2
2 and T˜1 =
sˆ1
2 =
qT˜2 < T˜2. Inserting the optimal ratio of taxes, the downward IC constraint then
follows as
(1− q) sˆ2
2
≤ sˆ2 − s (yˆ1, ω2)
⇔ (1 + q) sˆ2
2
≥ s (yˆ1, ω2)
Both sides of this inequality contain only exogenous variables. Whether the
downward IC is satised or violated for Laer rates in the relaxed problem thus
only depends on properties of the variable cost function h and the dierence be-
tween skill levels ω1 and ω2. If the inequality above is satised, then the down-
ward IC is slack in the surplus-maximizing allocation for all levels A˜ in the in-
terval (Amin, Amax). If is is instead violated, then there is a threshold AD ∈
(0, Amax) such that the downward IC is binding, and y1 is downward distorted
in the surplus-maximizing allocation for all levels of A˜ ∈ (AD, Amax).
This result seems to contrast with the result for threshold AU , which is above
Amin if and only if δ¯ is suciently large. Allowing for δ 6= 0, however, one can
also show that AD is below Amax if and only if δ is suciently small.
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Appendix 3.B Proofs for Section 3.7
Proof of Proposition 3.8
In the following, I assume that the social planner observes xed cost types, while
the agents are privately informed about their skill types only. Proposition 3.8 stud-
ies optimal utilitarian income taxation given this information structure. Then,
observable xed costs types can be used for tagging, i.e., the social planner is
able to design specic tax schedules for each xed cost group. For example, he
might choose dierent benet payments for unemployed agents with dierent
xed costs types.
For readability, I denote in the following the consumption-output bundle allo-
cated to agents of type (ωj, δ) by cj(δ) = c(ωj, δ), and yj(δ) = y(ωj, δ). Further-
more, I rewrite the joint type distribution Ψ using the functions G(δ) and F (δ).
G(δ) denotes the unconditional cdf of xed costs, with pdf g(δ) > 0 if and only if
δ ∈ ∆. F (δ) represents the cdf of skill types ω in the group of agents with xed
cost type δ, while the share of agents with skill type ωj is denoted by fj(δ).
Lemma 3.16. With observable xed cost types, an allocation is incentive compatible
if and only if, in each group of agents with xed cost type δ ∈ ∆,
(i) there is a unique threshold type k(δ) ∈ N such that all agents with skill type
ωj < ωk(δ) are unemployed and receive the same cost-specic benet b(δ) ∈ R,
while all agents with skill type ωj ≥ ωk(δ) provide positive output yj(δ) > 0,
(ii) if ωk(δ) > ω1, the allocation of the threshold worker type (ωk(δ), δ) satises
ck(δ)(δ)− h
(
yk(δ), ωk(δ)
) ≥ b(δ) + δ ≥ ck(δ)(δ)− h (yk(δ), ωk(δ)−1) , and
(iii) if ωk(δ) < ωn, the allocations of all workers with skill types ωj ≥ ωk(δ) satisfy
h
(
yj+1(δ), ωj
)− h (yj(δ), ωj) ≥ cj+1(δ)− cj(δ) ≥
h
(
yj+1(δ), ωj+1
)− h (yj(δ), ωj+1) .
Proof. For part (i), consider rst two types (ωi, δ) and (ωj, δ) such that yi(δ) =
yj(δ) = 0. Incentive compatibility requires that ci(δ) = cj(δ) = b(δ), which is
the benet receives by all unemployed agents with xed cost type δ. Second,
consider some employed type (ωj, δ) with yj(δ) > 0. Incentive compatibility
requires cj(δ)−h
(
yj(δ), ωj
)−δ ≥ b(δ). By single-crossing, all agents with higher
skill type prefer bundle
(
cj(δ), yj(δ)
)
strictly to bundle (b(δ), 0), and must thus
provide positive output in any incentive-compatible allocation. Symmetrically,
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if there is some type (ωi, δ) that weakly prefers unemployment, then all agents
with lower skill type will strictly prefer unemployment. Thus, there is a unique
threshold ωk(δ) ∈ [ω1, ωn] for each xed cost level.
For parts (ii) and (iii), note that we only need to consider incentive compatibility
constraints between agents with identical xed cost δ. The inequalities given in
part (ii) guarantee that ωk(δ) is indeed the threshold skill level. The inequalities in
part (iii) represent standard IC constraints between adjacent skill types. As usual,
the single-crossing property implies that global incentive-compatibility holds if
and only if all local IC constraints are satised.
Lemma 3.17. At any utilitarian allocation, the downward IC constraint for the
threshold worker type ωk(δ) is binding in each group of agents with xed cost type
δ ∈ ∆, i.e., ck(δ)(δ)− h
(
yk(δ), ωk(δ)
)
= b(δ) + δ holds.
Proof. Given Lemma 3.16, the planner’s objective can be written
W (c, y) =
∫ δ¯
δ
Wδ(c(δ), y(δ))dG(δ),
where the cost-group welfare levelWδ(c(δ), y(δ)) for each δ ∈ ∆ is given by
Wδ(c(δ), y(δ)) = Fk(δ)−1(δ)U [b(δ)] +
n∑
j=k(δ)
fj(δ)U
[
cj(δ)− h
(
yj(δ), ωj
)− δ] .
The feasibility constraint can be divided into a global constraint
∫ δ¯
δ A(δ)dG(δ) ≥
0 and a set of cost-dependent constraints
∑n
j=k(δ) fj(δ)
[
yj(δ)− cj(δ) + b(δ)
] ≥
b(δ) +A(δ). The set of incentive-compatibility constraints is given as in parts (ii)
and (iii) of Lemma 3.16.
By standard arguments, any utilitarian allocation satises the feasibility con-
straints with equality. The function of cost-specic revenues A(δ) is chosen to
equate average marginal utilities (and average endogenous weights) in all xed
cost groups, which typically implies redistribution from low-cost groups to high-
skill groups. Within each xed cost group, the functions c(δ), y(δ) and the benet
b(δ) are chosen to maximize cost-specic welfare Wδ(c(δ), y(δ)) subject to the
cost-specic revenue requirement A(δ) and the cost-specic IC constraints.
A proof by contradiction demonstrates that the thresholdworker type
(
ωk(δ), δ
)
must be indierent between employment and unemployment, i.e., the downward
IC between types
(
ωk(δ), δ
)
and
(
ωk(δ)−1, δ
)
must be binding in any utilitarian al-
location. Assume this were not the case, i.e., there is an incentive compatible and
feasible allocation thatmaximizeswelfare and involves ck(δ)(δ)−h
(
yk(δ), ωk(δ)
)
>
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b(δ) + δ. Then, leaving y(δ) unchanged, reducing cj(δ) uniformly by a small
amount ε > 0 for all workers with ωj ≥ ωk(δ) and increasing the unemployment
benet b(δ) by ε
[
1− Fk(δ)−1(δ)
]
/Fk(δ)−1(δ) would be possible without violating
feasibility or incentive-compatibility. Themarginal welfare eect of this variation
is given by
dWδ
dε
=
[
1− Fk(δ)−1(δ)
]
α0(δ)−
n∑
j=k(δ)
fj(δ)αj(δ) > 0
This is positive as Assumption DUR δ implies α′0(c, y, δ) > α
′
j(c, y, δ) for all j ≥
k(δ). Thus, the original allocation cannot be a utilitarian allocation.
Note that, with observable xed costs, increasing b(δ) induces extensive margin
responses if and only if it conicts with the IC constraint for type (ωk(δ)−1, δ).
Thus, an equity-eciency tradeo can arise if and only if the downward IC of
type
(
ωk(δ), δ
)
is binding.
Lemma 3.18. At any utilitarian allocation, all downward IC constraints between
active workers with ωj ≥ ωk(δ) are binding in each group of agents with xed cost
type δ ∈ ∆:
cj+1(δ)− h
(
yj+1(δ), ωj+1
)
= cj(δ)− h
(
yj(δ), ωj+1
)
= b(δ) + δ +
j∑
l=k(δ)
[h (yl(δ), ωl)− h (yl(δ), ωl+1)] .
Proof. I only provide a sketch of the proof, because it is based on standard ar-
guments that are familiar from the literature on optimal income taxation with
labor supply responses at the intensive margin only (see, e.g., Mirrlees 1971).
Consider some feasible and incentive-compatible allocation in which the down-
ward IC constraint between types
(
ωj, δ
)
and
(
ωj+1, δ
)
is not binding, where
ωj ≥ ωk(δ). Then, it is possible to reduce consumption uniformly for all agents
with skill typeωi ≥ ωj+1, and using these resources for uniform transfers towards
all agents with skill types ωl ≤ ωj , until the downward IC constraint between
agents with skill types ωj and ωj+1 becomes binding. This is consistent with
incentive-compatibility and feasibility, and yields a marginal welfare increase of
dWδ
dε
=
1− Fj(δ)
Fj(δ)

Fk(δ)−1(δ)α0(δ) + j∑
l=k(δ)
fl(δ)αl(δ)


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−
n∑
l=j+1
fl(δ)αl(δ) > 0
As social weights are strictly decreasing in ω by Assumption DUR δ, this induces
a strict welfare gain.
Thus, the downward IC must be binding between all pairs of skill types above
ωk(δ), as well as for the threshold skill type ωk(δ). Consequently, cj(δ) follows as
a function of δ, b(δ) and the output levels yi(δ) of all skill types ωi ≤ ωj .
Lemma 3.19. At the intensive margin, labor supply is undistorted at the top skill
level ωn and strictly downwards distorted everywhere below the top for all workers
in each group of agents with xed cost type δ ∈ ∆.
Proof. In the following, we write xδj = xj(δ) for x ∈ {y, b, f, λ, A} for reasons
of readability. By Lemmas 3.17 and 3.18, the group-specic Lagrangian can be
written
Lδ =F δk(δ)−1U
[
bδ
]
+
n∑
j=k(δ)
f δjU

bδ + j−1∑
l=k(δ)
[
h
(
yδl , ωl
)− h (yδl , ωl+1)]


+ λδ


n∑
j=k(δ)
f δj

yδj − h (yδj , ωj)− δ − j−1∑
l=k(δ)
[
h
(
yδl , ωl
)− h (yδl , ωl+1)]


−bδ − Aδ}
Taking the derivative with respect to b(δ) implies that λ(δ) equals the cost-specic
average weight α¯(δ). The derivative with respect to yj(δ) is given by
Lyj =
[
h1
(
yj(δ), ωj
)− h1 (yj(δ), ωj+1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
n∑
l=j+1
fl(δ) [αl(δ)− λ(δ)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ λ(δ)fj(δ)
[
1− h1(yj(δ), ωj
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0.
By the single-crossing property, the term in the rst bracket is strictly positive.
As the social weights are decreasing with ω, the second term is strictly negative.
Thus, the rst-order condition can only be satised if h1
(
yj(δ), ωj
)
< 1. In other
words, labor supply is strictly downward distorted for all worker types below
ωn, yj(δ) < yˆj , in any utilitarian allocation. For the top skill level, the familiar
“no-distortion-at-the-top” result prevails. Intuitively, the downward distortion
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in yj(δ) slackens the downward IC constraint between types (ωj+1, δ) and (ωj, δ),
allowing to redistribute more resources to lower skill types. Starting from yj(δ) =
yˆj , this has negligible eciency costs, but allows to achieve rst-order equity
gains. Again, the crucial dierence to the model with two-dimensional private
information is that changes in yj do not involve labor supply responses at the
extensive margin.
Lemma 3.20. At the extensive margin, labor supply is weakly downward distorted
in each group of agents with xed cost type δ ∈ ∆, and strictly downward distorted
for some xed cost levels δ ∈ ∆.
Proof. Again, the Lemma can be proven by contradiction. Assume that a utilitar-
ian allocation involves, for workers with skill type ωj , some output requirements(
yj(δ)
)n
j=1
and sˆk(δ) < δ, i.e., upward distortions in labor supply at the extensive
margin. By Lemmas 3.17 and 3.18, all downward IC constraints must be binding
in any utilitarian allocation. Thus, an agent with threshold skill type ωk(δ)must be
indierent between employment and unemployment. In this allocation, the level
of the unemployment benet b(δ) is pinned down by the feasibility constraint:
b(δ) =
n∑
j=k(δ)
fj(δ)
[
yj(δ)− h(yj(δ), ωj
]− δ − A(δ)
−
j−1∑
l=k(δ)
[h(yl(δ), ωl)− h(yl(δ), ωl+1)]
If sˆk(δ) ≤ δ, welfare can be increased by removing agents of type (ωk(δ), δ) from
the labor market by setting yk(δ)(δ) = 0, while keeping the workloads and con-
sumption levels of all agents with ωj > ωk(δ) constant. Because the former agents
were indierent between working and staying unemployed before, this is possi-
ble without violating any IC constraint. All else equal, the feasibility constraint
is relaxed by
−fk(δ)(δ)
[
yk(δ)(δ)− h
(
yk(δ)(δ), ωj
)− δ] > −fk(δ)(δ) [sˆk(δ) − δ] ≥ 0.
The rst inequality follows due to the downward distortion in yk(δ)(δ) at the in-
tensive margin (see Lemma 3.19), the second one by assumption. As the feasibility
constraint is slack after this deviation, the consumption levels of all agents in the
skill group can be increased uniformly, inducing a Pareto improvement. Con-
sequently, the initial allocation with upward distortions at the extensive margin
cannot represent a utilitarian optimum.
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By the same argument, labor supply is strictly downward distorted at the in-
tensive margin in all xed costs groups such that δ = sˆj for some ωj ∈ Ω. For
skill groups with δ ∈ (sˆj, sˆj+1), in contrast, labor supply is strictly downward
distorted if and only if the social planner has a suciently strong desire for re-
distribution.
Proof of Proposition 3.9
In the following, I assume that the social planner observes skill types, while
the agents are privately informed about their xed cost types only. Proposition
3.9 studies optimal utilitarian income taxation given this information structure.
Then, the social planner can use skill types for tagging, i.e., can condition un-
employment benets as well as tax payments directly on an agent’s skill type.
Proposition 3.9 is proven by a series of lemmas.
Lemma 3.21. In every implementable allocation, there is a unique xed cost thresh-
old type δ˜j ∈ ∆ for each skill level ωj ∈ Ω such that each agent with skill type ωj
and
(i) xed cost type δ > δ˜j is unemployed and consumes a skill-specic benet
bj ∈ R,
(ii) xed cost type δ ≤ δ˜j provides positive output y(ωj, δ) > 0 and enjoys a gross
(of the xed cost) utility c(ωj, δ)− h
[
y(ωj, δ), ωj
]
= zj = bj + δ˜j .
Proof. For part (i), consider agents with two xed cost types δ and δ′ 6= δ such
that y(ωj, δ) = y(ωj, δ
′) = 0. Incentive compatibility requires that c(ωj, δ) =
c(ωj, δ
′) = bj , which represents the unemployment benet. For part (ii), consider
agentswith two xed cost types δ and δ′ 6= δ such that y(ωj, δ) > 0 and y(ωj, δ′) >
0. Incentive compatibility requires that c(ωj, δ) − h
[
y(ωj, δ), ωj
]
= c(ωj, δ
′) −
h
[
y(ωj, δ
′), ωj
]
= zj . Note that incentive compatibility does not imply pooling
of all workers with skill type ωj . For the threshold type δ˜j , a worker with type
(ωj, δ) prefers his bundle to (bj, 0) if and only if c(ωj, δ) − h
[
y(ωj, δ), ωj
] − δ =
zj − δ ≥ bj , i.e., if δ ≤ zj − bj = δ˜j . Symmetrically, unemployed agents prefer
bundle (bj, 0) to the bundle of any worker if and only if δ ≥ zj − bj = δ˜j .
Lemma3.22. An allocation is Pareto ecient in the set of implementable allocations
if and only if, for each skill type ωj ∈ Ω, all workers are allocated the same bundle
(cj, yˆj) with undistorted labor supply at the intensive margin.
Proof. By Lemma 3.21, each worker with type (ωj, δ) is indierent between his
bundle
(
c(ωj, δ), y(ωj, δ)
)
and the bundles of all other types (ωj, δ) such that
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δ ≤ δ˜j . With observable skills, the social planner does not have to satisfy in-
centive compatibility constraints between agents with dierent skill types. Thus,
the social planner can allocate to all workers with skill type ωj the bundle (c, y)
whichminimizes (c−y) subject to c−h(y, ωj) ≥ zj . By Lemma 3.3, the solution to
this problem is given by yˆj , i.e., undistorted labor supply at the intensive margin.
The consumption level cj follows as cj = zj + h
(
yˆj, ωj
)
. If a positive measure of
agents would provide some positive output y 6= yˆj , then giving them instead bun-
dle (cj, yˆj) and redistributing the saved resources lump-sum to all agents without
violating any IC constraint would lead to a Pareto improvement.
Lemma 3.23. In any utilitarian allocation, labor supply is strictly downward dis-
torted at the extensive margin with δ˜j ∈
(
δ, sˆj
)
in all skill groups.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.21 and 3.22, the Lagrangian for the problem of optimally
redistributing resources within skill group ωj can be written as
Lj =
∫ δ˜j
δ
gj(δ)U
[
cj − h
(
yˆj, ωj
)− δ] dδ + [1−Gj(δ˜j)]U [bj]
+ λj
[
Gj(δ˜j)
(
yj − cj + bj
)− bj − A− j] ,
with δ˜j = cj − h
(
yˆj, ωj
) − bj if δ˜j ∈ (δ, δ¯). Assume for the moment that the
latter is true. Combining the rst-order conditions with respect to bj and cj , the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint equals the average
social weight in skill group ωj , given by
λj =
∫ δ˜j
δ
gj(δ)U
′
[
cj − h
(
yˆj, ωj
)− δ] dδ + [1−Gj(δ˜j)]U ′ [bj] .
The rst-order condition with respect to bj reads
∂Lj
∂bj
=
[
1−G− j(δ˜j)
] [
U ′
(
bj
)− λj]− λjgj (δ˜j) [yˆj − cj + bj] = 0.
For δ˜j ∈
(
δ, δ¯
)
, the second bracket in this equation is positive by Assumption
DUR ω. The same is true for the second bracket. Thus, the optimal level of cj
must be smaller than yˆj + bj to satisfy the rst-order condition. For the threshold
cost type, this implies δ˜j = cj − h
(
yˆj, ωj
)− bj < yˆj − h (yˆj, ωj) = sˆj .
For δ˜j = δ, the rst-order condition with respect to bj cannot be satised. In
this case, all agents in this skill group would be unemployed so that λj = U
′(bj).
Then, yj − cj + bj = 0 would have to be true, implying δ˜j = sˆj . By Assumption
REM , this is however inconsistent with δ˜j = δ. Similarly, the FOC with respect to
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cj cannot be satised for the corner solution δ˜j = δ¯. Thus, labor supply is strictly
downward distorted with δ˜j ∈
(
δ, sˆj
)
in all skill groups.
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